




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


National Endowment for Democracy
Supporting freedom around the world

KOSOVO SECURITY BAROMETER

Citizens' perceptions on Violent Ex- tremism







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Citizens' perceptions on Violent Extremism

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Information presented in this report are a summary of respondents only, and should be treated as such. It is in no way a definite assessment of the quality of the work of the institutions subject in this study. It shall serve as an instrument for them in addressing potential shortcomings, and also as an indicator of the effectiveness of their communication with the people.

The views presented in this report are perceptions of the respondents and do not necessarily represent views of the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. Opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) either.

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KEY ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY USED

CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
Homemaker	Housewife or Househusband
ICK	Islamic Community of Kosovo
K- Albanian	Kosovo Albanian
KCSS	Kosovar Centre for Security Studies
KP	Kosovo Police
KSB	Kosovo Security Barometer
K-Serb	Kosovo Serb
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
Respondent	An individual selected and interviewed face-to-face by KCSS field researchers team based on the Kosovo Security Barometer methodology;

INTRODUCTION

There have been plenty of assumptions about the magnitude of the effects of violent extremism on the Kosovan society. As witnessed from the various articles and reports published internally and internationally on this topic, these assumptions have been triggered mainly by the fact that since the breakup of the civilian war in Syria¹, many individuals from Kosovo have joined the conflict. However, even though the represented numbers of foreign fighters from Kosovo suggest a concerning situation on ground, there are many opposing arguments to the represented situation of the phenomenon in Kosovo that have too often been underrepresented, suggesting that the number of foreign fighters do not reveal the real extent of the phenomenon's reach within Kosovo.

In this regard, the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) considers that one of the most accurate ways to observe the level of influence of the phenomena of violent extremism on the citizens of Kosovo, is to measure the citizens' perceptions about it. Therefore, when it comes to this special edition of the Kosovo Security Barometer the main focus is to provide deep analysis on some of the main indicators on the given topic, that have been collected through this survey².

The report focuses on analysing eight specific indicators:

1. Citizens' perceptions towards threat posed by violent extremism
2. Citizens' perceptions on threat posed by self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS);
3. Citizens' views on the decision made by foreign fighters to join conflicts;
4. Citizens' perceptions towards threat posed by returned foreign fighters;
5. Citizens' views on the state and society's treatment towards the returned foreign fighters;
6. Citizens' trust towards first-line institutions involved in preventing and combating violent extremism;
7. How often citizens were invited by respective institution to take part in public discussions on the topic;
8. Main sources of information about the phenomena of violent extremism used by citizens;

It is worth mentioning that the indicators have been studied from various angles in the following analysis. Hence, in addition to the generalised results this report provides, there are also clustered analyses for each of the abovementioned indicators. This has been done by applying cross-tabulation methods involving breaking down results provided by randomly selected respondents to sub-indicators, such as

¹In particular from 2012 and on

²See the Annex on the Kosovo Security Barometer Survey methodology

geographical location, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, education, occupational status and the level of income.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is a special edition of the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB). It represents a detailed quantitative analysis reflecting citizens' opinion on violent extremism. The results of this report show that religiously motivated violent extremism continues to be perceived as a threat to Kosovars, though not to a large extent. Respondents consider that internal religious extremism presents a larger threat to the Kosovo society rather than internationally functioning terrorism such as ISIS. The results of this survey reaffirmed that the vast majority do not support the decision of individuals to join foreign conflicts. The results showed that the respondents are largely concerned of the potential threat posed by the radicalized individuals, thus majority remained against reintegration of foreign fighters.

The report measured citizens' trust towards security institutions, underlining the importance of understanding the national efforts to prevent and combat violent extremism. However, the results showed that only Kosovo Police gains sufficient trust while citizens' trust towards the judicial bodies and the Government in general continues to bear extremely low trust.

Finally, the report also underlined that when it comes to violent extremism, there is a low frequency of communication between citizens and respective municipal institutions. Likewise, it highlighted the potentially important role of media when it comes to developing the citizens' mind-set regarding the violent extremism.

KEY FINDINGS

i. Public perceptions on the religiously motivated violent extremism³

Although, according to Kosovo Security Barometer religion does not represent the main source of ideologically or politically motivated violence the results showed that majority of Kosovo citizens are highly concerned by the threat posed by this source of violent extremism. Data analysis of this survey showed that more than 2/3 of the respondents (70 percent) consider that religiously motivated violent extremism represents a serious security threat, with a 3 percent decrease from 2014 KSB result. However interestingly, this percentage varied depending from which perspective it was calculated from:

- From the geographical point of view, 72 percent of those living in urban areas perceived violent extremism as a threat, compared to 67 percent of those living in rural areas

³This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 1 of the extended analyses

- Studying the regional perspective, 93 percent of those living in North Mitrovica region considered the phenomenon as a threat, whereas Ferizaj, Prishtina and Prizren region the percentage varied between 75 and 69, while South Mitrovica, Gjilan and Peja scored 5 to 10 percentage lower, circling between 62 to 63 percent.
 - Ethnically, the results show that 70 percent of Kosovan-Albanian respondents considered violent extremism as a threat compare to 58 percent of the Kosovan-Serbs who shared the same thoughts. It is worth pointing out that there was a vast difference in opinions between K-Serbs living in the northern part of Kosovo, where almost 100 percent of whom considered this phenomenon as a threat and Serbian community living more integrated in the south, only 33 percent shared same opinion.
 - The result was very similar when survey answers were analysed based on religious beliefs of the respondents. More precisely, 70 percent of survey respondents that identified as Muslim (predominantly K-Albanians) stated that violent extremism represent a serious threat, while only 57 percent of those identified as Orthodox (predominantly K-Serbs) shared same thoughts.
 - Frequency of practicing religion did not influence the respondents' opinion. This was evident especially among the Muslim respondents where the difference between practitioners and non-practitioners was less than 5 percent.
- The results showed that age did not evidently impact the perceptions of the respondents. However, when it comes to gender, the difference between men and women varied 16 percentage points.
- Education and income did not seem to have major impact, although respondents with mid-level social-economic status tend to be less preoccupied by this phenomenon. On the other hand, when it comes to the occupation of the respondents, the number of student respondents perceiving violent extremism as a threat was 10 percent higher compared to other categories.

ii. Public perceptions on threats posed by ISIS⁴

The survey results showed that majority of the respondents considered terrorist organisation ISIS to be a serious threat on Kosovo. Respectively, 66 percent of them stated that ISIS pose serious threat towards Kosovo, while 11 percent stated that it represents a moderate threat. Only 22 percent of the respondents considered threat posed by this terrorist organisation as unlikely. However, similar to the case of measuring the perception related to violent extremism as a threat, the perception of

⁴ This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 2 of the extended analyses

the respondents differed depending on the respondents' background:

- With very minor difference, respondents living in the rural area resulted to be more afraid of the threat posed by this terrorist organisation than those living in the urban area;
- Respondents from Ferizaj, Prizren and Prishtina resulted more afraid by ISIS compared to other regions in Kosovo;
- K-Albanians respondents and some small communities in Kosovo resulted more afraid compared to K-Serbs;
- Respondents belonging to Muslim and Catholic religions resulted more afraid of the threat compared to the Orthodox respondents;
- There was no difference in percentage between the respondents who practice religion regularly and those who do not practice regularly in respect to perceiving ISIS as a threat;
- Similarly, there was no significant difference in views provided by younger and older respondents;
- Gendering the results, the percentage of total number of women respondents stating that the terrorist organisation represent serious threat was 22 percent higher than of the men;
- Level of education, level of income or occupation did not seem to influence the perception of respondents regarding the threat posed by ISIS.

iii. Public perceptions on the decision to join foreign conflicts⁵

Results showed that citizens largely oppose the decision of individuals to join foreign conflicts: Respectively 83 percent of the respondents considered that the decision as wrong, compared to 6 percent who stated it as a positive act. Additionally, the angles of data analysis likewise showed highly differing results in this case:

- Considering the ethnicities of the respondents, only 2 percent of K-Albanians stated that the radicalised individuals' decision was positive, whereas 42 percent of K-Serbs said it was positive. Similar data emerged when viewing this indicator from religious perspective where only 3 percent of Muslim respondents stated that the decision of these individuals was right, compared to 43 percent of the Orthodox.
- The analysed data showed that K-Albanian religious practitioners and non-practitioners have almost identical views, while within K-Serb community this variance is around 7 percentage where religious practitioners seemed to be more supportive towards joining foreign conflicts.

⁵This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 3 of the extended analyses

- Interestingly, similar results emerged when analysing the results of the different age groups within the respondents. While there was almost no difference in opinion between younger and older generations among K-Albanian majority community, it was the younger respondents of the K-Serb community whose percentage was 7 points higher than of the older community in supporting the decision of join foreign conflicts.
- Finally, the results emphasised that the level of education, occupational status and the level of income of the respondents did not strongly affect the trends of their responds in judging the decision of joining foreign conflicts. Although the illiterate respondents - who were mainly the elders - and those with university diploma seemed to be slightly more indifferent about these decisions but by very small margins.

iv. Public perceptions on the threat posed by foreign fighters⁶

When it comes to the threat posed by the returned foreign fighters who joined the conflict in Iraq and Syria, it seems that citizens remain slightly sceptical that these individuals pose a realistic threat towards Kosovo. Up to 64 percent of the respondents stated that these individuals represent a serious threat while 18 percent added that it represents a moderate threat. On the other hand, 17 percent of the respondents ruled out the possibility that these returned individuals may pose any threat to Kosovo. However, again in this case the answers of respondents varied depending on their background:

- Yet again, the percentage of K-Albanian respondents who stated that these individuals represent a threat was 23 percent points higher compared to K-Serb respondents.
- Almost identical was also the percentage difference between Muslim and Orthodox respondents, Muslim respondents resulting being more fearful of these individuals than the Orthodox ones.
- Generally speaking, there was very limited difference between religious practitioners and non-practitioners, while younger respondents tend to be more concerned of the returned foreign fighters than older ones, above 35 years old.
- However in this case, an above average number of those respondents (70 to 75 percent) with primary education or lower considered these individuals as a major threat, compared to those with high school or university diploma (whose answers circled between 57 to 63 percent).

⁶ This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 4 of the extended analyses

- At the same time, employed respondents and retired ones seem to be more indifferent about the threat posed by returned foreign fighters with percentage varying between 56 and 58 percent, whereas students, homemakers and unemployed ones considered the same 64 - 74 percent.
- With respondents with no or less than 120€/month were more concerned, than other respondents with higher incomes.

v. Public perceptions on how state and society should treat returned foreign fighters⁷

The report studied perceptions related to integration of returned foreign fighters back in the society. In these regards, the results showed that 58 percent of respondents refuse to accept these individuals to be reintegrated in the society; 25 percent were open about this only in the case if the state continues to supervise them closely, while only 15 percent were open to their re-integration without expressing any reserves. However, geographically or regionally speaking these percentages varied significantly:

- In comparison to the rural percentage, in the urban areas the number of respondents was higher with 3 percent who stated that they are open to accept these individuals to be re-integrated in the society if they are closely supervised by the state.
- Likewise, with 80 percent the respondents from North Mitrovica region showed most reluctance in re-integration of these individuals, followed by Ferizaj, Prishtina, Gjakova and South Mitrovica with 62 and 59 percent in between.
- Respondents from Gjilan, Peja and Prizren were more open about integration with only 48 to 52 percent responding against.

vi. Public's trust towards main institutions involved in implementation of the Kosovo's strategy on violent extremism⁸

In addition to measuring the perception related to perceived threat from religion-based violent extremism ideology and the affected individuals, the report analysed the trust on key institutions involved in the implementation of CVE strategy, including: Police, Prosecution, Court, Government, Municipalities and Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK). Here it must be pointed out that the results related to institutions are collected individually and considering the completely different tasks and mission the institutions have, the idea was not to compare one institution with another. Nevertheless, general credibility is an important aspect which shapes the

⁷ This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 5 of the extended analyses

⁸ This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 6 of the extended analyses,

citizens' views on the institutions' capability to deal with certain phenomena. When it comes to CVE the general trust towards institutions in preventing this phenomenon have important role in shaping the citizens' view. The results showed:

- From all institutions involved in dealing with phenomena, Kosovo Police is the only institution which can be considered as highly trusted by the Kosovan citizens, with 56 percent.
- With 44 percent, BIK was the second most trusted institution. However, it should be pointed out that the KSB trend results have showed over the last four years (2013-2016) the trust of citizens towards ICK dropping almost 20 percentage in comparison to the 2013 results. The major reason for this was the inability of its religious mechanisms to protect the Muslim community in Kosovo from outside tendencies to spread violent narrative among its members.
- Trust towards Government (only 13 percent) and judicial institutions (21 percent for courts and 27 percent for prosecution) is low, although causes for this low level of trust have no relations to issues associated with religion. These causes are predominantly related to the high level of corruption, nepotism, politicisation, abuse of power and incapability to provide the society with socio-economic development. Nevertheless, it is evident that it would be difficult for citizens to believe that this phenomenon can be prevented and combated properly if the level of trust towards the involved institutions does not improve.

vii. Interaction between municipal institutions and citizens on preventing and combating violent extremism⁹

Another citizens' concern highlighted in this report is the lack of consultations of citizens from the respective institutions, although raising awareness has been considered crucial in fighting the phenomenon in many municipal reports. The report reveals that only 5 percent of the respondents had been invited by municipal officials to discuss the topic while 94 percent stated that they were never contacted by any authority to consultations. From those who were contacted, 3 percent declared that they were contacted more than once while the other 2 percent declared that they have been contacted only once. Meantime further detailed results showed that:

- Respondents living in the rural resulted being slightly more frequently contacted by their municipal institutions compared to the percentage of those living in urban areas;

⁹This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 7 of the extended analyses,

- Respondents from Prizren, North Mitrovica and Ferizaj region were most frequently contacted (with 8 to 7 percent), followed by those from Prishtina, Peja, Gjilan, South Mitrovica and Gjakova region (circling from 4 to below 1 percent);
- From gender point of view, only 3 percent of the total women respondents interviewed by this survey, stated to have been invited by their respective municipal authorities to discuss the topic. This equals to 4 percentage less compare to men respondents, of whom 7 percent stated to have been invited by their respective municipal authorities to discuss the phenomena;
- Older respondents resulted being contacted more frequently than younger ones; Employed respondents (8 percent) declared being the most frequently invited by municipal institutions in these discussions followed by Students (5 percent).

viii. The citizens' main sources of information on violent extremism¹⁰

Finally, the survey measured the most frequent sources of information on violent extremism. As expected, the results showed that 70 percent of the respondents use television; 17 percent relied on online social media (Facebook, Twitter etc); 2 percent newspapers; and 2 percent use friends and relatives as a source of information. Nevertheless, interesting results emerged in data analysis, showing that:

- Respondents living in the rural areas continue to be slightly more traditional when it comes to picking the means of information, as 74 percent of them chose television as their main information source compared to only 66 percent of those living in the urban areas;
- Unlike other regions in Kosovo where use of television is more prevalent (between 69 to 75 percent) and online social media (between 13 to 21 percent) as the main source of information on the phenomenon, respondents from North Mitrovica region were less predisposed to use them as a source (only 44 percent);

Interestingly, the general results show that K-Albanians were more predisposed to use social media than other communities (K-Serbs with only 7 percent);

- Almost identical case was revealed with Muslim and Catholic respondents who showed more tendency to use social media as an information source compared to the Orthodox respondents;
- There was no evident difference between religious practitioners and non-practitioners in different means of information about violent extremism;
- More than 1/3 of the respondents of 35-years-old or younger stated that social media is the main means of information on violent extremism, that represent almost 25-percentage points difference compared to older ones;

¹⁰ This key findings sub-session represents a summary of the detailed quantitative data analyses in the session Section 8 of the extended analyses

- There were no evident differences between women and men respondents in their information sources;
- Finally, when it comes to occupation of the respondents, students resulted being much more predisposed of using online social media (36 percent) and online news portals (19 percent) as the source of information compared to other categories, confirming once again that younger respondents are much more exposed to free internet content.

IDENTIFIED KEY PATTERNS

Considering that cross-tabulated data has been used as the foundation of this report, the method allowed using sub-indicators throughout the paper to measure the divergences within the results of each measured indicator. Hence, the report identified interesting patterns that were characteristic throughout the paper that were enabled through cross-tabulation.

Among the most visible pattern that became evident was that in essence the findings did not provide major difference in opinion between respondents from different socio-economic backgrounds. More precisely, respondents from urban and rural areas, men and women, 35-years-old and younger together with older respondents, respondents from different socio-economic status (level of education, occupation and level of incomes) basically shared almost identical opinions towards the measured indicators related to violent extremism in Kosovo. This shows that push-and-pull-factors that have been defined in the current CVE national strategy of Kosovo are not as problematic as initially was thought. On the other hand, the analysed results showed that respondents who may generally be considered as more vulnerable, showed more tendency to perceive the threat of violent extremism at a higher tone, including the youth, women, students, isolated communities, respondents with lower social-economic status and also those with higher than average income.


Meantime, the largest gap between the respondents' opinions were between those having different ethnic backgrounds. Generally, K-Albanians showed higher tendency to see violent extremism as a threat compared to K-Serbs. Interestingly, the different ethnic groups and their perceptions towards the phenomenon corresponded largely with the perceptions of the traditionally related religions. However, throughout the results it was easy to notice that the reason for it could be because religiously

ethnic communities in Kosovo are highly homogeneous: majority of Muslim and minority Catholic community in Kosovo are K-Albanians whereas the majority of Orthodox community in Kosovo are K-Serbs.

WHY PERCEPTIONS ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM MATTER?

Over the last few years, violent extremism has become one of the most discussed security topics in Kosovo. However due to the lack of any credible source which could enable more information about the topic, there have been major vagueness and difficulty in measuring to what exact extent this phenomenon has affected the population in Kosovo. Respectively, while since 2012 approximately 317 Kosovo citizens¹¹ have joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq, there were limited first-hand sources that could explain what those numbers really mean.

The most anticipated method used to measure the level of violent extremism ideologies in Kosovo is by comparing the situation to other countries in Europe as well as with those in the region. Official numbers of foreign fighters per capita indicated that the phenomenon's influence in Kosovo have struck at an alarming scale. Kosovo thus resulted in having among the largest number of foreign fighter per capita in Europe and Western Balkans.¹²




¹¹ Latest reports by Kosovo Police, June 2017

¹² Efraim B. and Esteban F. Klor, "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters" National Bureau for Economic Research, April 2016, Page 19 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w22190.pdf>

However, despite the important contributions that the horizontal comparisons between countries have had in early identification of problem patterns, in the case of Kosovo such measurements have been somewhat inadequate. First and foremost, it lacked consideration of the religious element: unlike other European countries, 90 percent of Kosovan population identify as Muslim. Hence, as the following chart show, one cannot provide accurate measurements about the phenomenon if crucial demographic components and other social elements are overlooked. Therefore, in respect to the number of foreign fighters, in 2015 KCSS have rightly spotted that if only Muslim population would be taken into consideration, Kosovo would fall far below most of the European countries and the Western Balkans.¹³

Similar figures related to the number of foreign fighters in conflicts have been published by National Bureau for Economic Research in 2016¹⁴ which is a US based private non-profit organisation. Accordingly, Kosovo resulted being 17th in the list of the European countries with foreign fighters. Respectively, it reiterated a lower percentage in contrast to geographically and culturally close Western Balkan countries such as Montenegro (8th), Serbia (11th); Bosnia & Herzegovina (12th) and Macedonia (13th). Interestingly, according to this source almost all top 10 places were taken by most developed European countries.¹⁵




Besides, as affirmed by the figures below, it has to be reminded that not all individuals joining foreign conflicts were solely radicalised by violent extremism but a significant number of them were misled. Likewise, around 28 of those who joined conflict in Syria and Iraq were children while 44 others were spouses of the fighters who can also be considered as victims forced to travel together with their radicalised family member to the so-called Islamic State's caliphate or other terrorist groups.¹⁶

¹³ Shpend Kursani, "Report inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens' involvement as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq", published by Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, April 2015

¹⁴ NBER is a US based private, non-profit, non-partisan organisation located in Massachusetts which is dedicated to conducting economic research and to disseminating research findings among academics, public policy makers, and business professionals. <http://www.nber.org>

¹⁵ Efraim B. and Esteban F. Klor, "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters" National Bureau for Economic Research, April 2016, Page 19 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w22190.pdf>


¹⁶ This source refers to the latest reports from Kosovo Police, June 2016



- 1 FF WHO JOINED CONFLICTS
- 2 CHILDREN AND SPOUSES FORCED TO JOIN THEIR CONFLICTS
- 3 RETURNED FOREIGN FIGHTERS
- 4 IMPRISONED AND DETAINED INDIVIDUALS
- 5 OTHER RADICALIZED INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVENT COMMITTED ANY CRIMINAL

Henceforth, it is of importance to recognise that studying problems from a horizontal comparative point of view does not necessarily provide the audience with a transparent overview about the extent of the phenomenon and its effects on the citizens of Kosovo.

Finally, as citizens' perception measurements show, religious extremism does not represent the most potent source of violence in Kosovo. There are other sources of extremism, e.g. ethnically and politically motivated violence that are considered as much more imminent threats in Kosovo than religiously motivated extremism is. This was confirmed by the following data of KSB survey collected in October 2016.



Input 0: Respondents' perception on threatening sources of the phenomenon of violent extremism in Kosovo (KSB 2016)

However, since the abovementioned alternative sources of violent extremism in addition to religious motivation have less global implications compare to the religiously motivated one, the focus of the public towards other sources of extremism threatening Kosovo are less apparent. Therefore, this paper has focused solely on measuring perceptions of the Kosovo citizens on religious violent extremism. Respectively, the aim of these interview-based data and in-depth analyses is to serve as an alternative source for various researchers, experts and policy makers in order to figuratively be presented with the extent and effects of the phenomenon amongst the Kosovan citizens without no-longer having to rely solely on the confounding and inattentive sources of information.

KOSOVO SECURITY BAROMETER

Special Edition on Violent Extremism

EXTENDED DATA ANALYSIS

I. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM


As highlighted in other reports published by KCSS, the rise of religious based violent extremism in Kosovo represents a realistic threat. The only disputable issue which has so far been related to the phenomenon is assessing its true threat and the level that this threat has affects the citizens of Kosovo. In this regard, one of the first aims of the KSB survey is to study the extent of the effects that violent extremism has on Kosovan citizens.

The results show that more than 4/5 of the interviewed respondents considered violent extremism to be a threat. This includes a figure of 70 percent of whom considered this phenomenon as a serious threat. Only 15 percent of the respondents stated that violent extremism does not represent a realistic threat.



Indicator 1: Respondents' perception on violent extremism as a threat

Moreover, results show that the level of the perceived threat have not significantly changed over the past couple of years. As can be seen from the trend figure below, similar results were presented in the 2014 KSB survey.¹⁷



Sub-Indicator 1.A: Comparison of respondents' perception on violent extremism as a threat

¹⁷ KCSS, Database of Kosovo Security Barometer Survey Edition of 2014, conducted

However, it is worth mentioning that although the results show that the threat of violent extremism remain present, it is difficult to draw a specific conclusion from these results without breaking the results down. Therefore, in an attempt to provide a clearer picture of the respondents' views on the matter, the report has utilised different sub-indicators to analyse this result. The report has successfully used cross-tabulation method to further analyse this result. This includes categorisation of the respondents' responses based on the following characteristics: type of habitat area (rural/urban); region where they come from; ethnicity; religion; age; gender; level of education, occupation and the level of monthly income.

Among others, the results showed that respondents living in the urban areas feels slightly more vulnerable to this phenomenon compared to those living in the rural ones.

RURAL

16%

Around 1 in 6 respondents from rural area do not consider violent extremism as a threat

67%

Two in three respondents from rural area consider violent extremism as a threat

URBAN

15%


Around 1 in 6 respondents from urban area do not consider violent extremism as a threat

72%

More than 7 in 10 respondents from urban area consider violent extremism as a threat


Sub-Indicator 1.1: Perception towards violent extremism as a threat seen from rural/urban perspective

The results highlighted that respondents from North Mitrovica region felt more vulnerable to this threat compared to other regions in Kosovo. Significant level of fear was expressed also by respondents living in Ferizaj, Prishtina, Prizren and Gjakova regions. Meanwhile, respondents from Peja, South Mitrovica and Gjilan resulted being less concerned by this threat.




Sub-Indicator 1.2: Perception towards violent extremism as a threat seen from regional perspective

In the meantime, when it comes to ethnicity of the respondents, the figure below shows that respondents belonging to K-Albanians and other small communities considered themselves much more threatened by this phenomenon than the K-Serbs.




Sub-Indicator 1.3: Perception towards violent extremism as a threat seen from ethnic perspective

It worth pointing out that when it comes to K-Serb respondents, their opinion regarding the issue differentiated depending on the region they came from. As seen below, almost entire number of interviewed respondents from the community living in the four northern municipalities of Kosovo stated that violent extremism represents a serious threat for Kosovo. In contrast to them, the opinion of those from this community living more integrated in the southern parts of Kosovo was highly different, with only 1/3 of them considering this phenomenon as a threat.



Sub-Indicator 1.4: Perception of K-Serb respondents on violent extremism based on their living area

The analysis cross-tabulated this result also in relation to the religious background of the respondents.¹⁸ As expected, figures emerged from this formula did not differ from those based on their ethnicity. However, similarities were predictable as the ethnic and religious groups in Kosovo are highly homogenous and corresponsive. Hence, Muslim and Catholic respondents (majority of whom are K-Albanians) felt much more concerned about threat posed by violent extremism compared to the Orthodox ones (majority of whom are K-Serbs).



Sub-Indicator 1.5: Perception towards violent extremism as a threat based on the declared religion of the respondents

Nevertheless, there is one predicament worth exploring more closely: which one of these have influenced the perceptions of the respondents more, religion or ethnicity? Historically, Kosovo has never been an arena for religiously motivated conflicts. However, the same cannot be said about ethnic conflicts: Since 1989 Kosovo have been an arena of deep interethnic division between K-Albanian majority and K-Serb minority that was inspired by reprisal regime of Milosevic that culminated into a bloody war in 1999. Henceforth, it seems that wounds from this period triggered different opinions between these communities also in this matter.


Furthermore, data analysis found out that the difference in the opinions between respondents who were regular and non-regular religious practitioners is quite small. Respectively, when compared to those who stated that they are practitioners, respondents who declared themselves being non-regular practitioners, only slight divergence was seen. Despite the figure below describing the difference only between Muslim respondents, similar tendencies were noticed also among respondents belonging to other religious communities



Sub-Indicator 1.6: Perception of the Muslim respondents towards violent extremism based on the frequency of practicing the religion

¹⁸ The structure of respondents interviewed by KSB 2016 was as follow: 89 percent were Muslims, 6 percent Orthodox, around 2.5 percent Catholics and around 2.5 percent were undeclared.

In the regard of age and gender, the results showed that there is almost no difference between respondents who were 35-year-old or younger and those above 35 years old. However, this was not the case when the results were calculated taking the gender of respondents into account: The difference in opinion between women and men respondents in this issue was evidently high. Men respondents were more unafraid of the phenomenon compared to the women respondents.



Sub-Indicator 1.7: Perception towards violent extremism: age and gender perspective

Finally, the results related to level of threat posed by violent extremism were cross-tabulated also from social-economic composition of the respondents' perspective. The aim of this measurement was to identify specific clues deriving from the so-called 'push-factors'. Nevertheless, as can be noticed from the figures below, socio-economic factors lack determining factor in influencing the mind-set of respondents towards the phenomenon of violent extremism as overall differences in opinion between these categorized groups resulted being minimal.

Respectively, respondents with university degree and those with little or no education resulted being more predisposed to consider violent extremism as a threat

	Illiterate	Unfinished Primary School	Finished Primary Education	Finished Secondary Education	With University Degree
Not a Threat	11.11%	6.35%	13.76%	16.96%	15.99%
Threat	72.22%	76.19%	68.12%	66.08%	73.67%

Sub-Indicator 1.8: Respondent perceptions towards violent extremism as a threat based on their level of education:

Similarly, respondents with income less than 120€ and those who declared income above 500€ were more predisposed to threat than those of midlevel income.

	From 0 to 120 Euro	From 120 to 250 Euro	From 250 to 500 Euro	From 500 to 800 Euro	More than 800 Euro
Not a Threat	15%	16%	18%	5%	25%
Threat	71%	67%	66%	74%	69%

Sub-Indicator 1.9: Respondent perceptions towards violent extremism as a threat based on their level of income:

Meantime, when it comes to occupation of the respondents, students and homemakers were more preoccupied about the threat that this phenomenon represents in Kosovo than the employed, retired and surprisingly unemployed ones.




Sub-Indicator 1.10: Perception of respondents towards violent extremism phenomena as a threat based on their occupation status

2. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON THREAT POSED BY ISIS

Besides analysing the citizens' perception on violent extremism, a phenomenon which is now considered to have taken up domestic scale, the report analysed perception of some external factors that trigger violent extremism in Kosovo. Particularly, it analysed threat perceptions of citizens towards the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist organisation which over the past few year occupied a central stage in the global scale when it comes to inspiring religiously motivated violent extremism.

As expected, the survey findings show that the vast majority of citizens consider this terrorist organisation to represent serious threat towards Kosovo. Respectively, as seen in the figure below, around 66 percent of Kosovo citizens consider ISIS to be a serious threat while additional 11 percent stated it as a moderate one. On the other hand, around 22 percent of respondents were not convinced that this organisation has interests in Kosovo.



Input 2: Perception of respondents towards violent extremism as a threat

However, while the result showed that majority of respondents considered ISIS as a threat it also showed that according to them this terrorist organisation represent lesser threat compared to the phenomena of the religiously motivated violent extremism in general. Nevertheless, in order to provide a more specific study to the topic, the report continues with further analyses to the results. It includes measuring citizens' perception towards this threat by using similar sub-indicators which were used when measuring violent extremism, being: rural/urban area, region, ethnicity, religion, age, gender, education status, occupation and income.

The results showed that respondents living in the urban area were slightly less concerned about the threat posed by ISIS compared to urban ones. However, despite that the margin of difference between these two groups was small, the result seemed very interesting considering that almost all attacks committed by ISIS have targeted urban areas.

RURAL

20%

Around 1 in 5 respondents from rural area ruled out ISIS as potential security threat

67%

Two in three respondents from rural area considered violent extremism as a serious threat

URBAN

15%


Around 1 in 4 respondents from urban area ruled out ISIS as potential security threat

66%

2 in 3 respondents from urban area considered violent extremism as a serious threat


Sub-Indicator 2.1: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Rural/urban perspective

Interesting figures derived when the result was analysed based on their home regions. Respondents from Ferizaj, Prishtina, Prizren and Gjakova regions showed more concern about the threat posed by ISIS compared to other regions. On the other hand, respondents from fourth northern municipalities were the least threatened from ISIS, which interestingly is the completely opposite of what was the case when measuring violent extremism as a threat.




Sub-Indicator 2.2: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Ethnic perspective

From the ethnic perspective, the results once again showed that K-Albanian respondents were more predisposed to consider ISIS as a threat compared to K-Serb respondents, following a similar trend as when measuring the threat from violent extremism. However, the margin of difference between K-Albanians and K-Serbs in this case was slightly lower.



Sub-Indicator 2.3: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Ethnic perspective

Meanwhile, a similar trend emerged when measuring the respondents' religious background. Again, the Muslim and Catholic respondents (majority of whom are K-Albanians) felt more concerned about the threat than the Orthodox respondents (majority of whom are K-Serbs), similarly to analysing the threat of violent extremism.



Sub-Indicator 2.4: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Religion perspective


It is worth noting that when it comes to the threat posed by ISIS, there were no difference in opinion between regular and non-regular religious practitioners: Both seem to share almost identical views regarding the level of threat posed by this organisation.



Sub-Indicator 2.5: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Religion practitioners/non-practitioners perspective


No essential difference in opinion were noticed when clustering this result based on the age groups of the respondents. Both 35 years and younger and the older respo-

ndents shared almost identical views about the threat posed by ISIS. However, this was not the case when the result was cross-tabulated with gender composition of the respondents. Respectively, the figure below shows that around 77 percent of the women respondents considered ISIS as serious threat compared to 53 percent of male, representing 23 percentage points difference between these two gender groups.



Sub-Indicator 2.6: Perception towards violent extremism: Age and gender perspective

Interestingly, respondents that had lower education level were more predisposed to consider ISIS as a threat compare to those with higher education.



Sub-Indicator 2.7: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Education level perspective

On the other hand, when it comes analysing this result based on the respondents' income level, the results did not speak as much. As can be seen bellow, the margin of difference in opinion between respondents from different levels of income was relatively low.



Sub-Indicator 2.8: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Income level perspective

Finally, a similar situation arose when analysing the threat based on the occupation of the respondents. Homemakers in this case resulted to be more afraid of ISIS, whereas all other respondent categories tended to share similar views on the threat posed by ISIS.




Sub-Indicator 2.9: Perception towards threat posed by ISIS: Occupation status perspective

3. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON DECISION TO JOIN FOREIGN CONFLICTS

One of the most important indicators that closely study the Kosovo citizens' views on religiously motivated foreign conflicts is their opinion on some individuals' decision to join these conflicts. This was also the idea that pushed KSB to measure the citizens' perception on the matter.


The results of KSB confirmed that citizens are very much against the motives that have led individuals from Kosovo to join the foreign conflicts. This can be identified in the below figure that highlights that a ratio of more than 9/10 interviewed respondents disapprove the decision join foreign conflicts, in comparison to 1/17 interviewed respondents who consider the decisions as positive.



Input 3: Respondents' perceptions on the decision of Kosovan individuals to join foreign conflicts

Although the percentage of those who declared themselves supportive towards motives that trigger individuals to joining foreign conflicts was very low, due to the sensitivity of this topic, the result shall be studied through sub-indicators. Respectively, the results were cross-tabulated by using the following specifics of the respondents: ethnicity, religion, age, level of education, income and occupation.


Ethnically, the results showed that 96 percent of K-Albanians opposed the decision of individuals to join the foreign conflicts. Similar views were shared also by respondents belonging to other communities. Surprise exception to this were only K-Serb respondents who resulted being quite supportive towards such decisions. The ratio of K-Serb respondents supporting such decision resulted being 42 percent.



Sub-Indicator 3.1: Perceptions based on ethnic background of respondents


Overall, it is difficult to identify what precisely made K-Serb respondents to be more supportive towards the decision. However, based on information collected through focus-groups organised together with field researcher, their main indications were that many of them linked foreign fighters with the individuals who joined Russian supported separatists in Ukraine and Syria's Bashar Assad's forces to fight against its opposition, and ISIS.

It is worth mentioning that identical figures were received when analysing respondents' answers clustered based on their religion. Clear majority of Muslim and Catholic respondent showed firm opposition to individuals from Kosovo joining foreign conflicts.¹⁹ On the other hand, 43 percent of respondents identifying as Orthodox²⁰ shared positive regards on motives that trigger the decision to join foreign conflicts.



Sub-Indicator 3.2: Perceptions based on religion belonging of respondents

On other hand, the figure below shows that frequency of practicing the religion does not have significant influence in the respondents' answers on this matter. Although, as can be seen, among the K-Serb respondents the gap difference between practitioners and non-practitioners was slightly more evident compare to K-Albanians.




Sub-Indicator 3.3: Perceptions of K-Albanians and K-Serbs based on level of practicing religion

¹⁹ Vast majority of whom were K-Albanians

²⁰ Vast majority of whom were K-Serbs


Moreover, the following figure confirms that age plays no significant role when it comes to different opinions shared by K-Albanian or the K-Serb respondents.



Sub-Indicator 3.4: Perceptions of K-Albanians and K-Serbs based on the following age-groups


Finally, when it comes to the social-economic perspective, the results show that although there are variables between respondents from different background, there were no indication that the level of education, occupation or level of income play any major role in shaping the views of the respondents.

Nevertheless, as can be seen from the figure below, illiterate respondents resulted having slightly more positive views towards motives of foreign fighters joining foreign conflicts. However, this cannot be considered a representative indicator considering that the participation of this category of respondents in the total percentage is very low.²¹



Sub-Indicator 3.5: Comparing the difference in perceptions based on the level of education of the respondents

Meantime, the retired respondents resulted being more supportive towards these decisions. However, this may reflect rather on their lack of interest in this topic rather than any concrete moral support towards these groups.



Sub-Indicator 3.6: Perceptions of respondents based on their occupation

Finally, the results show that income does not play any significant role in shaping the opinion of the respondents.




Sub-Indicator 3.7: Perceptions of respondents based on their level of incomes

²¹ The structure of respondents resulted as follows: 1,6 percent illiterate; 5,8 percent with unfinished primary education; 27,3 percent with finished primary education only; 36,1 percent with finished secondary education; 29,2 percent had university degree.

4. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON THREAT POSED BY FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Aside from inquiring how Kosovan citizens view the decision of fellow citizens to join foreign conflicts, another important indicator to study is whether they consider that the return of these foreign fighters affect the level of their personal security. The results of the KSB show that majority of citizens feel threatened by the returning foreign fighters. Respectively, 64 percent of the respondents stated that they consider these individuals being a serious threat, and in addition to it, another 18 percent declared that these individuals represent a moderate threat. Only 17 percent of the respondents stated that they are unconvinced that these individuals may pose towards interests in Kosovo.



Indicator 4: Threat posed by the returned foreign fighters

However, as can be noticed, respondents shared more concerns regarding the decision to join foreign conflicts than they did against foreign. The main argument of those who ruled out the threat coming from returned foreign fighters was that many of those who joined foreign conflicts were triggered by the sudden global political support that opposition in Syria received in the early stage of the conflict.²² Otherwise, insights from the field research indicated that citizens are still hopeful that the radicalised individuals are still attached to their initial secularised community therefore they won't commit any attack against them.

The report once more used sub-indicators of ethnicity, religious beliefs, frequency of practicing religion, education, level of income and the occupation of the respondents to analyse the nuances of citizens' perceptions the initial indicator.


²² Focus Group

The results showed that K-Albanian respondents in much larger percentage consider the returned individuals as a threat compared to K-Serbs ones. Similar trends were noticed in comparing the Muslim and Catholic respondents compared to the Orthodox.

	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Muslim	Orthodox	Catholic
No particular threat	16%	26%	16%	31%	8%
Major Threat	65%	42%	65%	41%	77%

Sub-Indicator 4.1: Perceptions based on ethnicity and religion of the respondents

Similar trends were seen in analysing the age groups, although the difference in opinion between younger and older respondents was higher compared when they were asked about the violent extremism phenomena in general.



Sub-Indicator 4.2: Perceptions based on the respondents' age-groups

Analysing the level of education, the most indifferent respondents were those with secondary education diploma or higher. This may be related to the fact that the more educated the respondents are, the more aware of the fact that not all who joined the conflict were foreign fighters or joined the foreign conflict because due to radicalisation. On the other hand, these results may be interpreted from the point of view that people with lower education may feel more targeted by violent extremist groups.

	Illiterate	Unfinished Primary School	Primary Education	Secondary Education Diploma	University Degree
No particular threat	17%	10%	16%	18%	16%
Major Threat	61%	75%	70%	57%	63%

Sub-Indicator 4.3: Perceptions of respondents based on their level of education

On the other hand, different level of income resulted in showing no significant results amongst different income groups.

	From 0 to 120 Euro	From 120 to 250 Euro	From 250 to 500 Euro	From 500 to 800 Euro	More than 800 Euro
No particular threat	18%	19%	20%	12%	13%
Major Threat	65%	57%	58%	60%	56%

Sub-Indicator 4.4: Perceptions based on monthly income of the respondents

In respect to the occupation of the respondents, students and homemakers continued to express most concern about the threat of returning foreign fighters, while the employed and retired respondents were again more predisposed to see it as a problem.


	Employed	Retired	Student	Homemakers	Unemployed
No particular threat	17%	25%	11%	16%	15%
Major Threat	58%	56%	71%	69%	64%

Sub-Indicator 4.5: Perceptions based on the occupation status of the respondents

5. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON HOW STATE AND SOCIETY SHOULD TREAT RETURNED FOREIGN FIGHTERS

As noticed from above sections, the vast majority of Kosovan citizens oppose violent extremist ideologies and are against individuals joining the foreign conflicts. Likewise, it also showed that majority of the citizens consider the return of these individuals as a threat to Kosovo. Moreover, the results continued to follow the same pattern in the treatment of these individuals by the state and society.

As seen in the figure below, almost 3 in 5 interviewed respondents were reluctant to accept returned foreign fighters in their communities. According to these respondents, those individuals pose direct threat towards them, indicating that they must be kept away from the rest of the society.²³ However, not all respondents agreed with a tough institutional approach against these individuals: Almost 1 in 4 respondents were in favour of semi-open policy against them, which means that they were open to accept the returned foreign fighters to be reintegrated in their living environments but only in the case if the state institutions assure them that the institutions will closely monitor the movements of the returned individuals. Furthermore, around 15 percent of interviewed respondents stated that they would have no problem whatsoever if the returnees were reintegrated in their living environment. These respondents considered that despite the background of these individuals they still lack willingness to commit any violent act against Kosovo.




Input 5: Respondents' perception related to institutional measures towards foreign fighters

²³ Focus Group with Field Researchers involved in conducting the Kosovo Security Barometer Survey, Edition of 2016 held at KCSS premises on November 1st, 2016


It must be pointed out that one of the most important components of de-radicalisation and re-integration of the returnees is the readiness of the society to embrace these individuals as their members, particularly as long as their democratic rights are guaranteed.

Hence in order to measure the readiness of the communities to engage the returnees, the report analysed this data also from a geographical perspective. The goal of this was to identify in which areas and regions the citizens are more reluctant and more willing to accept the reintegration of these individuals along the lines of the contemporary reintegration strategy of Kosovo. Respondents from rural areas seem to be slightly stricter about accepting returnees in their environment compare to urban ones as emphasised in the percentages. This may result as people living in the rural areas in Kosovo have stronger sense of community. However, bearing in mind the minimal difference, both those living in rural and urban area shared very similar views when it comes to the



Sub-input 5.1: Respondents' perceptions related to institutional measures towards foreign fighters viewed from Rural/Urban perspective

prospect of treatment of these individuals and their reintegration in the society. When analysing the regional differences, the cross-tabulated results showed that Northern Mitrovica region is the most reluctant to reintegrate returnees in the society. More than 80 percent of the respondents from this region stated that they would not accept returned foreign fighters in their living area. Meantime the regions that resulted being less rigid about the idea of reintegration, were Gjilan followed by Peja and Prizren. Only 48 and 52 percent of the respondents from these regions were against immediate reintegration of these individuals in their living environment, stating that they pose a threat to the society.




Sub-Input 5.2: Respondents' perceptions related to institutional measures towards foreign fighters: regional perspective

6. PUBLIC'S TRUST TOWARDS MAIN INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KOSOVO'S STRATEGY ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The Strategy on Prevention of the Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020²⁴ highlights that there are various institutions in Kosovo involved in prevention and combating violent extremism phenomenon. This includes not only the involvement of Islamic Community in Kosovo (ICK) and Kosovo police but also the judiciary and governmental institutions from both central and municipal level. However, one of the main prerequisites for these institutions to be able to exercise their role legitimately is for them to be trusted.

As can be seen from the figure below, trust towards the security institutions continue to remain low, other than towards the police. For a police institution to receive this level of trust is considerably high and is comparable to other police forces in other democratic countries. However, the same figure below shows that this cannot be said about the judiciary and central governmental institutions. Indeed, these institutions resulted being much less trusted compared to municipal institutions who were also trusted below the satisfactory level.




Input 6.A: Respondents' trust towards institutions in charge of P/CVE

²⁴ Strategy on Prevention of the Violent Extremism and Radicalisation leading to terrorism 2015-2020, Launched by Kosovo Security Council, April 2015 http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGY_parandalim_-_ENG.pdf

The low trust towards judiciary and government is predominantly related to the high level of corruption, nepotism, informalities, politicisation of public administration, incapability of the governmental institutions to guarantee social-economic development to citizens, and lack political stability.

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the important role of the judiciary and the government in preventing and combating the phenomenon of violent extremism, the low level of trust does not help the institutional efforts to combat it. Henceforth, rapid improvements in the practices of good governance and combating corruption are crucial in increasing the confidence of citizens to deal with violent extremism.

Speaking of BIK, the trust towards the religious institution resulted being higher than the judiciary and the government. However, it must be pointed out that also this year the trust towards BIK continues with a negative trajectory. As seen in the following graph, in 2013 when KSB for the first time measured the citizens' perceptions towards BIK, around 64 percent of the respondents stated that they trust this institution while only 16 percent stated the opposite. However, due to the developments that occurred during this period of 2013-2016 - that are largely related to the spread of violent extremism in Kosovo - now in 2016 only 46 percent of the respondents stated that they trust BIK, whereas 24 percent stated the opposite.



Input 6.B: Trends of respondents' trust towards the Islamic Community in Kosovo (2013-2016)

Therefore with the comparison to previous years, the current level of trust towards ICK can be considered quite low. This is especially evident considering that historically this institution has had an important role in maintaining national unity through the promotion of religious and ethnic tolerance in Kosovo. However, due to the emergence of violent extremism, the perception of citizens towards this institution has started to shift gradually.

This decreased level of trust in no way can be interpreted as a result of any direct engagement of ICK in the spread of violent extremist narratives. To be more specific, there has never been evidence which could relate imams operating under BIK's jurisdiction to have consciously supported narratives triggering radicalisation of individuals in Kosovo. On the contrary, ICK continues to be considered as promoter of religious tolerance in Kosovo.


However, the main reason why the trust towards ICK seem to have lately decreased is because for some period of time ICK lacked adaptability to provide efficient response against such content and groups who showed much greater skills in using the latest emerging internet technologies to promote their extreme ideology.

Nevertheless, when it comes to this matter it is not only ICK who failed to provide proper response to these radicalised groups: Similar failures were evident also to non-religious state institutions. However, bearing in mind this new hybrid-warfare environment in which the religiously motivated violent extremism is operating, the lack of adaptability shown by all responsible institutions to challenge these groups unavoidably affect the citizens trust towards BIK.

7. INTERACTION BETWEEN MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZENS ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Arguably Kosovo is still far from being considered as a hotbed in spreading religiously motivated violent extremist ideas. Therefore, in Kosovo the problem of spreading violent extremist ideas is mainly considered a social problem rather than as a security threat. As in the case of many other countries, it is undisputable that this phenomenon is likely to emerge as a security threat if it is not treated properly. In practice, this means raising awareness of the phenomenon and its narratives among the citizens.

The CVE strategy particularly focuses on the awareness raising efforts and consultations are particular to the municipal institutions and further, its citizens. Hence, the KSB asked its interviewees whether their respective municipal representatives have invited them to discuss the topic. However, the emerged results were quite concerning: More than 95 percent of the respondents were not aware that such consultations and discussion have ever taken place, while only 5 percent stated that they have been invited to such activities once or more times.



Input 7: Interaction between municipal institutions and citizens on P/CVE

The result showing a very negative trend, the survey wanted to identify respondents' background (geographic area, region, age group, gender and socio-economic status) and if it has affected the invitations.

The results showed that in general the respondents living in the rural areas have been slightly more often consulted than those living in the urban areas. This may be related to the fact that in rural area the sense of community is stronger, and as such,

the sense of the participation may be more present there than it is in the urban area

RURAL

4%

Less than 1 in 20 respondents from rural areas state that were consulted few times

1%

1 in 100 respondents from rural area stated that were consulted only once

URBAN

2%


1 in 50 respondents from rural areas state that were consulted few times

2%

Respondents from rural areas state that were only once consulted


Sub-Indicator 7.1: Rural/Urban perceptions on interaction between municipal institutions and citizens on P/CVE

The paper cross-tabulated this result also based on the administrative region of the respondents. Interestingly, the respondents from the North Mitrovica region followed by those from Prizren and Ferizaj, resulted being more often consulted by their municipal representatives compared to other regions.



Sub-Indicator 7.2: Regional perspectives on interaction between municipal institutions and citizens on P/CVE

Furthermore, the data shows that the men respondents have been more frequently invited for consultation by their municipality authorities to discuss the topic than the women respondents. In addition, persons older than 35 were more often invited in discussion about the topic compared to the younger respondents.



Sub-Indicator 7.3: Gender and age perspective

Data also showed that respondents with an employed status were the most frequently invited in the consultations organised by their respective municipal authorities.

	Employed	Retired	Student	Homemakers	Unemployed
FEW TIMES	6%	2%	2%	3%	2%
ONCE	2%	1%	3%	0%	2%

Sub-Indicator 7.4: Interaction between municipal institutions and citizens on P/CVE: occupational status of the respondents

The same results can be confirmed also when analysing data based on the declared income of the respondents. Those with middle of higher income were more regularly invited by municipal officials in various occasions.

	0-120 Euro	120-250 Euro	250-500 Euro	500-800 Euro	Above 800 Euro
FEW TIMES	3%	3%	6%	2%	25%
ONCE	1%	2%	2%	5%	0%

Sub-Indicator 7.5: Interaction between municipal institutions and citizens on P/CVE: declared income

8. THE CITIZENS' MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Due to the fact that religiously motivated violent extremism has an ideological background, studying the sources of information about it has a crucial role in tackling this phenomenon. Hence, one of the aims of this report is to identify which type of sources the citizens in Kosovo mainly use when it comes to getting information related to violent extremism.


The result show that Kosovan citizens continue to use television as their main source of information when it comes to violent extremism, with more than 3 in 4 respondents stating so. Nevertheless, it came as a surprise that almost 1 in 6 respondents stated that their main information source regarding the topic is the social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and similar. Bearing in mind that social media community in Kosovo has been developed very recently, this result is somewhat alarming as this tool is gradually becoming more and more determining in shaping the opinions of the citizens. Social media was more used even in comparison to internet news portals that resulted being followed only by 7 percent of the respondents. Moreover, newspapers were mentioned only by 2 percent.



Indicator 8: Main sources used by respondents to get information about violent extremism


The geographical, demographical and social-economic aspect of the citizens affect the choice of source of the information. Hence, the nuances of respondents' answers were studied in the following graphs.

Resulting, respondents from rural area were more predisposed to list television as the main source of information than urban ones, while the use social media was equal among both groups of respondents.




Sub-Indicator 8.1: Main sources used by respondents to get informed violent extremism: Rural/urban perspective

Gjakova and Ferizaj region respondent were the ones who seem to use television as their main source of information the most, while North Mitrovica region resulted the least. Online social media is used more frequently as source of information by respondents in Prishtina. Online news portals, friends and newspapers seem to be most frequently used by residents living in the North Mitrovica region.



Sub-Indicator 8.2: Main sources used by respondents to get informed violent extremism: Regional perspective

Ethnically, the results show that the K-Albanian respondents were more predisposed to use social media while K-Serb respondents were more predisposed to learn about the topic from news portals and the community.



Sub-Indicator 8.3: Main sources used by respondents to get informed violent extremism: Ethnic perspective

Similar results emerged in comparing the respondents' religion. Muslim and Catholic respondents showed tendency to get informed through social media while Orthodox respondents were slightly more informed by online news portals and friends.

	Muslim	Orthodox	Catholic	Other
Newspapers	2%	3%	0%	9%
Online news portals	7%	10%	8%	13%
Online social media	18%	9%	20%	9%
Friends	1%	9%	4%	9%
Television	71%	70%	68%	61%

Sub-Indicator 8.4: Main sources used by respondents to get informed violent extremism: Religious perspective

Meantime, there was no major difference in comparing practitioners and non-practitioners of religion. The only evidenced result in this case was that the practitioners resulted using slightly more traditional means of information, being television

	Religious Practitioner	Religion Non-Practitioner
Newspapers	3%	2%
Online news portals	6%	9%
Online social media	17%	18%
Friends	2%	2%
Television	73%	69%

Sub-Indicator 8.5: Main sources used by respondents to get informed about violent extremism: Frequency of practicing the religion

Then again, intersecting results emerged when analysing the data through age groups of the respondents. As expected, respondents 35 of younger use far more social media and online news portals as main source of information compared to the older ones, whereas only 52 percent of them use television as the main means to get informed about the phenomena. Meantime, the gender sub-indicator did not highlight any major difference between male and women respondents. Nevertheless, it is evident that women respondents are a bit more predisposed to use traditional means of information compared to male respondents that may be related to the ongoing discrepancies in emancipation between the two gender groups.

	18-35 Years Old	Above 35 Years Old		Women	Men
	2%	3%	Newspapers	3%	2%
	13%	4%	Online news portals	7%	8%
	32%	9%	Online social media	16%	20%
	1%	2%	Friends	2%	2%
	52%	81%	Television	73%	68%

Sub-Indicator 8.6: Main sources used by respondents to get informed about violent extremism: Age and gender perspective

Finally, the results of this survey analysis emphasised that online social media (36 percent) and online news portals (19 percent) are the main sources of information by students. Likewise, also employed and unemployed respondents were at a certain degree predisposed to use social media as the main information source about the phenomena. Contrary to them, the retired respondents and the homemakers declared that they mainly get informed about it from television.

	Employed	Retired	Student	Homemakers	Unemployed
Newspapers	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%
Online news portals	10%	2%	19%	4%	6%
Online social media	22%	4%	36%	8%	21%
Friends	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%
Television	64%	88%	41%	83%	71%

Sub-Indicator 8.7: Main sources used by respondents to get informed about violent extremism: Occupation perspective

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ANNEX ON METHODOLOGY

This report is primarily based on the data collected through the Kosovo Security Barometer survey conducted in October 2016 by the KCSS field research team. The KSB survey data was collected through face-to-face interviews around Kosovo. Most of the questions were close-ended in the form of five-point Likert scales. Few questions were open-ended allowing respondents the opportunity to provide their opinions without predefined options. The sampling, piloting, and interviewing were conducted by the KCSS team consisted of 27 field researchers. The national sample from which the research was drawn featured 1,093 households, following a representative sample of the population above 18 years old in Kosovo. The ethnic breakdown of the interviewed respondents was as follow: 86.9 percent K-Albanian, 7.0 percent K-Serbian, and 6.1 percent involved other communities (1.4 percent Turks, 0.6 percent Bosnian, 0.9 percent Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (REA) and the rest includes Gorans, Croats, and Montenegrins). The sample frame was based upon telephone code areas, and, as such included the following 7 regions: Ferizaj, Gjakova, Gjilan, Mitrovica, Peja, Prishtina and Prizren. The first stage of geographical clustering was based on the 2011 Kosovo Census Report, while the second stage involved clustering samples by the respective municipal areas with a stratified rural/urban sample as per the number of households. The last stage followed a random sampling method using the nearest 'birthday method'. Random sampling ensures that each resident in Kosovo has an equal probability of being chosen for an interview. Given the sample used for this study, the results of the survey project the mirror image of trends in attitudes and perceptions amongst the entire adult population of Kosovo in general. The margin of error is 3 percent with a confidence interval of 95 percent.

In addition to the use of data collected from KSB survey questionnaires, the report used other sources to interpret the data of this survey, including focus groups, results from previous editions of the survey and desk research. Focus groups were organised with field researchers involved in this survey and their purpose was to underline key experiences and impressions witnessed by them during the field research which could not be evidenced in the survey questionnaire alone. Previous editions of KSB survey were used to identify the trends of citizens' perceptions on specific measures analysed by this report. Desk research sources are mainly used to

provide arguments related to the importance that the measuring of the citizens' perceptions have in prescribing the level of citizens affection from the studied phenomena, compared to alternative quantitative sources that have been widely used before.

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