



Critical Discourse Analysis

(De-) Constructing KFOR Discourse

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Prishtina
December 2013

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This is the second KCSS research paper which is entirely based on discourse analysis. The KCSS and the author would like to acknowledge the support of Open Society Foundation – Think Tank Fund, for making possible the research and release of this publication. Apart from that, it needs to be emphasized the overall institutional support of the Think Tank Fund in strengthening the capacities and skills of KCSS researchers

Edited by: Florian QEHAJA

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations _____	3
INTRODUCTION.....	4
Executive summary _____	5
Key findings of this analysis _____	5
Methodology and theoretical framework _____	6
DECONSTRUCTING KFOR BOTTOM-UP APPROACH.....	8
Biopolitics _____	8
A paternalistic discourse towards the local population _____	10
KFOR’s threatening tone following a deterioration of security situation in Kosovo _	12
WAYS OF DESIGNATING THE TARGET AUDIENCE	12
General expressions in tense periods _____	12
KFOR AMBIGUOUS AND UNCLEAR DISCOURSE TOWARDS ITS GENDER- SENSITIVITY PROGRAM.....	13
CONCLUSION.....	16
ANNEX I: FREQUENCY OF TERMINOLOGY KFOR PRESS RELEASES 2008-2012.....	17
Bibliography _____	18

List of Abbreviations

CBM	Community-Building Mitrovica
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
JRD	Joint Regional Detachment
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LMT	Liaison Monitoring Team
MKSF	Ministry of Kosovo Security Force
SFL	Systemic Functional Linguistics
UNFPA	United Nations Populations Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

Introduction

Kosovo Force (KFOR) was officially deployed in Kosovo on June 12, 1999 under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR). Nevertheless, KFOR has experienced several restructuring in line with the improved security dynamics in Kosovo. Since mid-2009, the NATO ministers of defence commonly approved the transformation of KFOR from a full NATO military presence to a lighter multinational presence composed of a diminished number of troops present in Kosovo as the result of increased performance of the Kosovo Police and EULEX. Once a huge military presence of 50.000 troops in 1999, the force was slightly reduced to only 5, 000 troops in 2011(NATO, 2013). This reduction expresses KFOR will to increasingly delegate its missions and competencies to local institutions such as the Kosovo Security Force (Defence Ministry France, 2013). This re-organization and adaptation happened in accordance with the progress of the security situation and was in no way determined by a timeframe (KFOR, January 2008). KFOR got divided into two Battle Groups respectively located in Pejë and Bondsteel with a capacity of action over the whole territory of Kosovo. Nevertheless, five separate JRD's (Joint Regional Detachments) in charge with general missions composed of LMT (Liaison Monitoring Teams) still remain anchored to their initial locations.

In addition to its performance on the ground, since the beginning of its mandate KFOR has held a sustained communication approach by publishing online press releases as well as monthly chronicles (NATO online) (KFO Chronicle). It is important to define the term of “communication strategy” along major linguistic theories in order to further elaborate on KFOR communication strategy in particular. A communication strategy conveys a “*particular form of linguistic behaviour*” (Irvine 1: 2012) and was thoroughly studied by structuralist thinkers as Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes before being further explored and revisited by post-structuralist thinkers such as Noam Chomsky and Jacques Derrida. All of these latter on commonly approach language and language communities as entities that cannot be directly analysed, but whose data and facts obey to abstract rules and schemes internalized and reproduced by speakers. This is how symbolic systems and discourse are generated (Irvine 2012; Barthes 1957). Discourse, comes out of language (Foucault 1984; Chomsky 2000): it is made of speeches, words and particular forms of sentences. It circulates through particular cultures, values and social groups (Irvine 2012).

Aiming to study KFOR communication strategy, this report intends to identify through the structuralist school of thought how KFOR forms itself as a speech community and how the population of Kosovo can interpret the messages it delivers through its communication strategy. Standing for particular meanings and obeying to subjective hierarchies, communication strategies need to adopt the particular cultural code bases to be equally understood by the speaker and the receiving audience, in this case the population of Kosovo. Therefore, the aim of this report is to identify and deconstruct how the Kosovar population can interpret KFOR discourse of the period from 2008 to 2012 and if the organisation succeeded at delivering its intended messages.

Executive summary

Reading the press releases over the period of 2008-2012, KFOR has repeatedly stated its overall objective to maintain “*a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins*”²(NATO, August 2013). The main assumption stemming out of the study of KFOR press releases is that KFOR 2008-2012 discourse was visibly influenced by the post-Cold-War holistic paradigm on security as expressed by international actors and experts. The international community did commonly agree on the idea that the concept of security was “too narrowly founded” and that a “*broader framework of security*”, combining regional, societal, political, military and environmental aspects was necessary (Buzan 1991: 368). Every single element of social life was recognized as part of the security package.

While this bottom-up, holistic paradigm is easily identifiable in KFOR communication approach it can also lead to unexpected reactions once applied to the local population. Many reactions expressed by Kosovo public opinion showed an inadequate discourse towards the civil society, which often views KFOR as entering unrequested aspects of civil society.

Key findings of this analysis

- KFOR regularly adopts a paternalistic discourse using a heroic vocabulary towards an infantilized local audience by frequently pronouncing imperative verbs and a moralizing tone.
- KFOR discourse is subject to an aggressive turn and addresses its audience in most generalizing terms whenever the security situation deteriorates.
- KFOR adopts a derisive way of referring to the local population once tensions and violence erupts and starts a differentiation between the different target groups.
- In its public discourse KFOR often cites and other international actors and perspectives whenever the security situation in Kosovo deteriorates, but does not so when the situation is calm.
- Despite its willingness to introduce a gender-sensitive approach, KFOR soldiers’ testimonies remain highly male-oriented.

²A word count of the recurrent terminology will be provided at the end of this report for more significance.

Methodology and theoretical framework

KFOR discourse will be studied throughout the period of 2008-2012 due to the importance of the June 2008 events where NATO decided to undertake new tasks in Kosovo, focused on the establishment and development of the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force (MKSF) and the KSF (NATO, August 2013) (KFOR, 28th August 2009).

The methodology used for the compilation of this policy paper is derived from an academic model, which is well framed and explained. It has been primarily based on the Teun Van Dijk's model known as Socio-Cognitive Approach (SCA) and Norman Fairclough with a focal approach consisting of discourse, cognition and society serving as a mean to systemize phenomena of the social reality. The KCSS also applied the same methodology in a 2012 report for the EULEX discourse analysis. The core concepts of power, knowledge, discourse and *biopolitics* elaborated by Michel Foucault will also be used as tools to study the KFOR shifts within its discourse. The major contribution of post-structuralist thinker Jacques Derrida the concept of "*deconstruction*" also constitutes a core element to analyse the discourse of KFOR enunciated and performed in Kosovo. The concepts of other academics such as Roland Barthes, Gayatri Spivak, Pierre Bourdieu and Noam Chomsky will be used in this report to analyse it through the general lenses of post-structuralism.

Finally, the work of feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe on women in military will be used to explore the limited gender-approach in peace-building missions and the patriarchal structure of military institutions and international politics in general. In this line, discourse is understood as a communicative event whereby social representations have a crucial role. In this report, it is intended to focus on critical discourse analysis to trace tendencies of KFOR "*language in use*" based on desk research. Furthermore, the focus is placed on the frequency of terminology used in KFOR programme reports, themes addressed in press releases, especially in the micro-level of language and the writing style. As mentioned above, the data for analysis was comprised of different informative sources made by KFOR.

Based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), this report intends to produce a qualitative social analysis identifying the key words in KFOR press releases corpus in order to search for linguistic and power patterns of co-occurrence in the political context of Kosovo. The frequency of the terminology expressed in KFOR online press releases were the primary data, but research was completed with online ads, academic reports and texts and one live-interview.

Data

**2008- 2012 online press releases and
chronicles**

Reports and academic texts

Public billboards and interviews

Figure 1: CDA of KFOR 2008 - 2012

The theoretical framework used in this report is based on major works on Critical Discourse Analysis but also seeks to combine a multidisciplinary approach by adding the work of major (post)-structuralist thinkers and experts in international development. Before further elaborating, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) ought to be defined. Based on the work of Norman Fairclough (2003) and Teun Van Dijk (2008), CDA is defined as “*one productive way of doing research through a focus on language*” (Fairclough 2003: 3). Despite the numerous forms and definitions of discourse analysis, most of them rely on the post-structuralist heritage of Derrida but also in a certain extent Michel Foucault. Hence, Critical Discourse Analysis is mainly based on the core concepts of *power* and *knowledge* that are emanating from discourse (Foucault 1984). Discourse as defined by Foucault, expresses “*an entity of sequences of signs in that they are enouncements (known as *énoncé*), shaping specific relations between objects and subjects*”. Particular forms of discourse create certain bodies of knowledge and the choice of words and of particular language has a real, pervasive effect on life (Fairclough 2003: 3). CDA is in that way closely linked to Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Halliday 1975) (Chomsky 2000) and aims at exploring the relationships between language and the different aspects of social life (Bourdieu 1998; Fairclough 2003: 5).

The concept of “*deconstruction*” elaborated by Jacques Derrida also lies at the core of this analysis and is a powerful way to analyse KFOR discourse in Kosovo. First of all, its important to note that the term “*text*” ought to be understood in a very accurate way to Derrida: it should be seen as a vehicle that constantly delivers indefinite amounts of meaning. Texts, whatever their nature, might not always convey the right expressions. It is actually often the contrary: a boundary can actually often be drawn between the actual truth of things and a text (Derrida 2011: 107). In that sense, the process of deconstruction seeks to reveal how meanings take their identity (Wolfreys 1998: 10). Reading is therefore a problem in itself: proper meanings are often hardly visible and systematically demand careful reading and interpretation. By sustaining: “*there is nothing outside the text*” (1967: 158), Derrida states that discourse influences all aspects of social life, but also how social structures such as the State or the Army are established through textual inclusions, exclusions, contradictions and cancellations (Wolfreys 1998). Words and expressions of people or institutions contain a

richness that ought never be turned down. The process of “*deconstruction*” seeks to explore the borders and the limits of concepts present in the texts in order to dismantle “*totalitarian*” epistemological projects such as the European Enlightenment, science or patriarchal structures in a more democratic order by “*naming something more powerful rather than just undoing it*” (Derrida 1987: 5; Wolfreys 1998: 9). In a similar perspective, the work of early post-structuralist thinker Roland Barthes is also helpful to analyse the global sign systems generated by a capitalistic dominant ideological apparatuses, the existence of myths being to Barthes’ the result of successfully implanted when the values appearing as universal and subject to a hierarchy (Barthes 1957: 217; Althusser 1984).

The general hypothesis formulated by the Critical Discourse Analysis is based on the assumption that the words and particular forms of language exert by KFOR has real impact on social life. It attempts to understand how it may have affected the local population of Kosovo by conveying particular visions of Kosovo civil society. It examines the communication strategy from 2008 to 2012. Hence the KCSS found important to scientifically evaluate the increasing public discourse of KFOR, in order to make policy stakeholders aware of the perceptions of KFOR by the local population in Kosovo and the impacts of KFOR on Kosovo civil society.

Deconstructing KFOR bottom-up approach

The study of the various press releases and billboards of KFOR throughout the period of 2008-2012 shows its media communication strategy aims at maintaining close ties to the local population.

Yet the meaning of the bottom-up approach and its empirical practices can be subject to several unexpected drifts, from both the speaker and the audience.

Biopolitics

Whilst analysing the various press releases and billboards ads starting from 2008, one can observe KFOR willingness to cover unexpected security domains of everyday life in Kosovo.

The health care and education sectors were of primordial importance for the military force over the years of 2008 and 2009. Many health care projects of relatively big scales were announced from January 2008 by KFOR. Its cooperation with the Malishevë, Pejë and Prizren Municipal Hospitals by launching the charity project “*lachen helfen*” (“*helping to laugh*”) could be taken as a relevant example. Words such as “*solidarity*”, “*good medical care*”, “*health*”, “*medical care*” “*first aid training*” “*dental work*” surprisingly also appeared quite frequently (18 times over the 2008-2012 period) in the press releases of 2008 and 2009.

Another 2008 Press Release, describing the “*fascination of children when the lady dentist unpacked the two dental models in a class*” might also convey a somewhat derisive view on the nature of the services KFOR delivers to a supposedly “*naïve*” local population (March 3rd,

2008 Press Release). KFOR also occasionally draws a parallel between “*good medical care*” and “*security*”, as if these elements were essentially linked, through a press release insisting on the need for children to brush their teeth (February 19, 2008 KFOR Press Release). Another parallel seems to be drawn between these types of health care projects and the increasing professionalism and efficiency within KFOR, when Lieutenant General praised the “*highest degree of professionalism*” and the “*efficiency*” of the military force.

The hypothesis of Critical Discourse Analysis can be verified here: the KFOR speaker is shaped by its performative actions and improves itself by enunciating the local society’s improvements. Such practices of intrusion in everyday life through health and education are projected in Foucault’s concept of *biopolitics*. *Biopolitics* refers to the practice of modern states regulating their subject through numerous techniques for achieving the subjugation of their bodies (Foucault 1984). Practices such as public health, heredity and risk regulation are directly designed as such (Foucault 1984).

By expressing its will to “*improve the lives of young Kosovars*” through a variety of civilian administrative functions such as health care (KFOR July 22, 2009), KFOR seems to have sparked many defensive reactions. Several signs of protest appeared in certain parts of Kosovo and expressions of rejection by a certain part of the Kosovar population. The meaningful sentence “*big brother is watching you*” was for example found tagged on one of KFOR billboards (Mirceaopris, 2013). This clearly denounces a super-presence in the ordinary aspects of daily life coined as “*biopower*” by Foucault. Furthermore, this negative tagging on a KFOR billboard expresses the existence of a relative important degree of frustration from the local population and a perception of KFOR as intrusive in the daily political and social life of Kosovo.

A Facebook group named “*Reklamat e KFOR-it ma shajnë inteligjencën me nanë*” expresses the irritation of the group and already has more than 5, 483 “*likes*” so far. This trend is also defined as “*development-security nexus*” by major donors and international organisations (Zoellick, World Development Report 2011). This nexus is also present in the 2011 KFOR communication where the “*well-being*” of the population is frequently mentioned and linked to security (KFOR January 4, 2010 Press Release), which reinforces the feeling of KFOR almightiness on people’s lifestyles. Following these observations and out of the press releases, it becomes easily identifiable that KFOR could potentially seek to outreach the traditional prerogative executed by a military force. This recent take over and express of interest in issues such as dental hygiene and/or the social development of children in Kosovo is related to an important paradigmatic change experienced in conflict studies following the Cold War. Stating that “*the absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security*”. *The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security*”, UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* is well-known for this paradigmatic change (Ghali, 1992: 34).

Defined by Foucault as a “*modern form of production of citizens through regulatory acts*” (Foucault 2003: 245), the concept of biopower deals with the population as a political

problem and seeks to produce a certain safe and developed citizen maintaining equilibrium in a particular society (Foucault 2003: 245). The concept of *biopolitics* strongly resonates with Derrida's idea of "*deconstruction*" as this latter also operates through the inclusion and exclusion of people considered as "*improper and dangerous*" (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat 2007: 16) and helps dividing the West from the rest of the world (Duffield 2007: 4). Indeed, *biopolitics* operated in international political agendas and serve to Duffield (2007) a precise objective of maintaining violence and dangers in the realms of so-called "*non-insured populations*" (Duffield 2007: 10). The new nature of conflicts described by several academics or politicians (Blair 2005; Duffield 2007; Hettne 2010) - as being a phenomenon within the States and of ethnic nature rather than between States - gradually modified the idea of traditional security and forced experts and international agencies to take a closer look at security through different lenses, based on a more human-centred approach to conflict, aiming at prioritizing peoples' security rather than states' (Duffield 2007: 3; Mutimer 2007: 88; Stern & Öjendal 2010: 14).

This shift is thus also visible in KFOR activities and missions, willing to implement a more human-centric approach of security in Kosovo. This relatively new idea now commonly designated under the concept of "*Human Security*" analyses underdevelopment in various forms as a main cause of conflict. It also raises the important problem the Nation-State by questioning a potential obsolescence of this traditional political framework and denounces its inability to contain contemporary threats such as terrorism and various forms of violence like gender-based mistreatment or ethnic discrimination (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 14).

The constant invocation of rights and freedom of movement of people as expressed by KFOR can be understood as a will to manage and contain disorder rather than resolve it (Duffield 2007: preface) It expresses a potential exaggeration of stability, strictly handling the collective aspects of this latter. Foucault also sustained this idea of biopower better penetrating masses when this latter asserted that institutional discourse in biopolitics is "*never preoccupied with individual bodies*" (Foucault 2003: 246). Professing the freedom of the population of Kosovo while entering domestic aspects such as hygiene and morals can be a way, as identified by Barthes, to create new mythologies since a myth is "*a performative act defined by its intention much more than by its form*" and succeeds when it penetrates "*the most insignificant spheres of daily life*" (Barthes 1957: 211).

A paternalistic discourse towards the local population

Another recurrent aspect of the analysis of KFOR communication strategy is the frequency of imperative verbs used in its press releases (see Annex 1) and the strong moral tone present in many of those. The use of imperative verbs could be interpreted as a paternalistic top-down speech and the praising of its different events as a "*heroization*" of the military force, for instance when COM KFOR praises "*well-behaved*" Kosovar children watching instructions on how to brush their teeth (March 3rd, 2008, KFOR Press Release). A Western, Christianized approach to reconciliation is softly imposed when KFOR "*warmly recommends and*

encourages people to maintain dialogue on a regular basis". KFOR is also particularly authoritative when requiring "all ethnic communities *should* feel the moral obligation to commit to their best" (January 27, 2011, KFOR Press Release). The use of the adjective "*Christianized*" to define KFOR reconciliation approach can be here justified by the moral vocabulary repeatedly used in its communication: injunctions such as "*should*" or "*moral obligation*" invokes a rather Manichean analysis of the social order present in the Biblical tradition, viewing a strict opposition of good versus evil (Nietzsche 2003), what is "best" being constantly subject to changes according periods and societies. Such moral injunctions from a military force seem particularly intrusive.

Critical Discourse hypothesis stating morality is created through the exercise of discursive power is here verified (Foucault 1984). On October 3rd, 2009, KFOR was congratulating the organization of a Halloween party at the Women and Children Centre, where KFOR Commander welcomed around 50 masked children who "*particularly enjoyed a trick and treat tour and a drive on fire intervention trucks*" as a "*moral recreation for orphans and traumatized children from the war*" (KFOR October 3rd, 2009). This initiative to impose Western forms of entertainment does not necessarily reflect distinct cultural values in Kosovo. Indeed, Halloween is not traditionally part of the Kosovar Albanian popular culture, which is for the most part of Muslim confession. Neither it is part of the Kosovar Serb Orthodox cultural and religious practices. Finally, other elements suggest a certain "*heroization*" of KFOR personnel and actions in its discourse. The Commemoration on August 28, 2008 designated as "Kosovo Remember Day" strongly emphasises on the salvation of Kosovo, praising "*soldiers who died to provide such an environment in Kosovo*" (August 2008, 28 KFOR Press Release).

The term "*ultimate sacrifice*" used to pay tribute to these servicemen and women who passed away during the KFOR mission also belongs to a religious registry (August 28, 2008 KFOR Press Release).

KFOR public advertisements within the country complete this assumption: slogans such as "*peace and determination*" ("*paqe dhe vendosshmëri*"), "*respect the rule of law*" ("*ta respektojmë rendin dhe ligjin*"), but particularly "*Faster than ever!*" ("*më i shpejtë se kurrë!*") or "*small structure but faster than ever*" ("*strukturë më e vogël, më shpejtë se kurrë!*") express a form of invincibility to a local audience (Gazeta Koha Ditore 2010; Mirceaopris.com 2012). Such a discourse undeniably emphasizes on the invincibility of KFOR and thus of its masculine power, able to protect a weak local population in need. In such a manner, KFOR discourse can be interpreted as infantilizing the local population in a rather implicit and soft way through the various practices mentioned above. Justified by good will, it though can be seen as implicitly using of a paternalistic discourse and, in a certain extent, an intrusive, superior tone towards its audience. However, a shift in discourse appears when Kosovo seems to experience "*difficult situation(s)*" (KFOR, 2010, 2011).

KFOR's threatening tone following a deterioration of security situation in Kosovo

Violent incidents occurring in Kosovo at several occasions lead to a fluctuation in the KFOR discourse. Following intermittent violent clashes in the northern part of Kosovo, it is observed that KFOR started including EULEX in joint declarations to express more strength. In 2009, it is for example stated: “*KFOR and EULEX are ready to respond in a strong way*”. The “*KFOR and EULEX ask all people of Mitrovica to stay calm*” (KFOR press release January 6, 2009,) statement is also very redundant.

A tougher discourse emerges as soon as imbalances occur in the country. Furthermore, a threatening vocabulary clearly appears whenever clashes happen. In 2009 KFOR expressed its readiness to “*take the appropriate measures to maintain a safe and secure environment*”. The terms “*appropriate*” and “*measures*” are too open and suggest a limitless power in case of a disruption of order. The imperative tone is particularly visible when KFOR Admiral personally announced: “*I urge all citizens to practice restraint and will not allow violence*” particularly gives the impression of an uncontrollable local population that needs to behave and be managed.

Ways of designating the target audience

General expressions in tense periods

The rise of tone can also be found in the designation of target groups. Indeed, there seems to be a shift in designating these latter. In moments of relatively stable atmosphere, the different ethnic groups of Kosovo are mainly addresses under global denominations, stressing the idea of a whole for a “*safe and secure Kosovo... to the benefit of all communities, disregarding their ethnicity or religion*”, “*fully committed to provide a safe and secure environment to everybody*” (KFOR Press Release December 15, 2008). “KFOR needs the help and support of *anybody* who lives in Kosovo”. Expressions as “*work together*” “*unity of effort*” “*among the inhabitants of Kosovo*” also prevail.

A general tendency from COM KFOR to avoid all forms of distinction between Albanian or Serbian audience is clearly visible in its speech: Serbs are only referred to as such when questions of cultural and religious heritage come into play and this only in stable periods. In times of potential violence, KFOR systematically reminds its “*high state of readiness...*” to “*any current situation, either on-going or expected in Kosovo*” (pronounced 9 and 11 times over the 2008 - 2012 period) while keeping the most generalist forms of address possible, as if greater detachment allowed more efficiency.

Finally, the pejorative term “*local populace*” unexpectedly appears on January 1st 2010, which is a radical turning point in KFOR usual tolerant speech:

“KFOR will constantly remain in contact with the local populace and institutions through numerous liaison teams and field offices”

Indeed, the use of this expression in a public press release is particularly striking: coming from 16th century French and Latin, the term “populace” takes its roots from “*popolo*” (people) and was added the pejorative suffix “*accio*” to design a lower, ill-educated mass (Oxford English Dictionary online). Such words undeniably participate to the deconstruction of KFOR’s will to adopt a bottom-up approach through a newly diversified, competent and mobile armed force.

Last but not least, the term “citizen” only appears once in the 2009 Press Releases and twice in 2010. In a political space that is still strictly divided into Nation-States the feeling of exclusion among citizens is likely to emerge. It can influence an actor’s agency (Abdi 2006: 232) and in extreme cases, a discourse depriving its target from basic political concepts can participate to a situation of anomie, an absence of social landmarks (Goffman 1961). It could also implicitly imply a hierarchy between “citizens” and “sub-citizens” in an international space strictly defining political identity along this criterion.

KFOR ambiguous and unclear discourse towards its gender- sensitivity program

Reading KFOR press releases reveals that gender-awareness has become a crucial “*focal point*” for KFOR (KFOR Chronicle 2012) for KFOR from 2011. Many statements in 2011 and 2012 press releases and chronicles express the will from the military force to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 reaffirming “*the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security*”.

The presence of a female Lieutenant Colonel as “*first gender-advisor for the first time ever*” (KFOR Press Release May 17, 2011) echoes her will to “*face sexism*” (Ibid) and change the perceptions of soldiers and senior personnel on women through “*gender-equality*” and a “*comprehensive*”, “*mainstream*” approach (KFOR Press Release May 17, 2011; KFOR Chronicle, January 2012: 22). Thus KFOR seems willing to implement a solid gender-sensitive approach in its internal organisation.

Changing the perception on women soldiers in such a structuring institution in Kosovo as KFOR can exert important impacts on local populations, but also lead to unforeseen reactions. Addressed carefully, changing perceptions on female military staff can be an important grass-root measure in Kosovo and foster more stability on the long-term by reforming social customs and attitudes of patriarchy. Indeed, many agencies state that gender violence is not yet resolved in Kosovo (UNFPA 2005; CBM Mitrovica, Interview 2013). Despite the

attempted regulation of the U.N on this domain in its Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women part of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), violence towards women still remains very embedded in Kosovo, even after the conflict of 1999.

KFOR discourse is still too embedded in masculine views does not seem to provide any significant improvement in KFOR as in Kosovo. Despite the public expression of this will to shift KFOR discourse to a gender-mainstream approach, patriarchal expressions seems to remain present in many female's and male's testimonies released on the KFOR website. In a KFOR Chronicle published in January 2012, a female KFOR Officer has been asked to present her career and achievements. In her response, the young woman enthusiastically praised "*the support of her brother and parents*" and confessed that she "*could not possibly have achieved any of which she has been fortunate to do so to date without them*"(KFOR Chronicle January 2012: 24). Such statement reveals a strong masculine socialisation of women serving in KFOR and responds to the deep-rooted social requirement of rejecting femininity in international politics to ensure a social survival and a chance to succeed in an (international) armed force. Such a testimony seems to verify the argument formulated by several feminist scholars among others (Butler 1999) (Enloe 1990) along which "*male success depends on women's complicity*" (Enloe 1990: 16) when these latter proceed to the "*self-destruction of their own instruments of expression*" (Bourdieu 2001: 15).

The main success sexual division is the naturalness it pretends to obey to, as if it had always been in the phenomenological order of things (Husserl in Bourdieu 2001: 15). The power of patriarchy precisely relies on this absence of justification: the masculinised social order within the military (as other social fields) constantly seeks to legitimise this form of social organisation. Therefore, praising the launch of a gender-equality programme and the presence of women in this military force (KFOR Chronicle January 2012) can be interpreted as a strategy of legitimization (Bourdieu 2001) to, unconsciously or not, participate to masking persistent male structures by seeming more legitimate (Enloe 1990: 10). The female officer further expresses in her testimony her love of travelling "*particularly to the US*" that she has "*visited 12 times*" such as her fondness for masculine activities by for instance affirming to be a "*competitive runner and climber*" (KFOR Chronicle 2012: 24). Another Turkish soldier, Fatir Ehmir, also tells in the Chronicle about his "*hope to visit the U.S*" and his fondness of similar (masculine) activities (KFOR Press Release, January 2012: 25).

The need for these soldiers to affirm their common interests in highly masculine activities might reveal the "*negative symbolic coefficient*" that still characterises femininity in the army and international politics in general and the will to hide all forms of feminine clothing, talking or hobby (Enloe 1990). Feminine values are vulnerable compared to others such as virility and the love of risk, socially constructed as a rational, which makes them highly valued and thus dominant assets in such spheres (Bourdieu 2001: 20).

The visibility of women in press and video releases responds to a need for objectivity, and is further effective when women apply these power relations themselves, which is the key condition for legitimate violence, this latter being always approved by the dominated group

itself (Weber 1989) (Bourdieu 2001). Women also need to build-up their credibility in such masculinized areas, by for instance adjusting the tone of their voices or body postures and avoiding “girls’ talk”. In the army, in politics or in many other social fields, women constantly have to compensate and negotiate their gender by sustained efforts erasing all feminine connotations from their body and language behaviour. In Spivak’s sense, women, especially in the army can be analysed as “*subalterns*” subject to an “*epistemic violence*” and hardly able to “*speak*” in the sense of being heard and exert an influence through their speech (Spivak 2007: 75).

Masculine discourse is thus still largely embedded within KFOR communication (KFOR Chronicle 2012) to lead to meaningful progress in Kosovo on gender issues. The main contradiction seems to lie between theoretical wills expressed in KFOR Gender Discourse and the actual soldier’s socialization in practice. Such an opposition between KFOR texts and practices resonates with Enloe’s critique of international politics as an exclusive male landscape made of sites only filled by men and impacting all scales of politics, from international to local levels. Military bases seem in this case to resemble to small-scale societies created out of unequal relations between men and women but also classes and races (Enloe 1990: 2). Finally, the observation of KFOR billboards spread throughout Kosovo reveal an absence of women: indeed, only men were found on KFOR adverts. This obliteration of women once again demonstrates the dichotomy of gender and the spaces these latter are allocated: masculine aspects of production are present in the public sphere (in this case, public adverts in Kosovo landscape and streets) while feminine aspects remain confined to private sphere, spheres of “*re-production*” (Bourdieu 2001: 20), such as a video on a KFOR website, far less visible, far less accessible to local populations and thus far less likely to integrate women in peace-building process.

Conclusion

It is arguable as a conclusion that KFOR in its public discourse seems to practice a performance of biopolitics as previously defined, thus treating human life as Duffield and other Human Security specialists name “*the politics of bare life*”, that is, missions and agendas with little regards for the individual aspects of personhood, treating local populations as referent objects through protocols of communication and administration (Edkins 2008: 212). The concept of biopolitics underlying in these press releases obeys to the exclusionary and regulatory logics of the text which are applied in the development and security nexus them. Overall, KFOR discourse seems quite naïve.

On the another hand, the analysis of gender sensitivity in KFOR discourse reveals that KFOR and international politics in a general way focus too little on a genuine inclusion of feminist analysis in their processes. International political structures are still depending on the control of men over women (Enloe 1990: 4) and the few that actually are visible in those are not randomly selected, but are precisely “let” in the system because they are disposed and fit to such conditions, which furthermore increases the legitimacy of these institutions (Enloe 1990; Bourdieu 2001).

In this perspective, the implantation of masculinity in foreign policy and military should be further explored, not only for feminist goals but precisely because it would enable to understand how such patriarchal discourses within an international military force can also shape different visions of masculinity among ethnic groups in the territory of its mission and can sometimes fuel conflict by participating to different social constructions of Albanians and Serbs. The politics of masculinity and femininity should be given more importance: it helps to understand why NATO is so powerful: its perception of “normalcy” from local people justifies a military presence, which precisely rests upon this dichotomy of idea of strength versus weakness.

Annex I: Frequency of terminology KFOR Press Releases 2008-2012³

Terminology KFOR	2008	2009	2010	2011	Remarks (or in combination with)
Medical care	15	9	3	5	Healthcare, dental care
Safe and secure environment	3	7	33	21	These two terms are very often used in combination by COM KFOR
Freedom of movement	1	2	10	19	
Generic terms for population of Kosovo	5	10	25	29	These terms include all generic forms of addressing the Kosovo population and are mainly: all the people of Kosovo, the people, everybody. The word "citizen" is rarely mentioned, not at all at the beginning.
Citizens	None	1	2	None	
Populace	None	None	1	None	
Injunctions / Orders	1	11	None	6	These include: - everyone be patient and avoid any incident - people are asked to stay calm - people are asked to practice restraint
Moral injunctions	None	6	None	4	These include: - the words "should" and - "moral obligation"
Cooperation	None	12	14	18	This term is systematically used to either refer to KFOR cooperation with EULEX or with Serbia
High state of readiness and flexibility	None	6	3	3	
Immediate response to any situation	None	7	7	5	
Will not tolerate any kind of violence	None	3	None	2	Always with EULEX when the security situation deteriorates
Ready to respond in a strong way	None	5	None	6	Often with EULEX when the security situation deteriorates
Ready to respond to any current situation, either on-going or unexpected	None	5	6	None	
Young Kosovars	3	5	None	1	
Serbian	None	5	None	9	Generic terms start to disappear whenever situation improves, when not, "all the people" or "everybody", sometimes "parallel structures" remain the privileged term
Mutual understanding, tolerance, trust	None	2	None	15	
Stable, Stability	None	None	10	None	
Economic prosperity, prosperous	None	None	10	None	
Democratic, rule of law	None	1	None	6	

³2012 not applicable due to the document format

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