

**INSIGHTS ON CITIZENS' VIEWS IN THE 2020-2022 PERIOD:**

# **EU INTEGRATION, KOSOVO-SERBIA RELATIONS, AND REGIONAL COOPERATION**



## Authors:

Gramos Sejdiu dhe Dea Fetiu

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The data presented in the report derive from the Western Balkans Security Barometer (WBSB) survey. WBSB is a new regional initiative launched by KOSS in 2020, implemented in cooperation with the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in Serbia and Center for the Study of Democracy and Governance (CSDG) in Albania, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). WBSB serves as an instrument to measure public perceptions in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia on different security-related issues. The findings demonstrate how citizens percept or are informed about the issues presented in this report. As such, the views presented in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the KOSS, BCSP, CSDG or NED.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report of Western Balkans Security Barometer analyzes the Kosovo citizens' perceptions on EU integration, Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations, and Regional Cooperation.

Over the course of our measurement period, the public perception of EU integration has consistently maintained a high level of support. In 2020, 92.5 percent of citizens expressed support, followed by 92.3 percent in 2021, and 94.2 percent in 2022. These findings indicate a stable and high level of support for the integration process, with no significant changes observed over the last three years.

Turning to the citizens' perceptions of the Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations and the dialogue process, the second part of the report highlights an increase in support for the dialogue among Kosovo citizens. In 2021, 74.3 percent expressed their support to the dialogue, which rose to 83 percent in 2022. Furthermore, the chapter touches upon the shift of citizens' perspectives on the impact of the dialogue on Kosovo – Serbia relations, with 40 percent of the respondents believing it had improved in 2022 compared to 14.6 percent in 2021.

A majority of respondents (68.8 percent) expressed support for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, indicating a positive inclination among Kosovo's population. Additionally, respondents consistently expressed support for free movement, information exchange, and the establishment of a common market for goods and workforce in the Western Balkans. When specifically asked about the Open Balkan Initiative, responses were very divided and varied over the years, with fluctuating levels of support and opposition.

Overall, the findings highlight the strong aspiration for EU integration and the continuation of the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue, with citizens understanding the complexity and challenges of both processes and the challenges ahead.

# INTRODUCTION

The process of European Union (EU) integration, the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the regional cooperation and the so-called “Open Balkan” have long been critical topics in the context of the Western Balkans. These endeavors hold immense importance for the region’s political stability, economic development, and regional cooperation. Public perceptions regarding these predicaments play a crucial role in shaping the aspirations, concerns, and expectations of the citizens directly affected by these processes. Understanding the dynamics of public opinion is essential for policymakers involved in these processes to foster dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, European integration and understanding of the “Open Balkan”.

This report is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter aims to examine the public perspective of EU integration in Kosovo, offering insights into citizens’ views on EU membership and their beliefs regarding the EU’s willingness to accept their respective countries as member states. By analyzing and comparing data collected over a three-year period (2020–2022), the report seeks to identify shifts or trends in public perceptions. The second chapter is divided into two subchapters: firstly, it examines the citizens’ perception of the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue process, focusing on their support for the dialogue and their opinions on the track of the dialogue; secondly, it analyzes citizens’ evaluation on the dialogue’s impact on relations between the two countries. The third chapter showcases the perspectives of citizens regarding regional cooperation, and identifies potential trends and shifts during the three-year measuring period.

Regarding methodology, the survey data for this report was collected within the framework of Western Balkans Security Barometer (WBSB) survey through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected respondents throughout Kosovo. The WBSB is a regional project led by Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) and the survey was simultaneously conducted in Albania and Serbia. KCSS is partnering with the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Governance (CSDG) in Albania and the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in Serbia to implement this project. Field research was conducted from 25th of September to 2nd of October 2022. The questionnaire for the survey primarily consisted of closed-ended questions in the form of five-point Likert Scale, followed by several open-ended questions without pre-defined options. The national sample for the survey featured 1,136 households. The first stage of drawing the sample was based in the administrative divisions of the Kosovo Police Regional Directorates, including the following eight districts: Ferizaj, Gjakova, Gjilan, Mitrovica South, Mitrovica North, Peja, Prishtina, and Prizren. The number of surveys conducted in each district was drawn in proportion to the population numbers for each municipality within the respective districts based on Kosovo’s 2011 population census. Within the municipalities, the sample was stratified into urban / rural sample based on the number of households in each area.




Random patterns were used to select households within the sampled locations, while the randomization within the households was based on the next adult birthday method. The data was verified in real time through field coordinators who visited a pre-defined sample of households after the completion of the survey in the respective households, through telephone contact with all respondents to confirm the adherence to the methodology and some of the key answers, and by analyzing the logical consistency of the answers when processing and analyzing the data. The margin of error is 3 percent with a confidence interval of 95 percent.

# CHAPTER 1: EU INTEGRATION

The process of European Union (EU) integration holds significant importance for the countries of the Western Balkans. The prospect of EU membership has long been seen as a key driver for political stability, economic development, and regional cooperation in the region. This chapter focuses on exploring and analyzing the public perceptions regarding EU integration in Kosovo. The chapter also offers a comparison of perceptions throughout the three last years. By analyzing and comparing data collected from 2020, 2021, and 2022, we try to identify any shifts or trends in public perceptions over time.




For Kosovo, public support for EU integration remained consistently high throughout the three years. In 2020, 92.5 percent of citizens expressed support for EU integration, and this figure only slightly decreased to 92.3 percent in 2021. However, there was a marginal increase in support in 2022, with 94.2 percent of citizens indicating their support. These numbers suggest that overall, there has been a stable and robust level of support for EU integration in Kosovo, with no significant changes observed over the three-year period.

**TABLE 1 WBSB 2020-2022 CITIZENS' SUPPORT ON THE EU INTEGRATION OF KOSOVO**

DO YOU SUPPORT THE EU INTEGRATION OF KOSOVO?		Yes	No	I don't know
		<b>2020</b> 	92.5%	3.2%
	<b>2021</b> 	92.3%	4.1%	3.6%
	<b>2022</b> 	94.3%	3.5%	2.2%

This edition of WBSB also asked the citizens about how they perceive EU's willingness to accept their respective countries into the Union. In this sense, the data shows some variations in respondents' perceptions of EU willingness over the three-year period. In 2020, 38.2 percent believed that the EU was willing to accept Kosovo as a member state, while 38.9 percent thought that acceptance would happen in the future (2+ years). However, there was a slight decrease in these numbers in 2021, with 33.6 percent expressing belief in the EU's willingness and 40.7 percent anticipating acceptance in the future. In 2022, there was a notable increase, with 45.6 percent perceiving EU willingness and 38.9 percent foreseeing acceptance in the future. These findings indicate some fluctuation in perceptions, but overall, a significant portion of respondents remained hopeful about the EU's willingness to accept Kosovo as a member state.

**TABLE 2 WBSB 2020-2022 CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS FOR EU'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT KOSOVO AS A MEMBER STATE**

DO YOU THINK THAT THE EU IS WILLING TO ACCEPT YOUR COUNTRY AS A MEMBER STATE?		Yes	Yes, but not in the near future (2+ years)	No	I don't know
		<b>2020</b> 	38.2%	38.9%	15.5%
	<b>2021</b> 	33.6%	40.7%	19.8%	5.9%
	<b>2022</b> 	45.6%	38.9%	11.8%	3.7%





# CHAPTER 2: KOSOVO – SERBIA DIALOGUE AND RELATIONS

The Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue, initiated in 2011, has provided a significant platform for addressing and resolving the complex issues surrounding the relations between the two countries. This bilateral dialogue, facilitated by the European Union (EU), holds high importance as it seeks to tackle longstanding political, social, and economic challenges in the region. Through this chapter, we try to analyze how Kosovo citizens’ see the dialogue process and the Kosovo–Serbia relations in general. The chapter is structured into two sections. Firstly, we examine the citizens’ perceptions of the Dialogue process, its success, and potential outcomes. Secondly, we analyze the citizens’ perceptions of the Kosovo–Serbia Relations in general.

## Chapter 2.1: The Dialogue process


When comparing Kosovo citizens’ perceptions of the Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue in 2021 and 2022, notable shifts in trends can be detected. In 2021, 74.3 percent of respondents expressed support for the dialogue, while 21 percent opposed it, and 4.7 percent claimed to be uncertain. In 2022, 83 percent of respondents expressed support for the dialogue, while only 13.5 percent opposed it. This data indicates a significant rise in support for the dialogue, reflecting a potential grow of understanding and appreciation for the value of the dialogue as a means to foster cooperation, stability, and a lasting solution between Kosovo and Serbia.

**TABLE 3 WBSB 2021-2022- CITIZENS’ PERCEPTION ON THE SUPPORT OF THE KOSOVO – SERBIA DIALOGUE**

DO YOU SUPPORT THE KOSOVO – SERBIA DIALOGUE?		Yes	No	I do not know/No opinion
	<b>2021</b> 	74.3%	21%	4.7%
<b>2022</b> 	83%	13.5%	3.5%	

In 2022, the WBSB also measured the perceptions of the respondents regarding the direction that the dialogue process is headed. The results reveal that 48.9 percent of respondents believe that the dialogue is heading in the right direction, while a significant portion (41.8 percent) expressed reservations, stating that they do not believe the dialogue is on the right track. An additional 9.3 percent of them responded with uncertainty regarding the direction of the dialogue.

**TABLE 4 WBSB 2022- CITIZENS’ PERCEPTION ON THE DIRECTION OF THE KOSOVO – SERBIA DIALOGUE**

DO YOU THINK THAT THE KOSOVO – SERBIA DIALOGUE IS GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?		Yes	No	I do not know
	<b>2022</b> 	48.9%	41.8%	9.3%

On another note, the citizens’ perceptions of Kosovo’s political shift can be seen in their assessment of the current government’s impact on the country’s position in the dialogue. Among the respondents, a majority (50.5 percent) believe that the current government has improved Kosovo’s position in the dialogue. A significant portion (33.5 percent) feel that the position remains unchanged, while a smaller percentage (10.3 percent) express concerns that the current government has weakened Kosovo’s position.

**TABLE 5 WBSB 2020-2022- CITIZENS’ PERCEPTION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF KOSOVO’S POSITION IN THE DIALOGUE BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT**

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT HAS IMPROVED KOSOVO’S POSITION IN THE DIALOGUE?		Yes, Kosovo’s position has improved	No, Kosovo’s position has weakened	No, Kosovo’s position remains the same	I do not know/No opinion
	<b>2022</b> ■		50.5%	10.3%	33.5%

When comparing the data from 2021 and 2022 regarding the trust in facilitators for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, similarities appear. In 2021, a majority of respondents, 49.8 percent, expressed their trust in the United States (US) to facilitate the dialogue, while only 4.3 percent placed more trust in the EU. Another significant proportion, 35.4 percent, believed that both the US and EU should jointly facilitate the dialogue while a small percentage, 5.5 percent, felt that neither the US nor the EU should get involved. In 2022, the trust in the US to facilitate the dialogue decreased slightly to 47.9 percent, while trust in the EU remained relatively consistent at 4.8 percent. The belief that both the US and EU should jointly facilitate the dialogue increased to 37.6 percent. The percentage of respondents who believed that neither the US nor the EU should get involved remained similar at 5.6 percent, and 4.1 percent had no opinion or were unsure. This data, paired with 90.8 percent of the respondents perception of US’ influence in Kosovo as positive,<sup>1</sup> reinforces the notion that Kosovo citizens place greater trust in the US compared to the EU as a facilitator of relations with Serbia

**TABLE 6 WBSB 2021-2022- CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THEIR TRUST ON WHO SHOULD FACILITATE THE KOSOVO – SERBIA DIALOGUE.**

WHO WOULD YOU TRUST THE MOST TO BE FACILITATORS IN THE KOSOVO – SERBIA DIALOGUE		I would trust the US the most	I would trust the EU the most	US and EU should facilitate together	Neither US nor EU should get	I do not know/ No
	<b>2021</b> ■	49.8%	4.3%	35.4%	5.5%	4.9%
	<b>2022</b> ■	47.9%	4.8%	37.6%	5.6%	4.1%

1 Western Balkan Security Barometer, 2022, <https://securitybarometer.qkss.org/>




## Chapter 2.2: Kosovo– Serbia relations

The WBSB throughout the last 3 years, regularly measured citizens' perceptions on the Kosovo–Serbia bilateral relations. In this context, this subchapter begins with analyzing the perceptions on the dialogue's impact in these relations.

In 2020, 17 percent of respondents believed that the dialogue had improved relations between the two countries, while 16.3 percent felt that relations had worsened. A majority (60.2 percent) perceived the relations as stagnant, and another 6.5 percent expressed no opinion. Moving to 2021, there was a slight decrease in the percentage of respondents who believed that the dialogue had improved relations, which decreased to 14.6 percent. Similarly, the proportion of those who felt relations had worsened decreased to 11.1 percent. The majority (69.4 percent) still perceived the relations as remaining the same, and 4.8 percent expressed uncertainty.

Nevertheless, in 2022, a substantial shift in perceptions is observed. The percentage of respondents who believed that the dialogue had improved relations increased to 40 percent, while the percentage of those who felt relations had worsened also increased to 17.8 percent. 37.8 percent perceived the relations as stasis, while a smaller percentage (4.3 percent) expressed uncertainty. These results highlight the impactful influence of last year's developments in the dialogue,<sup>2</sup> leading to significant changes in people's opinions. Notably, the percentage of respondents who perceived the relations as remaining the same has considerably decreased compared to the past two years, indicating a clear shift triggered by these developments.

**TABLE 7** WBSB 2020–2022– CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS ON THE IMPACT OF THE DIALOGUE IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE DIALOGUE HAS IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA?		Relations are worse	Relations are better	Relations are the same	I do not know
		2020 	16.3%	17%	60.2%
2021 	11.1%	14.6%	69.4%	4.8%	
2022 	17.8%	40%	37.8%	4.3%	

On the question on the citizens' perception on the potential consequences if the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia fails, the respondents provided varied viewpoints regarding the possible outcomes. Approximately 16.7 percent of the participants believed that the failure of normalization would lead to a direct conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. Another 16.1 percent expressed the concern that, in such case, the number of clashes between the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo and Serbia would increase. A significant part of respondents, 29.4 percent, opined that the failure of normalization would result in a continuation of the frozen conflict and the maintenance of the status quo. This viewpoint suggests a perception that the lack of progress in relations could prolong existing tensions and prevent any significant intent of a permanent solution. Moreover, 31.0 percent of participants believed that the failure of normalization would impede Kosovo and Serbia's integration into the EU, while a small percentage, 2.8 percent, indicated that they did not believe any of the listed consequences would occur.

<sup>2</sup> See 2022 dialogue developments on Kosovo Progress Report 2022, pg. 79, accessible here: <https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Kosovo%20Report%202022.pdf>

These results demonstrate the diverse range of perspectives reflecting the complex nature of the issue and its potential implications for Kosovo, Serbia, and the broader region, should the dialogue stagnate.

**TABLE 8 WBSB 2022- CITIZENS' PERCEPTION ON THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE DIALOGUE FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS FAILED BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA.**

WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE DIALOGUE FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS FAILED?		Direct conflict between Kosovo and Serbia	Increased clashes between Albanian and Serbian Communities	Frozen conflict and Status Quo continuing	Kosovo and Serbia failing in the EU integration processes	None of the above	I do not know/No opinion
	<b>2022</b> ■	16.7%	16.1%	29.4%	31%	2.8%	4.1%

Responses from 2021 to 2022 regarding the belief in reaching a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia appear to be uniform. In both years, 12 percent of respondents expressed the belief that such an agreement will never be reached. Similarly, 22 percent of respondents in both years were optimistic and believed that a final agreement would be reached in the near future. The majority of respondents, 61 percent in 2021 and 60.6 percent in 2022, shared the view that a final agreement will eventually be achieved but not anytime soon. These results indicate a continued sense of cautious optimism among the respondents, acknowledging the challenges involved throughout the dialogue process while holding onto the belief that a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is possible in the long term.

**TABLE 9 WBSB 2021-2022- CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF KOSOVO AND SERBIA REACHING A FINAL AGREEMENT.**

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT KOSOVO AND SERBIA WILL REACH A FINAL AGREEMENT?		Never	Yes, in the near future	Yes, but not any time soon	I do not know/ No opinion
	<b>2021</b> ■	12%	22%	61%	5%
	<b>2022</b> ■	12.2%	22.5%	60.6%	4.8%

Lastly, in 2022, the respondents were asked about their perception of the potential for a new war between Kosovo and Serbia. The results indicate that the majority, 45.2 percent, believed that the potential for a new war is non-existent, emphasizing a prevailing sentiment for stability and peace. Additionally, 32 percent of respondents viewed the potential as low, further reinforcing the notion that the likelihood of armed conflict is perceived to be minimal. However, a notable proportion, 14.6 percent, still expressed concerns, considering the potential for a high level of conflict. A smaller percentage, 5.5 percent, believed that the potential for a new war is very high, while noting that a small portion, 2.6 percent, either did not have an opinion or were uncertain about the matter. Overall, these findings suggest a common belief among respondents that the potential for a new war between Kosovo and Serbia is generally low or non-existent, indicating a hopeful optimism for continued peace and stability in the region.

**TABLE 10** WBSB 2022- CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS ON THE POTENTIAL OF A NEW WAR BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA.

DO YOU THINK THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR A NEW WAR BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA?		The potential is non-existent	The potential is low	The potential is high	The potential is very high	I do not know/ No opinion
		<b>2022</b> ■	45.2%	32%	14.6%	5.5%

# CHAPTER 3: REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE OPEN BALKAN INITIATIVE

Build upon the fundamental principles of the EU's Schengen Zone, the Open Balkan Initiative, spearheaded by the leaders of Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia seeks to remove barriers and promote a more seamless flow of goods, services, capital and people across the region.<sup>3</sup> While this initiative holds a significant potential to enhance regional stability, strengthen economic ties, and facilitate the EU integration processes for all the nations of the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH), Montenegro and Kosovo have been reluctant on joining the initiative for various reason. BiH's complex internal affairs have split the Serbian entity in supporting the initiative, while the Bosniak and Croat entity rejecting it.<sup>4</sup> Montenegro has too expressed a lack of belief in the initiative, quoting that "the country is furthest along the path to EU membership, no new initiative should jeopardize this trajectory"<sup>5</sup> Kosovo's media and leadership have continuously portrayed it as a platform in which Kosovo isn't represented equally as other parties,<sup>6</sup> therefore, this initiative has become a political tool that is not evaluated for its contents. This chapter aims to provide important insight into the Kosovo's citizens' perception of the Open Balkan, their support on free movement and transportation of goods and services and the common perception of the Open Balkan Initiative as a whole idea.

Over the course of the three-year period from 2020 to 2022, the question regarding support for the idea of the "Mini-Schengen of the Western Balkans", later referred to as the "Open Balkan" Initiative was posed to the respondents. The responses varied across the years, revealing some fluctuations in public opinion. In 2020, 38.3 percent of respondents expressed their support for the said initiative, with a majority opposition of 53.1 percent. The following year, the percentage of supporters increased to 42.2 percent with the proportion of those opposed slightly decreasing to 52.4 percent. However, in 2022, there was a significant shift, as the number of respondents supporting the initiative decreased to 31.4 percent, while those opposing it remained stable at 51.9 percent. Interestingly, the percentage of respondents who expressed uncertainty or did not have a clear opinion rose considerably in 2022, reaching 16.7 percent. These findings highlight the varying attitudes among the Kosovo population and clearly emphasize the need for further analysis on the detrimental impact of media portrayal and coverage on public perception.

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3 Elezi, Elona. "Open Balkan' Could Worsen Political Problems in Region – DW – 08/18/2022." dw.com, August 18, 2022. <https://www.dw.com/en/open-balkan-initiative-risks-aggravating-political-problems-in-the-region/a-62834261>.

4 Gaarmann, Margit Wunsch. "The 'Open Balkan' Initiative Complements the Berlin Process." Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), November 8, 2022. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-open-balkan-initiative-complements-the-berlin-process>.

5 Ibid.


6 "Kurti Rejects Invite to next Open Balkan Summit." Prishtina Insight, June 3, 2022. <https://prishtinainsight.com/kurti-rejects-invite-to-next-open-balkans-summit/>.

**TABLE 11** WBSB 2020–2022 – CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THEIR SUPPORT ON THE IDEA OF THE CREATION OF THE SO-CALLED “MINI-SCHENGEN OF WESTERN BALKANS”, LATER RENAMED TO THE “OPEN BALKAN INITIATIVE”.

DO YOU SUPPORT THE IDEA OF THE CREATION OF THE SO-CALLED “MINI-SCHENGEN OF WESTERN BALKANS”, LATER RENAMED TO THE “OPEN BALKAN INITIATIVE”?		Yes	No	I do not know/No opinion
		<b>2020</b> 	38.3%	53.1%
<b>2021</b> 	42.2%	52.4%	5.4%	
<b>2022</b> 	31.4%	51.9%	16.7%	



On another note, when asked about their support for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, a significant majority of respondents (68.8 percent) expressed a positive inclination towards fostering such cooperation. Conversely, a notable 24.5 percent expressed opposition to the initiative, while a smaller percentage (6.7 percent) stated that they did not have an opinion on the matter. These findings reflect a diversity of perspectives within the Kosovo society regarding the importance and potential benefits of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. Paired with results from other questions in this chapter, they highlight the need for further exploration and well-informed information of the population on the benefits of economic, political and social interconnectivity in reconciliation efforts.

**TABLE 12** WBSB 2022 – CITIZENS’ PERCEPTION ON REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.

DO YOU SUPPORT REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS?		Yes	No	I do not know/No opinion
		<b>2022</b> 	68.8%	24.5%

In both 2021 and 2022, WBSB measured the respondents’ stance on their support for free movement, exchange on information, and the establishment of a mutual market for goods and workforce in the Western Balkans. The results indicate a consistent trend of support for these aspects of regional cooperation and integration. In 2021, approximately 67.2 percent of respondents expressed their support, while in 2022, the percentage increased to a small extent to 69.9 percent. On the other hand, a significant part of respondents expressed opposition to these measures, with 25.6 percent in 2021 and 24 percent in 2022 expressing their disagreement. These findings underscore the complexity of public opinion in Kosovo regarding the specific components of regional cooperation and integration, emphasizing the need for further analysis to understand the underlying factors that shape these perspectives.

**TABLE 13** WBSB 2021-2022 – CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THE SUPPORT OF FREE MOVEMENT, INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND A COMMON MARKET FOR GOODS AND WORKFORCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.

DO YOU SUPPORT FREE MOVEMENT, INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND A COMMON MARKET FOR GOODS AND WORKFORCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS?		Yes	No	I do not know/No opinion
		<b>2021</b> 	67.2%	25.6%
<b>2022</b> 	69.9%	24%	6.1%	



# CONCLUSIONS

The stable and high level of support for EU integration in Kosovo, coupled with the positive perception of the EU's willingness to accept the country, highlights the importance of EU integration as a significant aspiration for Kosovo. Throughout the three-year measurement period, citizens of Kosovo have consistently demonstrated unwavering support for EU integration, with only minimal differences observed. Despite variations in respondents' views over this period, a substantial proportion of respondents remained hopeful about the EU's readiness and willingness to accept Kosovo as a Member State now or in the future.

Furthermore, the perceptions of Kosovo citizens regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations have provided insights into the dynamics of the dialogue process and the overall sentiment within the country. The data gathered from the WBSB showcased a complex range of opinions and perspectives. While there were fluctuations in the perception of the dialogue progress, a consistent theme emerged: a wish for improved relations and a resolution to the longstanding issues between Kosovo and Serbia. Most respondents expressed hope for a final agreement, albeit acknowledging the challenges and uncertainties involved. These findings underscore the importance of sustained dialogue, trust-building measures, and continued efforts by both sides and the international community to achieve a sustainable and comprehensive resolution to the Kosovo-Serbia relations, paving the way for a peaceful and prosperous future for both nations and the broader region.

On another note, the Open Balkan Initiative and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has also been a subject of analysis and evaluation in this report. The data collected shows evident perceptions that a majority of Kosovo citizens support regional cooperation, free movement and trade. However, when specifically asked about their support for the idea of the Open Balkan Initiative, the responses are divided, with a significant portion expressing skepticism or lack of opinion. The findings highlight the complexity of media impact and political narratives, diversifying and influencing public opinion. Moving forward, it is crucial to consider these perspectives and address concerns and misconceptions through transparent communication and inclusive decision making, especially with the aim of fostering and building regional cooperation and common initiatives.

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