Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Kosovo

1999–2009

DCAF

KCSS
Kosovar Center for Security Studies

BCBP

Civil Society Capacity Building to Map and Monitor Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans, 2009-2011

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CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASZ	Airspace Security Zone
BIRN	Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GZO	Ground Security Zone
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICO	International Civilian Office
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISRPO	Institute for Strategic Research and Public Opinion
ISSR	Internal Security Sector Review
KFOR	International Military Presence
KIA	Kosovo Intelligence Agency
KIPRED	Kosovar Institute for Policy Research
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KP	Kosovo Police
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
MMA	Monitoring, Mentoring, and Advising
MNTF	Multinational Task Force
MoIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoKSF	Ministry of Kosovo Security Force
MTO	Military Technical Operation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Governance
SHIK	Kosovo Intelligence Service
SRSG	Special Representative of Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

PREFACE

The sensitivity of the Kosovo case makes for a myriad of complexities with relation to Security Sector Reform (SSR). The transitional process in Kosovo formally began with the termination of hostilities in 1999, though the immediate post-war period was predominantly devoted to recovery. However, compared to other Western Balkan countries, the security sector in Kosovo has not been subject to reforms *per se*, rather it has been built from scratch with the support of the international community. The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) were the two main institutions established during the UNMIK presence in Kosovo. Since the declaration of independence in 2008, the new security architecture has developed in accordance with the Ahtisaari proposal for the final status of Kosovo.

This paper will concentrate on the context analysis of the security sector in Kosovo; firstly, it will assess the post-conflict period and the efforts for democratisation and security sector development (1999-2005); secondly, it will go on to elaborate upon the demands for reform (2005-2008), and finally, it will summarise the recent developments in security architecture (2008-present). As a whole, therefore, it is designed mainly for institutional analysis, omitting completely information on the post-conflict and democratisation processes which have occurred in Kosovo. Although the range of the material gathered is wide, it was not within the scope of this research to evaluate specifically the threats and risks present in Kosovo, as this issue would require the writing of a separate paper in order to adequately report on it.

This paper constitutes part of the research activities undertaken within the framework of the regional project, "Civil Society Capacity Building to Map and Monitor SSR in the Western Balkans". The research conducted for the purpose of this paper took place during the period of June – December 2009. Considering the lack of academic and professional literature in this sector, it is expected that this paper will become a reliable primary resource for students, researchers, government officials, and members of the international community who wish to study the security sector.

INTRODUCTION

After the end of the war in 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1244, which finalised the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo, required the demilitarisation of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and urged the return of refugees to Kosovo. The Resolution foresaw the deployment of the UN civilian administration known as the UNMIK as well as the NATO military mission to restore peace, order, and security in Kosovo (UNSC Resolution, 1999). During the period of the international administration, the uncertain political status of Kosovo warranted the high priority of the security sector among the international actors. Resolution 1244 was the *raison d'être* of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), which held *reserved responsibility*[1] over this sector until Kosovo declared independence on 17th February, 2008.

The nine-year period from 1999 to 2008 marked the creation of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)[2], built from scratch with the support of the international community, and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which was established as the result of the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and also played a significant role, especially in civil protection tasks. In addition, the post-conflict period found a destroyed judiciary with a very weak infrastructure and few trained personnel, who had primarily worked within the former Yugoslav system. However, as it will be elaborated throughout the text, until 2004, local ownership in the security sector was barely conceived of, and the UNMIK authorities expressed little, if any, intention to realise the concept. In other words, there was little to no local say in the consolidation of the security sector.

The cycle of institutional development, as well as UNMIK's executive power in the security sector, has been seriously challenged as the result of some events, with particular reference to the riots that occurred on 17 and 18 March, 2004. While one may admit that the violent riots that occurred in 2004 had an impact on the further developments in Kosovo, it consequently led to a shift of approach which required, among other things, an internal security sector review (ISSR, 2006), which was jointly initiated by the UNMIK and the Kosovo Government. Consequently, the need for reform has since been affiliated with the negotiations regarding the final status of Kosovo, turning towards the new security architecture embedded in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.

Thus, bearing in mind the specific context of Kosovo with respect to the security sector, while the overall region does adhere to the cycle of security sector reform, Kosovo shows

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[1] Reserved responsibility is a definition used by UNMIK which marked the executive authority of SRSG over the key domains in Kosovo.

[2] The text will refer to the KPS (Kosovo Police Service) or KP (Kosovo Police) which is the same institution but it changed the name from KPS to KP by 2008. The reader shall not be confused.

an exception in this regard, as its dominant context was a formative one. The security sector in Kosovo was constructed from scratch, and one may observe a great gap with the institutional interaction between the Yugoslav socialist system as well as the repressive Milosevic regime on the one side, and with the post-conflict period on the other. For instance, from an institutional perspective, though in different circumstances, only the civil defence mechanisms and a part of the judiciary have remained functional since the pre-1999 period and, thus, have been the only mechanisms subject to reform. Notwithstanding institutional capacity building, the need for altering the mindset among former KLA combatants and former Yugoslav officers and civil servants was inevitable.[3]

Due to this cycle of security sector development in Kosovo, the KCSS team has summarised these processes into three discrete phases. The first of these addresses the period from 1999 until the end of 2005, where the UNMIK authorities held absolute power over the performance and functionality of all security institutions. This period focused on recovery measures and the attempts at engaging with the post-conflict legacy. As for the local institutions, it predominantly concentrates on the development of the structures of the KPS, as well as the events related to the KPC. The second phase, though shorter than the first, marks the primitive stages of the transfer of competencies and reforms between the security institutions. It concentrates on the period from the end of 2005 until the declaration of independence in 2008. However, while it does not substantially change the influence of the international community, it increases the power of the Kosovo Government, and democratic oversight mechanisms hence became more robust than before. The third phase is exclusively demarcated by the events that have occurred since the declaration of independence in February 2008, up until the present. This period marks the need for the consolidation of new security architecture, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Kosovo Police (KP) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) should be considered the main local security actors.

This paper aims to critically evaluate the context of the security sector development in Kosovo since 1999. It was not the intention of the research team to elaborate in detail each processes and actor, but rather to point out key issues so the reader could have a general overview of the security sector in Kosovo. This research could not get in depth into discussions on the judiciary, although it is an important part of the broader security sector. Indeed, this paper will provide an evaluation of each period, containing socio-political dynamics, briefly indicating risks and threats, and other diagnosis types related to security sector. Due to the unique situation in Kosovo, only KFOR and KP retained prominent roles throughout all three periods, whilst other institutions prevailed only during one or two of these periods. For this reason, it was in our interest to evaluate the

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3   The KPS and KPC were partly made up of former KLA members, as well as former military and police officers from the Ex-Yugoslav system.

role of KFOR, with particular emphasis upon its impact in the entire decade. In addition to that, the role of the KP is broken down over three periods and the leverage of the KPC will also specifically be assessed. Ultimately, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo allows for the establishment of new security institutions. The research team found it crucial to evaluate the establishment of the KSF as well as the international EU Rule of Law Mission, EULEX.

CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR IN KOSOVO

In 1999, the development of the security sector in Kosovo was faced with two major challenges: the post-authoritarian process, and most importantly, the post-conflict recovery measures. The withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo marked the end of hostilities, however, the repercussions of war were far greater than excepted. For the purposes of this paper, it is worthy to mention that after the abolishment of Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989, and the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the security institutions remained completely under the control of the Milosevic state apparatus. Thus, it did not provide security to the state and its people in an efficient and effective way. Yet more damaging, was that this state of affairs became a primary cause of instability (*Bryden & Hanggi* 2004: 15), and repression. In this way, since the security sector in post-conflict Kosovo was predominantly built from scratch as of this point onwards, any research conducted before 1999 has been discounted from this paper.

Since 1999, Kosovo has been ruled by the UN SC Resolution 1244, which allowed for the deployment of an international civil and military presence in Kosovo. In lieu of the security sector, the international military presence undertook the overall burden to deal with the task of public order. The tense ongoing political and security situation required the rapid establishment of police structures in order to respond to the internal risks and threats. From the conceptual point of view, the Kosovo case has more prerogatives for security sector development than SSR. Security sector development predominantly deals with the legacy of armed conflict, including the dissolution of military formations and their integration into new security structures and/or civilian life, in addition to the clearance of landmines and unexploded bombs or missiles (*Bryden & Hanggi 2004),* something which applies strongly in Kosovo's case.

One of the main concerns regarding security sector development in Kosovo has been the absence of local ownership. The international presence was very reluctant to transfer responsibility efficiently to local societies, and the efforts for rapidly 'Westernising' the security sector in Kosovo were not compatible with the level of democratisation and sensitive circumstances in Kosovo. There was absence of 'local say' in the overall developments of the security sector. While the local experts argued that the international community lacked trust to locals *(Qehaja 2004:56)*, the international argument rested on the weak consolidation of the locals, and their incapability to take over the competencies. Indeed, local actors need to be involved in security sector processes from the outset, in order to gradually build local capacity and allow for the eventual handover of responsibility from external actors, as difficult as this may be. Kosovo is an example where an externally-imposed security sector has not proved conducive to sustainable

reforms (Bryden & Hanggi 2004). This can be illustrated using the example of certain cases where there was a discrepancy between the policing techniques used by the KPS. Here, experts from different countries each presented their own domestic techniques, which jeopardised the uniform set of standards among the police, as the methods implemented were completely at discord with each other (ICG, Report: 2004).[4]

The reserved responsibility of the UNMIK over the security sector made the implementation of some of the main principles of SSR impossible, in particular the democratic control over security institutions. According to the legal framework, the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) had no executive or oversight competencies regarding KPS and KPC and the judiciary. This situation ensured neither efficiency nor transparency, which resulted in the lack of any quantifiable measurement of the performance of the security sector. Furthermore, during the first period, the parliamentary oversight of the KPS, KPC, and other security institutions was not functional. By 2004, the Kosovo Assembly had established a Parliamentary Committee on Emergency Preparedness, exercising oversight over the civil emergency services. However, this did not include the KPC or KPS. The gradual transfer of competencies made the assembly more proficient and resulted in the establishment of the Committee on Security in order to oversee KPS and other security structures, although this was still under constraint by the executive powers of the SRSG. The post-independence period required the consolidation of the Committee on Internal Affairs and Security. However, it had no oversight mandate over the Kosovo Security Force and Kosovo Intelligence Agency since separate oversight committees has been established accordingly. Overall, the development of the parliamentary oversight of security institutions has undergone three phases: lack of oversight, limited oversight, and finally, attempts to create comprehensive oversight (KIPRED, 2008: 5).[5]

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[4]   The absence of local ownership in the security sector development in Kosovo is a specific topic that could be addressed in details only in a separate paper
[5]   Also the process of the consolidation of parliamentary oversight is in the same track with the periodization of the research

PHASE 1: THE OUTSET OF SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

(1999-2005)

This section will highlight the key socio-political dynamics of the period, and briefly touch upon the security risks and threats that occurred in the first six years after the end of the war. The general context is designed to refer to the role of UNMIK and domestic politics in the development of the security sector in Kosovo. A specific part is dedicated to institutional analysis, with the focus on the performance of KFOR and the consolidation of KPS and KPC.

General Context

Elaborating on the processes which took place from 1999 until 2005, the role of the SRSG (Special Representative of Secretary-General) was crucial, and the powers it was entrusted with by Resolution 1244 allowed the establishment of the UNMIK Pillar I – delegated to deal with security and justice (UNMIKONLINE, 2004). Thus, it concentrated the powers in the UNMIK SRSG level. Indeed, the indications that this type of 'status quo' situation was to change were not optimistic, and practically, this structure remained unmodified for nine years. UNMIK had the primarily responsibility to establish and monitor the local security institutions. However, apart from the strong role played by international actors, one should not discount the impact of local actors when considering the overall processes.

First of all, it is worth mentioning the role of political parties. On the one hand, there were political parties emerging from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), such as Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and Alliance for Future of Kosovo (AAK), and on the other hand, there was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), an older political formation dating back to the period of peaceful resistance during the 1990s. PDK was the largest political party emerging from the KLA structures. Hashim Thaçi, the leader of PDK was previously the Political Director of KLA, and after the establishment of the Provisional Government in March 1999, he was appointed to the position of Prime Minister.[6] Thaçi became a key political figure concerning the negotiations for the demilitarisation of KLA and transformation into KPC.[7]

Apart from the KPC, the influence of political parties appeared also to be over the establishment of Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and other security mechanisms. Therefore, this provisional government, and later on, the PDK, played a crucial role in the security

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[6] This Provisional Government has been established according to the Rambouillet Agreement though it never received international recognition.

[7] For more details about the number of KLA members and transformation into KPC see: ICG, What Happened to KLA? 2000

sector reconstruction processes in Kosovo. In this initial period, the LDK appeared to be less dominant as far as the security sector was concerned. However, due to the PDK's poor results in the first post-conflict elections, which occurred not only as a result of the strong popularity of LDK's leader Rugova, but also because of the shortcomings of PDK's which had to do predominantly with the behaviors of some of the former combatants, it triggered LDK to reconsolidate its structures and to establish a strong role at both the local and central levels. Nonetheless, despite the LDK's positioning after the 2000 elections, its dominance in the security sector development was continually overshadowed by the power and dominance of the former combatants.

Besides the impact of political parties, the sensitive political situation and tense inter-ethnic relations greatly influenced the development of the security sector in Kosovo. The Serbian community's reluctance to be part of the local security institutions shaped the overall efforts for institution-building, and further complicated the process of democratisation. However, as will be analysed in the institutional section, the participation of the minority, and particularly Serbian, community in the police service was of a satisfactory level. Conversely, the representation of the Serb community in the KPC was barely evident and the reactions against this institution were continually strong. The reason for this was that the KPC's affiliation of with the former KLA made for very difficult cooperation between the Serbian community and the KPC. Consequently, the trustworthiness of the institution was perceived as very low among the Serb community (UNDP, 2006, 2007). While the international community and local security institutions publicly invited the Serbs inhabitants to join the KPC, practically, these attempts did not produce tangible outcomes. One of the internationally required democratic standards, the so-called Standard 8, required the consolidation of KPC with a specific emphasis on the inclusion of Serbs. Overall, despite addressing consistently this issue, the process of minority integration into the security institutions in Kosovo should be considered as one of the main challenges facing the sector.

In addition to the inclusion in the security institutions, the presence of the parallel structures of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and civilian and military intelligence structures of Serbia, as well as a parallel judiciary system in the Serb-inhabited areas, especially in the Northern regions of Kosovo, (ICG 2005: 4) weakened the influence of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), particularly the police. In other words, the Kosovo institutions had little-to-no access to the Northern part of Kosovo and this constrained the overall efforts for strengthening the rule of law in the entire territory of Kosovo.

The post-conflict period underlined this fragile situation, and encountered various types of security risks and threats in the local and regional level. As for the key external threats,

this period saw conflict in the Presevo Valley and Macedonia, both of which involved the Albanian community there. Indeed, these two conflicts had a direct impact on the security situation in Kosovo, serving to keep the inter-ethnic relations tense. Furthermore, it kept the 'war cataclysm' retained within the Kosovo population.

The events of March 2004 backed up the comprehensive desire to strengthen democratic institutions. It marks the violent riots, which started after the media announced the headline news that three Albanian children in Northern Mitrovica had drowned in the river. One of the children who survived claimed they were attacked by Serb villagers. The extensive media reporting on the case has been considered as a 'turning point' for the violent demonstrations which exploded all over Kosovo. However, there is still no clear scenario that gives a real explanation for the occurrence of riots at that time. According to the sources, around thirty riots broke out across Kosovo involving more than 50,000 violent demonstrators (HRW, 2004: 3). This resulted in the widespread displacement of refugees, especially from the Serbian communities. The destruction of private property owned by Serbs was high; in particular, several Serbian Orthodox Churches were burned down, severely damaging the cultural heritage in Kosovo. These riots resulted in the deaths of 19 civilians - 11 Albanians and 8 Serbs.

As will be explained in the institutional section of this paper, these events further proved the inefficiency and weak capacity of UNMIK and KFOR to tackle violent demonstrations. Following these events, a review of the UNMIK mandate was considered crucial, as UN officials faced calls from UN Security Council members and non-governmental experts to decrease the size and scope of the Kosovo mission. As a result of the inabilities exhibited, frustration and scepticism towards UNMIK started to grow throughout the population. The UNMIK interpretation of Resolution 1244 and also the SRSG reserved responsibilities made difficult any further development of Kosovo's security institutions. Stagnation of the economic situation and issues surrounding the political status of the country also sparked an escalation of the population's passion.

As a final point in the general context for this period it is worth mentioning the attempts at creating effective civil emergency mechanisms. The civil emergency structures were reformed with the support of the international community, and thus became one of the first domains to be transferred to the locals (Constitutional Framework, 2001). Whilst there has been a specific Department for Civil Security co-headed by the local and international authorities, this department has been transferred to the Ministry of Public Services of the PISG. In 2005, these structures became subject to the planning of the Department for Emergencies at MoIA, though more powers to the local municipalities linked these structures directly with the mayor. The reform of the civil defence structures,

and in particular the Fire and Rescue Services, have been appreciated by the international community. Practically, Kosovo might be used as an example of the successful reform of civil emergency structures in the region, and of its investments, as well as the compatibility with the contemporary civil protection (Shalimanov 2009: Obs).

Institutional Analysis

This part evaluates institutional dominance and performance from 1999-2005. Throughout this period, KFOR retained 'hard security' responsibilities and was, therefore, the most dominant in the sector. As for the local security institutions, this period marked the increasing role of KPC and KPS.

International Military Presence

Since its deployment in 1999 under the Kumanovo Agreement, the international peacekeeping force, led by NATO, has taken a leading role in security and defence issues, and is seen as one of the main actors in this sector. In its capacity, KFOR has offered assistance to the local population and has provided policing and border control duties in fragile areas, most critically in the area to the north of the Iber River, where Kosovo governmental authorities have limited access and influence (ICG, 2005: 6).

The initial objective for the presence of KFOR in Kosovo was to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe in the wake of the 78-day NATO air campaign, enforce the withdrawal of Serbian forces, demilitarise the KLA and secure the country. KFOR derived its mandate from the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO, Serbia, and FRY. NATO was the only institution to oversee the technical agreement with respect to the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and Air Safety Zone (ASZ) with Serbia.[8]

By 2002, and with the operation's primary objectives achieved, the initial task force of 45,000 personnel had been reduced to 39,000 and the increasingly secure environment enabled further reductions to 17,500 by the end of 2003, under a process of 'normalisation'. However, the collapse of peace and stability during the March 2004 riots revealed KFOR as a paper tiger (ICG 2004: 16, 17), highlighting several major weaknesses within its chain

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[8] The Air Safety Zone was defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo border into the rest of FRY territory. It included the airspace above that 25-kilometre zone. The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo border into the rest of FRY territory. It included the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone. For more details see Kumanovo Agreement http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm

of command. The demonstrations reduced the country to a level of violence unseen since 1999, and by March 17 there were 19 people dead and hundreds wounded. However, it has repeatedly been questioned as to why KFOR failed to protect the citizens, in particular the Serb community, and quell the growing intensity of ethnic violence? Indeed, while there are several arguments answering this question, the most notable one is the statement of the former US Deputy Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, who admitted that, during the violence, "the restricted ability of troops to only operate under the NATO commander, with express permission from the capital, led to many troops remaining in their barracks".[9] In other words, some of the NATO contingents withdrew from the streets due to the orders they received from their national governments. These *national caveats* caused serious problems for KFOR when faced with large scale protests and violent mobs.

Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)

Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) should be considered as one of the main local actors during the first period and, indeed, at the top of the agenda in domestic politics. The KPC was established as a civil emergency organisation, employing 3052 active members and 2000 reservists. The KPC was predominantly composed of former KLA members under the strict scrutiny of KFOR and UNMIK KPC Coordinator Office. It has been modelled according to the French *Sécurité Civile*, and its mandate envisaged conducting emergency preparedness tasks such as providing assistance in case of natural or man-made disasters, defusing mines, ceremonial tasks, and humanitarian assistance. The training was carried out initially by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), followed by KFOR, UNMIK, and other actors.

Even though the legal framework delivered very limited tasks, public opinion at the time showed that KPC was one of the most trusted institutions in Kosovo[10] (UNDP, 2006), and comparing to the other public institutions, it repeatedly remained amongst the most trusted institutions, along with KFOR and KPS. The overall public perception represents the feel of a "uniformed" institution and the role of its predecessor - the KLA, for the Kosovo cause and the hopes of transforming it into the future military of Kosovo.[11] Even UNMIK's officials and some KFOR officers admitted (though never in public) that the KPC was a military-style organisation (ICG, 2000: 11). The senior officers of the KPC seemed to be influential, and their reactions in certain cases have been seriously taken into account by

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[9] See speech by Nicholas Burns, US Deputy Secretary of State,
    http://riga.usembassy.gov/EN/site/Z/a_nato/archive/nato20061122_2
[10] This was not the case with Serb community expressing no trust towards this institution and affiliating it to the KLA.
[11] This case might be similar to the other ex-Yugoslav countries where the military played an imperial role in the society. Even though KPC was not the military, the sense of perceiving it as the future military of Kosovo made this perception stronger. The KPC itself considered this institution as military.

the international community and the government. KPC took part in parades in the various ceremonies, and its presence in security activities deemed it one of the main actors at that time. The KPC was among the first to fulfil the internationally-required standards and a certain section of the senior officers has been praised for the fair campaign to incorporate the Serb community and other minorities into the KPC (ISSR, 2006).

Due to the reserved responsibility of the SRSG over the KPC, none of the activities have been conducted with public oversight of this institution. The UNMIK authorities tended to minimise the role of the KPC and excluded the possibility of democratic control or direct oversight by the Government. This made the oversight of this institution unique. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Committee on Emergency Preparedness and its successor, the Committee on Security exercised very limited oversight competencies on the KPC, further weakening efforts for democratic control. Regarding the media oversight, their glorious overall perception made the KPC "immune" in the face of the media criticism. Even the cases of corruption, discovered as a result of auditor's reports were, it could be said, reported by the media with a tone of surprise, which announced the incident as something not expected to happen (Daily 'Express', 2007).

Kosovo Police Service (KPS)

The foundation of the KPS marks the start of building security sector capacities in Kosovo and represents the most important local security institution to date. As a completely new institution, KPS was established by September 1999 with the training provided by OSCE, which supported the endeavours of building a training centre in Vushtrri/Vucitrn. The OSCE and UNMIK had to build the KPS structures within a very short period, in order to participate in law and order operations. KPS achieved the building of basic structural capacities and the recruitment of personnel who were representative of all ethnic groups. At the time of its establishment, this institution was already quite multiethnic, with between 12 to 15% of its officers from the minority communities. The outreach campaign to attract women and minority groups, and the work of the international community at the 'grassroots' level encouraged these groups to be represented in the KPS. Apart from that, a weak economy and limited job opportunities further encouraged these groups to join the KPS.

In the operational dimension, KPS began to function in cooperation with KFOR and the UNMIK Police. KFOR's role was purely supportive and played a reduced role over time, relinquishing policing duties to the KPS and UNMIK Police, as the security situation was considered increasingly stable. The role of UNMIK was far more autocratic, subjecting KPS to detailed control, while retaining extensive capacities for the command, control, training

and monitoring of the KPS. Even though this control was necessary during the initial stages, the KPS developments meanwhile had little impact on changing the approach of UNMIK Police from its initial mandate (UNMIKONLINE 2004).

During this period, democratic control of KPS was hazy. The civil society had little to no access to the monitoring of its operability and functionality. Even the Kosovo Assembly lacked control over the police and the principles of democratic oversight were not embedded in the outset of the institutional consolidation. These obstacles created an impotence of the security institutions in Kosovo to deal with potentially difficult and threatening situations, proven by the riots of March 2004, when security institutions failed to offer a solution to calm the situation. Aside from these challenges and shortcomings, KPS achieved the earning of trust of society at large by being rated amongst the two most trusted local institutions in the country. For instance, in the period of January 2005-December 2006, the trend of the trust towards KPS varied between 81%-86%, while comparatively, the trust towards SRSG, UNMIK and Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) decreased from 81% to 34% and 24% (Early Warning, 2005, 2006). In other words, the public trust towards the KPS was consistent comparing to the relatively low public perceptions of the Kosovo Government and international civilian presence.

PHASE 2: **GRADUAL TRANSFER OF COMPETENCIES TO THE LOCALS (2005-2008)**

This part will elaborate the key political developments which had an impact on security sector development and, particularly, the role of non-statutory security actors. It will emphasise the process of internal security sector review. The role of KFOR, KPS, and KPC in this period will be mapped out in the institutional part.

General context

With the request of the Kosovo Government and UNMIK, the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR)[12], launched at the end of 2005, delineated one of the first steps towards changes as it fielded the recommendation for the gradual transference of responsibilities to be taken into account. This inclusive and participatory research identified shortcomings in UNMIK's security mechanisms. Furthermore, the ISSR research coincides with the period of negotiations for the final status of Kosovo, therefore, at least part of the recommendation was seemingly in compliance with Ahtisaari's plan.

By October 2005, the UN Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Kai Aide as the UN special envoy for the comprehensive review of Kosovo, who launched a report for the implementation of the so-called "Standards before Status". Mr. Aide concluded that, "while standards implemented in Kosovo have been uneven, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political process"(Kai Aide Report, 2005). This report opened the negotiations for the final status of Kosovo by entering it into a new political phase.

From an institutional perspective, only a thin line divides the first period from the second and there are no significant changes except the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and Ministry of Justice (MoJ). However, most importantly, the second period exhibits the outset of transferral of responsibility to locals. The local institutions in particular, became more robust. In this way, the second period 'bridges' the first and third periods by assuring the ability of the locals to take over responsibility for the security sector.[13] Even though it is not the focus of this paper, the second period,

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12   The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) in Kosovo was initiated by the Kosovo Government and UNDP in 2005 to take a holistic view of the internal security situation. The ISSR Kosovo programme was built on a threat assessment based on the most extensive public consultations undertaken in a security sector review.

13   It is worth mentioning a political and security challenge by 2006 which is related to the death of historical president of Kosovo, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova. There was a fear for the increase of political instability due to the clashes between two major political parties in the domestic politics in Kosovo. In addition to that, Rugova's

to some extent, marks the engagement of the PISG in foreign affairs. In particular, the Prime Minister's and President's 'shuttle diplomacy', for the purposes of the negotiations for the final status of Kosovo, challenged the competencies of the SRSG in this matter. With respect to the negotiations for the final status of Kosovo, they coincide with the dissemination of the Ahtisaari proposal in the beginning of 2007, which gave Kosovo supervised independence. The part of this proposal which referred to the security sector, was consequently embedded in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, and unveiled new security institutions and required the necessary reform of the current systems.

This period marked a more political type of risk, linked with the fate of the final status of Kosovo. As explained above, the process of political negotiations reflected in the security situation in Kosovo by keeping the situation uncertain. This has been demonstrated by the ongoing violent protests of the local movements, such as 'Vetëvendosje' (Self-Determination)[14], which openly opposed any negotiation or solution except for self-determination. However, compared to the immediate post-conflict period, the surveys showed that the main internal security threats in Kosovo have turned to economic insecurity such as unemployment, economic underdevelopment, and corruption (ISSR 2006), simultaneously replacing the traditional risk and threats.

Looking at the political arena, the government of Kosovo reflected the coalition between the LDK and AAK, thus, leaving the PDK out of the government and in the capacity of the first Parliamentary Opposition in Kosovo. The commitment of the LDK to keep on the Presidency allowed the AAK to take over the position of Prime Minister, though in the elections this political party made up approximately 7% of the electorate. The process of the transfer of responsibilities in the security sector made the AAK and LDK the leading organisations, as far as the establishment of MoIA and MoJ are concerned. The unification of attitudes among the ruling political parties and opposition political parties has been perceived as a common strategic approach leading towards the independence of Kosovo. This approach halted potential threats of governmental crisis, artificially retaining political stability.

It is also noteworthy to mention the activities of the *non-statutory security forces* in Kosovo. Indeed, non-statutory security forces have existed since the outset of post-conflict Kosovo, however, some cases during 2005 and 2006 unveiled the existence of at least two non-statutory intelligence services. First is SHIK - Shërbimi Informativ i Kosovës (the Kosovo Intelligence Service), affiliated with the PDK and established during the war by the Provisional Government of Kosovo. The second is the Institute for Strategic Research and Public Opinion (ISRPO), associated with the LDK. Their main role was to gather intelligence and conduct analysis, usually for the purposes of political parties, teams, or

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death occurred at the outset of the negotiations for the final status of Kosovo and the initial attempts for gradullay transferring the responsibilities to the locals.

[14]   For more details on Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) see http://www.vetevendosje.org/

individuals. According to claims made by the former chief of SHIK, they performed in lieu of the statutory intelligence service by filling the gaps, in these cases, for the sake of 'national and public good' (Veseli, 2009: Quoted). Considering the organisations' close relationship with their respective political parties, the SHIK and ISRPO, it is hard to believe that these institutions had no influence over the decisions of the political players. To summarise, the role of non-statutory security forces has been largely controversial.

Institutional Analyses

This period highlights the shift in dominance among security institutions. The beginning of the transfer of responsibility and the establishment of the MoIA automatically increased the dominance and performance of the KPS. However, the considerable presence of KFOR and its prominent role during the negotiations for the final status of Kosovo kept it on further as one of the main international actors. Also, the KPC continued to demonstrate the importance of its role.

International Military Presence

The new developments in Kosovo prompted the KFOR to adjust with new circumstances. It has been subject to substantial changes, converting from the 'stable' Multinational Brigades to five Multinational Task Forces (MNTFs)[15], and this transition process was aimed at improving the effectiveness of the forces and their ability to operate flexibly throughout Kosovo, without restriction. In addition, it placed a greater emphasis on intelligence-led operations, with the MNTFs working closely with both the local police and the local population to gather information. Throughout the 2007/2008 status negotiation, KFOR supported the efforts of the Ahtisaari Plan and assisted in maintaining safety and stability on the ground, allowing the negotiations to proceed without disruption. Despite the fear of eruptions, only a few small scale demonstrations have been registered.

Kosovo Police Service

By 2006, the relevant actors in Kosovo agreed that KPS should be subject to further developments, increasing its competencies as a consequence. Within KPS, the newly implemented units and structures, such as the community-led policing and local safety mechanisms, have been found to provide improved safety services to the country's citizens. KPS took on the responsibilities discarded by the UNMIK Police, and by starting to work

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[15]   The new architecture of the KFOR presence in Kosovo was split into five multinational task force: Multina-tional Task Force Centre based in Lipjan, MNTF North Based in Novo Selo, MNTF South based in Prizren, MNTF West based in Peja/Pec, MNTF East based in Ferizaj/Urosevac

as an independent force, it deemed that civilian and democratic control should become part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) structure.[16] By delegating the responsibility and authority of the KPS, civilian and democratic control - albeit weak - became more functional. Most importantly, the establishment of the MoIA during this period started to ensure civilian oversight of the KPS. The MoIA was initially a relatively small institution containing few departments. However, within a short period of time, this Ministry took on one of the largest numbers of public servants, retaining more employees than five comparable European countries (FRIDOM, 2009: 20)[17]

Kosovo Protection Corps

The dominance of the KPC remained high, due to domestic opinion for the need of transforming it into 'Kosovo Defence Forces' or at least a gradual transfer of some of the security competencies towards this institution (ISSR, 2006). Indeed, as explained above, the structure and chain of command of KPC was considered consistent with the military of other countries (ISSR, 2006). However, the mandate marginalised only civil emergency tasks and the status quo judged the KPC as elite, without any clear vision as well as a lack of dynamism, especially since 2007. To date, the KPC has been directly involved in some emergency response cases, such as the earthquake in Gjilan, floods, rescue missions, and reconstruction. However, it was constrained to assist other law enforcement mechanisms in the more 'security'-related tasks.

This period revealed several shortcomings, which consequently raised the demand for a reform of this newly established institution. Firstly, the influence of certain individuals (KPC senior officers) was considerable on the regions they came from. Especially in the immediate post-conflict period, this caused divisions and to some extent a negative impact on the performance of the KPC. There were too many high military ranks, relative to a shortfall in the lower military ranks, making the illustrative structure as that of an "upside-down pear". In addition, in some key situations, the senior officers of the KPC openly refused to obey the orders of the commander, due to their personal or group beliefs.[18] These specificities amongst the KPC, particularly drew the attention of the international community and in some cases, the relationship between some members of KPC and KFOR became increasingly tense (James, 2003: 5). Ahtisaari's plan (2007) foresaw the honourable disbandment of the KPC, and the dissatisfaction of this proposal was vented through all mediums, including violent demonstrations. The dissatisfaction

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[16]   One of the main internal control mechanisms is the Kosovo Police Inspectorate - a civilian body created to control and monitor the efficiency of the police and to investigate any possible police violations.
[17]   The research conducted by FRIDOM indicated that, comparatively speaking, the MoIA of Kosovo is larger than five out of six of the EU countries (by population size): Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland.
[18]   During the funeralceremony of Kosovo President, Ibrahim Rugova in 2006, the Commander of KPC Guard, General Nuredin Lushtaku refused to obey the orders of the Commander of KPC, General Agim Ceku for engaging the ceremonial team for the purposes of the funeral ceremony.

erupted during January and February 2009, where a group of former KPC members did not pass the vetting of KFOR to be recruited for the KSF, and some of them were demoted.

PHASE 3: **NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (2008 - PRESENT)**

This section will indicate the key developments in the post-independence period. It will highlight the new security architecture embedded in the legal framework. The institutional part will touch upon the role of KFOR and KP; the recently deployed EULEX mission and the emerging KSF.

General context

Since the declaration of independence in 2008, the legal framework has allowed for the completion of the security sector in accordance with Kosovo's requirements and needs. According to the Constitution, "The Republic of Kosovo has authority over law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response, and border control within its territory" (Constitution 2008: Art. 125). Literally, the security sector became a burden for the Kosovo Government. However, the role of EULEX, regarding security issues and KFOR's peacekeeping and peace building mandate, is widely accepted. The establishment of the International Civilian Office (ICO), in the capacity of 'watchdog' for the implementation of the provisional Ahtisaari settlement, held the authority to intervene in case of changes or discrepancies in the development of the security sector. The justice sector remains one of the weakest sectors of the post-independence period (EULEX, 2009: 4). Despite the increasing efforts of international community, the results to date are very limited, which keeps the public dissatisfied with the judiciary (BIRN, 2009: 8).

The Kosovo Government is in the early stages of developing its security policies, with the exception of defence policies, which the constitution did not foresee. Currently, none of the security institutions are designed to conduct defence tasks except KFOR. By analysing the current legal framework and its developments, it is evident that the security sector in Kosovo concentrates on the protection of public security and the rights of the people in Kosovo, in compliance with the general benchmark for creating a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Compared to the two previous periods, the legal framework foresees a more 'robust' democratic control of the security institutions (Constitution, 2008). However, it is still too early to evaluate the results as far as this is concerned.

Compared to the previous periods, the power of political parties in this sector increased simultaneously with the decline of external dominance. The political scene was heavily controlled by the PDK, which in the late-2007 elections became the largest political party

in Kosovo. As such, this government was the most important since the post-conflict period, and thus the discourse of political stability was the *reason d'etre* that the old opponents - PDK and LDK - were brought into government. The coalition, made up of the two major parties has been widely criticised as artificial, and as a consequence the political scene reflected a relatively weak opposition power. Moreover, the PDK exercised almost absolute supremacy compared to its partner by sidelining any effort for 'joint control' over the development and reform of the security sector in Kosovo. Indeed, the PDK dominated key political institutions, such as the position of Prime Minister, the MoIA and the Ministry of KSF, while the LDK retained the MoJ.

The declaration of independence went ahead with fewer incidents than expected, not discounting the political risks and threats created due to the objections to Kosovo's statehood. The efforts of the officialdom in Belgrade to block the recognition process had an impact on the socio-political and security developments in Kosovo. In particular, Kosovo's diplomatic situation was seriously challenged and efforts to gain membership into international organisations were paralysed, due to the influential veto of Russia and other opponents.

Institutional Analysis

The mapping of the security institutions in the post-independence period reflects their positioning in the Constitution and the apparent new security architecture. Indeed, the role of local security institutions increased, though to some extent, the dominance of the international bodies present in Kosovo should not be underestimated. This is, therefore, a sign of the power and performance of Kosovo Police and Kosovo Security Force on one side, and also it marks the role of EULEX and KFOR on the other. One may not discount the role of Kosovo Security Council as a deliberative and coordination body. However, this research does not intend to specifically address its role.

Kosovo Police

The Kosovo Police Service exhibits new roles, structure as well as modification of its name into the Kosovo Police derived from the new Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The new Law on Police, which entered into force in mid-2008, makes necessary reforms among the police structures. First of all, it ensures civilian control over the police – it is directed and managed by the MoIA, it directs the rights of police officers towards reaching European standards, provides a clear chain of command, and specifically addresses the functionality of local police stations in the areas inhabited by a non-majority community (Law on KP, 2008). The necessity for these major changes makes this phase one of the most important periods of reform that the Kosovo Police have experienced, and has heralded the beginning of an increase in the involvement of civil society and the democratic control of security institutions.

In overview of the current situation, the Kosovo Police are dealing with various difficulties which include functional and organisational problems, tentative cooperation with the Criminal Courts, unreliable international cooperation (including cooperation with neighbouring state police), re-integration of the Serb community, and so on. Functional and organisational difficulties in Kosovo have arisen as a consequence of being a relatively new institution. Despite the progress on building a modern police structure and the ongoing attempts for reform, the reputation of the Kosovo Police has been shaped by several events. The most obvious of these involves the 'robbery' at the Kosovo Police HQ in April 2009, where a considerable number of weapons, drugs, and important documents totalling to a value of more than a million Euros mysteriously disappeared. Likewise, the events in the Northern part of Kosovo revealed shortcomings in terms of command and control, and the chain of command was found to be completely dysfunctional,[19] causing reactions amongst the public opinion.

International cooperation is also a challenge to KP, and its approach to regional cooperation is predominantly dependent on the political dimension, making progress in this area problematic. Experience has shown that excellent levels of collaboration of the Kosovo Police with the neighbouring countries of Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia can be achieved. However, there is a lack of official cooperation with Serbia due to its attitude towards the independence of Kosovo.[20] These challenges are particularly evident regarding the sensitive issues related to the Integrated Border Management (IBM) in the areas where Kosovo shares approximately 350 km out of the 740 km total border line with Serbia (IBM Strategy, 2009: 5). It should also be noted that the lack of cooperation with the Serbian Police also challenges the efforts for overall regional cooperation.

Kosovo Security Force (KSF)

The KSF belongs to a group of newly established, post-independence institutions. Although KSF has a civilian mission similar to that of the Kosovo Protection Corps, there is no official continuity between these two institutions. Indeed, the Kosovo Protection Corps was disbanded by the end of 2008, its mission considered accomplished, however, it is estimated that approximately 50% of former KPC members have been selected to serve in KSF (Kosovapress, 2009). The KSF, though initially designed only to exercise civilian protection operations, such as assisting civilian authorities in responding to natural and other emergencies (Kosovo Security Force 2009), has seen its mission build upon its original capacities, based on NATO standards. The basic concept refers to 'lightly armed multiethnic force which will be designed and prepared to fulfil other security functions,

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[19] In major cases, the Serbian community KP members operating in the North of Kosovo refused to obey the orders of Prishtina in specific cases

[20] There are some indications for inter-police cooperation with Serbia however that's only in the operational level.

not appropriate for the police or other law enforcement organisations' (Ahtisaari Proposal, 2007).

The structure of the KSF is likely to be considered unique compared with that of similar institutions found in other countries in the region. The process of building the KSF structures is still underway and the creation of Ministry of KSF (MoKSF) represents the first concrete step. The bottom structure of KSF will have 2,500 regular members and 800 reservists that will carry uniform, emblems, and will be lightly armed. Although the process of selection has been highly monitored and intense, it has also met with controversy and protest. The former KPC members belonged to the most dissatisfied groups since a part of them did not pass the vetting and were not selected. Furthermore, one of the main struggles of KSF has been with the inclusion of minorities in recruitment, particularly the Serb community.

The low number of personnel, light and low calibre weapons, limited tasks, and the close monitoring from the NATO/KFOR presence in Kosovo are also relevant arguments that KSF is developing in generating security in the region. Indeed, the role of KSF might be modified within the next five years, since the Law on KSF explicitly foresees that, "A full review of these limits is to be conducted no earlier than 5 years from the date this Law enters into force" (Law on KSF: Art 10.2)

Civilian and democratic control is a very important issue regarding the developments of KSF. The specific Parliamentary Oversight Committee on KSF has been established and it is difficult to measure the committee's effectiveness, since it is in the early stages of consolidation. Furthermore, the involvement of civil society and the media in the developments of KSF to date is considered to be limited.

EULEX

The post-independence period highlighted the deployment of the EULEX, widely considered to be the EU's largest civilian crisis management operation. This mission aims to monitor, mentor, and advise (MMA) the police, judiciary, and customs, and is aimed primarily towards achieving European standards and EU integration. However, the presence of EULEX in Kosovo is intended to be far more passive than that of UNMIK, with no intention to govern but with the aim of strengthening the rule of law institutions in Kosovo for the benefit of "all of its people" (ALSAT, 2009). It has retained a few executive powers with respect to organised crime and war crimes for use in exceptional circumstances (EULEX 2009). As well as providing assistance, it is intended to evaluate the systems and structures currently in place and identify areas which require future development and reform.

EULEX's benchmark for their MMA Mission has been to assist the Kosovo Police (KP), and, under the new motto of "local operability" it is announced that KP, not EULEX, will be in the lead. While the security situation has greatly improved in recent years, Kosovo's security is still challenged by organised crime and endemic corruption. In this regard, EULEX's initial task of note has been to help combat corruption and organised crime, which often go hand-in-hand.

However, while the police in Kosovo is in the process of reform in order to overcome the engrained attitude of corruption and the affiliation of many with organised crime, it is, nevertheless seen as the most efficient pillar of the security sector (Dagand, 2008: 38). Therefore, the main burden for EULEX lies in the major shortcomings of the justice sector. Future efforts need to concentrate on assisting local institutions to establish a solid legal and justice system that will provide a spearhead for combating corruption and serve to guarantee security and protection for all of Kosovo's people.

International Military Presence

Following the declaration of independence in February 2008, KFOR has taken on a new role, assisting in the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and the foundation of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and its civilian oversight structure. The number of troops is set to be downsized drastically by 2010 and then by a further 2,500 each year until 2011 (NATO –KFOR 2009). The NATO Heads of State have stressed that NATO stands ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008). Indeed, the normalisation of the security situation makes the KFOR presence more solid, if more in the psychological, rather than in the physical sense.

Despite some significant operational failings, KFOR's presence has been crucial in maintaining the safety and security of all individuals and communities in Kosovo. This is reflected in the consistently high levels of public trust and credibility - an uncommon concept for most local and international institutions operating in Kosovo. KFOR topped the public opinion poll of Kosovo's most trusted institutions conducted by the UNDP Early Warning Report, with a public satisfaction consistently of 80-90% over the past 4 years. (UNDP Kosovo, 2008)

CONCLUSIONS

The development cycle of the security sector in Kosovo is unique, when considering the SSR processes in the region. The core security institutions started to be built from scratch and there was no institutional correlation with the pre-conflict system(s). However, the main constraints related to the completion of the security sector had to with the overall

political development related to the fate of Kosovo. Its design heavily relied on the political negotiations for the status of Kosovo and the outcome. Thus, it took nine years to have an almost-complete security sector embedded in the legal framework.

The absence of local ownership in the overall developments in the security sector is an issue of concern. This research could not address in details the consequences of externally driven security sector models although it has been widely proven that lack of local context from the outset of institutional development could not correspond with the local needs. The first and second period highlights the exclusive internationally-driven security sector.

The development of democratic oversight in the first and second period has been hampered as the result of executive powers of the UNMIK SRGS. Parliamentary oversight started to consolidate simultaneously with the establishment of new security institutions in the post-independence period. However, its performance could not be assessed in this context analysis as it requires more specific research.

Finally, the role of the political parties, especially those emerged from the former combatants was dominant. The tendency of keeping the key security-related positions within the government confirms the political desire of certain political parties to retain control over the security institutions. In addition to that, the political affiliation with non-statutory intelligence actors has been proved accordingly.

ANNEX ON KEY POLITICAL ACTORS

Name of the actor: Democratic Party of Kosovo (Albanian: Partia Demokratike e Kosovës – PDK)			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
Political party emerged from the former KLA members

Affiliated to the war-wing individuals

Currently coalition party and major political party in Kosovo | Not yet profiled, although as most of parties in Kosovo, they pretend to be central wing party.

Their vision is to achieve the EU economical and political standards and create equality to all the community groups. | Main goals are to continue being the leading party and main governmental party in Kosovo.

Continuing its dominant role in the decision making processes

Using democratic and peaceful means but criticised by international community for pretending to be involved only so that they can rigourously control the state apparatus. | Established 1999 from the main officials of Political Directory of KLA

2000 – 2007 major opposition party. From 2007 until present, PDK became the ruling party and kept the position of Prime Minister and Chairman of Kosovo Assembly.

Led the process of declaration of independence in 2008

Involved in all processes of security sector development and reform in Kosovo |

Name of the actor: Democratic League of Kosovo (Albanian: Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës – LDK)			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
First post-socialist political party in Kosovo established in 1989

Affiliated to the figure of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova

Currently coalition party and second major political party in Kosovo | Not yet profiled though pretending to belong centre-right.

Jealously following the so-called "Philosophy of Rugovianism"

For a time period, affiliated with peaceful resistance | Re-positioning the LDK as the major political party

Continuing its dominant role in the decision making processes

Using democratic and peaceful means

Following the legacy of former President Rugova | From 1989 – 1999 LDK was affiliated with the peaceful movement and the final status of Kosovo settled peacefully.

Establishing and leading parallel institution during the Milosevic regime.

2000 – 2007 major political party in power

Since 2002 keeping the position of Kosovo President |

Name of the actor: Aleance for the Future of Kosovo (Albanian: Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës – AAK)			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
Political party emerged from the former KLA members

Affiliated to the war-wing individuals

Currently the fifth major party and the third major opposition party, | Not yet profiled, although as most of parties in Kosovo, they pretend to be right wing party.

For a time period, affiliated with post-armed resistance.

Their vision is to achieve the EU economical and political standards and create equality to all the community groups.

Strongly linked with the figure of Ramush Haradinaj (ex-KLA commander and former-Prime minister of Kosovo) who faced trial from 2005-2008 and upon his release, the prosecutions appeal prevailed by initiating retrial in 2010 | Main goals to turn into major political force and to retrieve their role in central institutions

Bounce back its dominant role in the decision-making processes

Using democratic and peaceful means

Tension relations with PDK and currently the most active political party in the opposition | Established 1999 from the ex-KLA members mostly from Dukagjini / Metohija region.

2000 – 2007 was third major party and from 2003, was in power coalition with LDK

Retained the position of Prime Minister until general elections in 2007 |

Name of the actor: Association of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) Veterans			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
Non-statutory security actor Former KLA members association Having presence in all over the Kosovo	Protection of KLA values Advocating for the interests of Kosovo Albanians	Lobbying for the improvement of their status as an important part of Kosovo society.	Established in 1999 from the dissolved KLA structures Influential in the post-conflict period especially in the issues considered of 'strategic importance' Ability to influence some decisions
Name of the actor: Intelligence Agency of Kosovo (Shërbimi Informativ i Kosovës – SHIK)			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
Non-statutory security actor Created during the period of KLA resistance as its intelligence and counter-intelligence service After 1999 strongly affiliated with PDK	Gathering information, most probably for the purposes of certain groups and individuals. Performing for the 'public and national good'	Conducting secret mission Analysing threats and risks	Established 1999 from the dissolved KLA By 15 June 2008 formally ceased to exist though its believed that some of its former members have been incorporated in the governmental structures.
Name of the actor: Lëvizja VETEVENDOSJA (English: SELF-DETERMINATION Movement)			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
Created by its key figure Mr. Albin Kurti Non-governmental movement	Self-determination of Kosovo Local ownership for the decision making processes in Kosovo	Protesting against the international dominance for key decision making role in Kosovo Opposition of the Ahtisaari Proposal	Opposing the main political decisions and mobilizing one part of the society against the 'international imposed solutions' and against negotiations with Serbia One of the main movements continually opposing previously UNMIK and currently EULEX missions

Name of the actor: Parallel Structures in the Serbian inhabited areas			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
Non-statutory security actor

Composed by Serb political figures dominantly in North Mitrovica

It is believed to be supported by the officialdom in Belgrade

Geographically, robust presence in the northern part of Kosovo but also in the central part (Serbian inhabited areas) | Offering public services for Serbs and other communities living in Kosovo

Opposing the provisional institutions of self-government and also post-independence institutions | Stronger influence over the Serbs living in Kosovo

Boycotting the inclusion of the Serb community in the Kosovo institutions

Stronger parallel structures such as: health system, education, judicial system and public order | Opposing through all means the processes in Kosovo

Influencing the majority of Serbs on boycotting Kosovo institutions |

Name of the actor: Foreign Embassies in Kosovo			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
International diplomatic representation in Kosovo	Supporting the democratic institutions in Kosovo

Offering assistance in capacity building and monitoring

Contributing in creating a multiethnic environment in Kosovo and the rights of all communities | Contributing towards peaceful processes | Ability to influence key political processes

Robust role in scrutinising the draft laws and strategies |

Name of the actor: International Organizations			
Profile	Vision	Strategies	Capabilities
EULEX – EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo ICO – International Civilian Office OSCE, USAID, UNDP, DFID	EULEX: Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising the Police, Judiciary and Customs. Retaining executive competencies in the war crimes and organised crime. ICO: Watchdog of the implementation of Ahtisaari Package Other: Donor Coordination – capacity building and support to the democratization in Kosovo	Capacity building of the Government of Kosovo, Assembly, Civil Society	Robust influence in the decision making Funds available to invest projects Participation in the key processes in Kosovo

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ANNEX 1

CHRONOLOGY OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN KOSOVO

This paper addresses the political and security events starting from June 1999 until the present time (June 2009). As it will be clearly elaborated in the context paper, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) cycle in Kosovo is split into three periods:

- First period starting from 1999 – 2005 is referred dominantly to the Security Sector Building (SSB). As written in the chronology below, the efforts were directed towards building security institutions such as: Kosovo Police Service (KPS), Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and other relevant mechanisms. This period is well known due to the reserved competencies of SRSG for the security institutions. The locals had limited competencies.
- Second period starting from the end of 2005 until the beginning of 2008 is broadly known for the initial transfer of competencies from international community to locals. The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) is considered as turning point towards building new security architecture in Kosovo and assessing the current state of security sector. In addition, the establishment of the MoIA and MoJ and the UNMIK shift of competencies to these ministries characterized the importance of the SSR during this period.
- Third period is indeed affiliated to the declaration of independence and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The new security architecture in Kosovo allows the establishment of new security institutions in one side such as KSF, KSC, KIA and the reform for police and emergency services in the other side.

1 9 9 9
- **(June)** Kumanovo Agreement has been signed between NATO and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This technical agreement foresaw the withdrawal of Yugoslav Army, Police and other security mechanisms from the territory of Kosovo. In addition to that, this agreement addressed the ground security zone 5 km from the border line with Kosovo as well as the airspace security zone 25 km from the border.[21]
- The UN Security Council approved the Resolution 1244[22] on deploying civil administration (UNMIK) and international military presence (KFOR) in Kosovo.
- 50.000 KFOR troops entered Kosovo.
- General Mike Jackson from UK was appointed the first KFOR commander. He served as a KFOR commander until 8th October 1999.

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[21]   See NATO Webpage http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm
[22]   UNSC Resolution 1244 http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/N9917289.pdf

- The Russian Contingent from BiH dashed in the Prishtina Airport creating serious tensions between NATO and Russia[23]
- **(July)** UN Secretary General Kofi Annan nominated Bernard Kouchner as the first UN Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.
- Kosovo Provisional Government transferred in Prishtina. This government was disbanded after the establishment of governmental council
- **(August)** UNMIK Police took over law enforcement duties in Prishtina
- **(September)** The agreement for the demilitarization of Kosovo Liberation Army and the transformation into Kosovo Protection Corps has been signed by COMKFOR General Mike Jackson, Political Director of KLA, Hashim Thaçi, NATO Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark and Commander of KLA, General Agim Çeku.
- OSCE opened the Kosovo Police Service School in Vushtrri/Vucitrn
- **(October)** KPC started to function having initial tasks on civil protection and reaction to catastrophic emergencies. It had General HQ, 6 Protection Zones based in Prishtina, Prizren, Peja/Pec, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Mitrovica and Skenderaj and other supportive units
- **(October)** German General Klaus Reinhardt was appointed as KFOR Commander, succeeding General Mike Jackson. He served on as KFOR Commander until 18th April 2000.
- IOM initiated the reintegration programme for former KLA combatants. There were around 18.000 former combatants registered at IOM
- First generation of the Kosovo Police Service started to operate
- **(November)** The conflict in Presevo Valley had repercussions in Kosovo especially in the eastern part

2 0 0 0

- **(February)** The Protection Academy of KPC has been established as well as other supportive units
- SRSG signed administrative instructions for appointment of KPC senior officers
- Several riots occurred in the Northern Mitrovica resulted continual fatality and collateral damages. Protests were repeatedly held by the Albanians and Serbs[24]
- **(April)** The UNMIK administration started the registration of the residents and the new ID cards has been released
- The conflict in Macedonia also had repercussions in Kosovo. The border line with Macedonia was porous and allowed the smuggling and the refuges from the border zone

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23   Clark Wesley, Waging Modern War, p.57
24   http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/photos/covermriot210200.htm

- The Spanish General Juan Ortuño Such was appointed as a new KFOR commander, succeeding German General Klaus Reinhardt. He served as a KFOR Commander until 16th October 2000.
- **(September)** 13 prisoners with high criminal record managed to escape from the Mitrovica prison
- Huge weaponry arsenal has been discovered as well as KFOR captured Serbian MoIA officers in Gracanica
- **(October)** The Italian General Carlo Cabigiosu was appointed new KFOR Commander succeeding Spanish General General Juan Ortuño. He served as a KFOR Commander until 6th April 2001.
- The first free election has been organized in the local level. LDK lead by Ibrahim Rugova won the majority of the municipalities followed by PDK lead by Hashim Thaçi and AAK lead by Ramush Haradinaj. Serbs refused to participate in the elections
- **(November)** Among some departments, UNMIK established the Department for Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness[25]

2 0 0 1

- **(January)** UN Secretary General Kofi Annan nominated Danish Social Democrat Hans Hækkerup for SRSG as a replacement for Bernard Kouchner.
- First UNMIK Travel Documents distributed[26]
- **(February)** The agreement between FRY and Macedonia on the border demarcation signed. The Kosovo villagers claimed there were around 2.500 ha passed to Macedonia
- **(March)** COMKFOR allowed the decrease of the ground security zone
- **(April)** The Norwegian General Thorstein Skiaker was appointed as a new KFOR Commander Succeeding the Italian General Carlo Cabigiosu. He served as a KFOR commander until 3rd October 2001.
- Confrontations between the Serbian demonstrators and the UNMIK police in Mitrovica resulted with few police officers wounded.
- **(May)** The Constitutional Framework[27] has been drafted and approved leaving the main competencies to the UNMIK SRSG based on the Resolution 1244. The Constitutional Framework was used as the base for organizing elections and establishing Kosovo Assembly, Kosovo Government and President. It also foresaw the functionality of the municipalities.

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[25] UNMIK Regulation on Establishment of Department for Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness
[26] http://www.unmikonline.org/press/press/pr481.html
[27] See Constitutional Framework http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPocket_ENG_ Dec2002.pdf

- **(September)** The Department for Emergency Preparedness seized to exist
- **(October)** French General Marcel Valentin was appointed as a new KFOR Commander succeeding Norwegian General Thorstein Skiaker. He served as KFOR Commander until the 4th October 2002.
- **(November)** The first general elections have been held. The LDK won followed by PDK and AAK
- Hans Hackerup was appointed the new SRSG replacing Bernard Kuchner

2 0 0 2

- **(January)** Euro (€) officially became the currency used in Kosovo. Euro replaced the German DM which was in use after 1999 in Kosovo. The currency is not regulated through the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.
- The Kosovo Assembly has been inaugurated having 120 seats. 100 seats from the elected representatives whereas 20 reserved seats for the minority communities (10 for Serbs and 10 for other minority communities). The first chair of the Kosovo Assembly became Nexhat Daci.
- The Kosovo Assembly voted for Ibrahim Rugova as the first international recognized Kosovo President
- **(February)** UN Secretary General Kofi Annan nominated Michael Steiner as a Hans Hakkerup successor.
- **(March)** The new Kosovo Government has been established and the first prime minister was Bajram Rexhepi. It was the government of unity including three main political parties (LDK, PDK, AAK) and creating climate without opposition. This government had limited competencies in some certain areas such as finances, economy, youth, sports, culture, education, agriculture, environments etc. The reserved competencies of SRSG remained the security sector (KPS, UNMIK Police), KPC, Correctional Services, Justice, Internal and Foreign Affairs, Border Management and Customs and other important areas.
- **(April)** Earthquake hit the eastern part of Kosovo and especially the town city of Gjilan/Gnjilane. Its magnitude was at 5.9 Richter. Collateral damages occurred.
- KFOR reduced its troops from 50.000 to 39.000[28]
- **(July)** A disaster occurred in the Kosovo Electro Distributor (Kosova 'B'). Kosova 'B' was the main power supplies of KEK
- **(October)** Italian General Fabio Mini was appointed as new KFOR Commander succeeding French General Marcel Valentin. He served as a KFOR commander until   3rd October 2003.
- Second local elections have been organized. LDK won the main municipalities followed by PDK and AAK.

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[28]   http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm

2 0 0 3

- **(June)** KFOR reduced troops to 26 000[29]
- **(August)** UN Secretary General Kofi Annan nominated Harri Holkeri as a Successor of Micheal Steiner as SRSG
- Several protests took place organized by Serbs therefore blocking the main roadways such as Prishtina – Skopje and Prishtina – Gjilan
- **(October)** German General Holger Kammerhoff was appointed new KFOR Commander Succeeding Italian General Fabio Mini. He served as a KFOR Commander until 1st September 2004.
- For the first time, direct talks between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian leadership took place.
- **(December)** International community launched the so-called standards before the status for Kosovo[30]
- KFOR reduced troops to 17 500[31]

2 0 0 4

- **(March)** Violent riots occurred by March 17. There were around 18 people dead and hundreds wounded.[32]
- NATO urgently deployed 2500 additional troops to reinforce the existing KFOR strength
- UNMIK released the "Standards Implementation Plan."
- **(April)** The Provisional Criminal Code and Procedural Code entered into force
- **(June)** Søren Jessen-Petersen was named Special Representative of the new United Nations Secretary-General for Kosovo and head of UNMIK and held the position until the end of June 2006. He was brought to succeed Harri Holkeri
- **(August)** A report by the Kai Eide, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, argued that the "standards before status" policy lacked credibility and that a priority-based standards policy aimed at facilitating orderly future status discussions should replace it.
- **(September)** French General Yves de Kermabon was appointed the new KFOR Commander succeeding German General Holger Kammerhoff. He served as a

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29   http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm
30   See the full content http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/priorities.htm
31   http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm
32   The protests started after the media announced the headline news that three Albanian children's in Northern Mitrovica have drawn in the river. One of the children who survived claimed they were at-tacked by the Serb villagers. The exaggeration by media has been considered as 'tuning point' for the violent demonstrations in all over the Kosovo. This resulted with the displacement of refuges espe-cially from the Serbian community. Several private properties have been destroyed in particular some Serbian orthodox church have been burned.

KFOR commander until the 1st September 2005.
- **(November)** The parliamentary elections took place. LDK and AAK created the government leaving in the opposition PDK
- **(December)** Ramush Haradinaj from AAK, formed the government. Ibrahim Rugova was re-elected president as well as Nexhat Daci, Chair of Assembly.

2 0 0 5

- **(March)** ICTY launched indictment against Ramush Haradinaj while he was at the position of the Prime Minister. He immediately resigned and went to Hague. Bajram Kosumi became his successor in the position of Prime Minister[33]
- **(May)** Kai Aide has been appointed special envoy of UN SG for reviewing the implementation of standards in Kosovo
- **(September)** Italian General Giuseppe Valotto was appointed the new KFOR Commander succeeding French General Yves de Kermabon. He Served as a KFOR Commander until the 1st September 2006.
- **(October)** Kai Aide recommended the beginning of negotiations for the final status of Kosovo[34]
- **(November)** The UNDP in cooperation with Kosovo Government and British Government and other stakeholders started the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR)
- The Border Police has been established as centralized unit within Kosovo Police Service
- For the first time, the debate started over the functionality of intelligence services; SHIK controlled by PDK and "Sigurimi i Atdheut" (Homeland Security) controlled by LDK
- Koffi Annan appointed Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for status talks
- **(December),** The SRSG singed the administrative instructions for establishing two ministries part of the Kosovo Government: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice. This was the first step towards the transfer of competencies in the security sector

2 0 0 6

- **(January)** The President of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova died at age 61 at lung cancer.[35] Thousands of citizens salute in the last flat their president. The successful management of situation during this time was highly appreciated.
- The Commander of KPC Guard refused to obey the order of KPC Commander on

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33   http://www.icty.org/sid/8631
34   http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf
35   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4634616.stm

engaging the Battalion for Ceremony in the mortuary ceremony for the president. This case has been considered as politically affiliated by media

- **(February)** Fatmir Sejdiu became new Kosovo President.
- In Vienna the UN launched the first direct talks on the status of Kosovo between Belgrade and Kosovo authorities.
- **(March),** The Prime Minister, Bajram Kosumi resigned after the international community pressures and the AAK appointed Agim Ceku as new Kosovo Prime Minister. Also the Chair of Assembly, Nexhat Daci resigned and LDK replaced him appointing Kolë Berisha
- General Sylejman Selimi became new KPC Commander replacing General Agim Ceku
- **(April)** The European Union deployed the EU Planning Team Mission in Kosovo[36]
- The ISSR has been published and the report has been distributed
- **(June),** NATO did the reorganization of multinational brigades and creating multinational tasks force consequently enhancing the mobility of the troops.[37]
- **(July)** The Inspectorate of Kosovo Police has been established. It is an executive agency of MoIA.
- The Government established the Anti-Corruption Agency. This Agency acts independently. The Director of Agency became Hasan Preteni.
- **(September)** German General Roland Kather was appointed the new KFOR Commander succeeding Italian General Giuseppe Valotto He served as KFOR Commander until August 31, 2007.
- The Parliamentary Committee on Emergency Preparedness has been transformed into Committee on Security

2 0 0 7

- **(February)** Violent demonstrations organized by "Vetvendosja" movement took place in Prishtina opposing the negotiation talks for Kosovo. Two demonstrators have been deadly shot by the UNMIK police and the others were heavily wounded.[38]
- **(March)** After the maratonic negotiations, the UN special envoy, Marti Ahtisaari publicized his plan by recommending the supervised independence for Kosovo. As regarding the security sector this plan foresaw the establishment of Kosovo Security Force (KSF), Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA), Kosovo Security Council and Civil Aviation Authority. In addition, it foresaw the reform of the Kosovo Police. This plan opens the possibility of modification as regarding the security

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[36] The Council of European Union, Joint Action – 7771/06 http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5903_en.htm

[37] See NATO webpage http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm
The new architecture of the KFOR presence in Kosovo was split into five multinational task force: Multinational Task Force Centre based in Lipjan, MNTF North Based in Novo Selo, MNTF South based in Prizren, MNTF West based in Peja/Pec, MNTF East based in Ferizaj/Urosevac

[38] The investigations concluded the Rumanian Gendarmerie overwhelmed the use of force

sector five years after it enters into force.

- **(April)** UN Fact Finding mission visited Pristina and Belgrade to assess the progress made.

- **(July)** Fires occurred all over the Kosovo forestry.

- **(August)** Five prisoners with high criminal records escaped from the Dubrava Prison

- French General Xavier de Marnhac was appointed new KFOR Commander succeeding German General Roland Kather. He served as the KFOR Commander until 29th August 2008.

- **(September)** Joachim Rücker was named Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Kosovo and head of UNMIK and held the position until the end of 15 June 2008.

- **(November)** Parliamentary and local elections held in Kosovo. PDK won the elections followed by LDK and AKR.

- Two of the escapers from Dubrava prison have been killed by the Macedonian police in an incident in the village of Brodec

- **(December)** Hashim Thaci formed the Government made up of the coalition partners PDK – LDK

2 0 0 8

- **(January)** The Parlamentary Committee on internal Affairs renamed as Committee on Internal Affairs and Security

- **(February)** Kosovo Assembly declared the independence of the Republic of Kosovo. It received immediate recognition by USA, Albania, UK, Afghanistan and Turkey. Until the present time, the Republic of Kosovo has been recognized by 60 countries.[39]

- The Serbian demonstrators burned two border crossing points 1 (Bernjak) and 31 (Jarinje). Kosovo Police and Customs until the present time control the goods coming from Serbia only in South Mitrovica. This state led towards the growth of smuggling in the Northern Part of Kosovo

- Several violent demonstrations occurred in North Mitrovica

- Serbian police officers boycotted the Kosovo Police

- The EU established a European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) to provide support for Kosovo through its Council's Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP.

- An "International Steering Group" for Kosovo was formed.[40] It appointed Peter

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[39] See the Declaration of Independence, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/Dek_Pav_sh.pdf
[40] Initial membership included the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the US, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Slovenia and Switzerland.

Feith as Head of International Civilian in Office in Kosovo.[41]

- **(March)** Kosovo Assembly approved the laws in package according to Ahtisaari's plan. In this case the majority of Laws on the security sector have been approved.[42]
- President Bush announced the US will provide Kosovo with weapons.[43]
- UNMIK reasserted control over a rail line in northern Kosovo which had been used by Serbia to send two of its trains south.[44]
- Serbs organized violent protests in North Mitrovica and occupied the district court of Mitrovica. A UN Ukrainian special police officer died. Few protesters were arrested.
- The UN police, backed by French NATO peacekeepers, retook a court building
- **(April)** The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo has been signed by the MP's
- Kosovo Government established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Skender Hyseni from LDK became the minister.
- **(June)** The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo entered into force.
- According to the new Law on Police, Kosovo Police Service changed its name to Kosovo Police. New structure for police.
- Kosovo Government took over the competencies from UNMIK Customs consequently renamed as Kosovo Government.
- Lamberto Zannier was named Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Kosovo. He is the current SRSG of Kosovo, even though the role of UNMIK in Kosovo is reduced and the domestic leaders of Kosovo has ask occasional time for UNMIK to leave Kosovo as they considered it's mission Kosovo is has been accomplished.
- At a NATO defence ministers meeting, agreement was reached to launch and train a civilian-controlled Kosovo security force
- SHIK announced it seized to exist
- Kosovo Government and Macedonian Government started the demarcation of the border line between two countries
- Joint inter-institutional exercise on emergency response took place. KPC had the leading role and the main stakeholders were involved.
- **(July)** First Kosovo Embassies opened in nine countries[45]
- Dangerous materials coming from Iran entered freely Kosovo. Strong reactions from the population.
- Republic of Kosovo issued its first passports.
- **(August)** The Kosovo Government established the Ministry of Kosovo Security

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41 For more details about ICO please see http://www.ico-kos.org/
42 See webpage http://www.assembly-kosova.org/
   Law on KSF, Law on Service in KSF, Law on Ministry of KFS, Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency, Law on Kosovo Security Force, Law on Dissolution of KPC and Law on Police
43 http://www.itsallpolitics.com/forum/index.php?topic=1989.0%3Bwap2
44 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2693009/
45 Ibid,

Force. Fehmi Mujota from PDK became the minister.

-   Italian General Giuseppe Emilio Gay was appointed the KFOR Commander succeeding French General Xavier de Marnhac. He is the current KFOR Commander.
-   **(October)** The UN Security Council voted the Serbian Government proposal for the opinion of International Justice Court on the declaration of Kosovo independence legacy.[46]
-   Macedonia and Montenegro recognized independence of Kosovo.[47]
-   **(November)** UNMIK Customs has been formally renamed Kosovo Customs
-   **(December)** The EULEX Mission formally started its mission in Kosovo after the approval at the UN Security Council
-   The President of Kosovo appointed General Sylejman Selimi for the Commander of KSF.
-   The Prime Minister of Kosovo appointed General Sheremet Ahmeti for the Director of Kosovo Police[48]
-   Civil Airspace Authority of the Republic of Kosovo took over the control of Prishtina International Airport[49]

2 0 0 9

-   **(January)** KPC has been formally disbanded. The UNDP started the reintegration programme for the former members of KPC not part of KSF. KFOR announced it will approximately include 1.500 former KPC members in KSF. The other KSF members are being recruited from the open society.[50]
-   KSF started to function. It will have 2.500 active troops and 800 reserve troops. It will have initial tasks on the civil protection and assisting the police and international presence on specific issues. KSF will be deployed for international peacekeeping missions.
-   The Barracks of the 3rd Rapid Reaction Brigade in Peja have been attacked.
-   **(February)** Kosovo President and Kosovo Prime Minister appointed Bashkim Smakaj for the Director of Kosovo Intelligence Agency.
-   KFOR and Ministry of KSF announced and promoted the recruitment from the open society for the Kosovo Security Force.
-   KFOR started trainings for KSF members in the Kosovo Centre for Public Security, Education and Development based in Vushtrri/Vucitrn
-   Violent demonstrations took place as the unsatisfied groups of the former KPC alleged for unfair selection process for KSF.
-   Kosovo Security Council held its first constitutive meeting.

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46   http://www.icj-cij.org
47   http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27106251/
48   http://www.evropaelire.org/content/News/1358320.html
49   http://www.kosova.com/artikulli/50385
50   See webpage of Ministry of KSF http://mksf-ks.org/?page=2,1

- **(April)** MoIA adopted the Strategy for Integrated Border Management.
- Serious robbery occurred at the Kosovo Police HQ. Strong reactions from the opposition parties and civil society.
- Serbs repeatedly protested after the Kosovo Government started to build houses for the dispelled Albanian from the village Kroi i Vitakut.
- **(May)** Kosovo Security Council held the second meeting. It initiated the drafting of National Security Strategy after continual pressures from the civil society for the delay. It also approved the logo of KSC.
- Kosovo Assembly elected the local judges of Constitutional Court of Kosovo. Six judges are locals whereas three internationals.[51]
- Minister of KSF announced that the institution will be semi-operational by September 2009.
- MoIA released a final deadline (30 June) for Serbian police officers of Kosovo Police who boycotted the institution since the declaration of the independence. Those not respond positively will be opened the position for new police officers.
- **(June)** Kosovo has been admitted at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
- NATO announced it will gradually reduce the number of KFOR troops. This year the troops will be downsized up to 10.000 soldiers and until 2011 the number of troops will drop at 2.500
- Kosovo President approved the emblems for KSF units.[52]
- The first generation of the KSF recruitment finished the basic trainings

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[51] http://english.cri.cn/6966/2009/05/16/1721s485014.htm
[52] http://botasot.info/home.php?gjuha=0&category=6&id=19110

Prishtina, 2010