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CITIZENS PERCEPTIONS ON
NEW THREATS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KOSOVO

FEBRUARY 2019

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Perceptions presented in this report are a summary of information gathered from respondents and it solely demonstrates how people perceive institutions. It is no way a conclusive assessment on the quality of the work of institutions subject to this study. It shall serve as an instrument to them toward addressing potential shortcomings, but also an indicator of the effectiveness of their communication with the people.

The views presented in this report are perceptions of the respondents and do not necessarily represent the views of Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. Opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

CONTENT

ACRONYMS

CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF)
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KSB	Kosovo Security Barometer
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism

INTRODUCTION

Kosovo Security Barometer report on violent extremism 2018 draws attention to the fact that Kosovo citizens still believe that returned foreign fighters are a security concern due to their war skills and their connections with terrorist groups. To understand the impact of the community in the rehabilitation efforts, it is crucial to know their perceptions about violent extremism (VE) since each community has their needs, similarities and differences. More than half of the respondents would not accept former fighters in their community. While, in 2017 respondents were overwhelmingly supportive for the prevention and rehabilitation programs by the Government of Kosovo to counter violent extremism, in 2018 48 percent of respondents, consider that Kosovo institutions should be more focused on prevention programs because the situation is the same and no changes are noticed in this regard.

This report consists of data analysis on perceptions regarding threat of violent extremism and trust towards stakeholders involved in prevention of this phenomena. It is divided in three main sessions: the first focuses on general perceptions about violent extremism and other forms of extremism such as: ethnically motivated violence, political violence and religiously motivated violence; the second outlines the perceptions towards risks and threats of returned fighters, and community willingness to accept former fighters and women/minors; the last session focuses on the perceptions towards stakeholders involved in implementation of the CVE strategy.

KEY FINDINGS

The key findings related to citizens' perception in regards to the threat posed by violent extremism highlighted by this edition of KSB were:

- The report findings shows that, in comparison to previous years, the perceived threat from violent extremism have decreased slightly resulting on 5 percentage points drop.

- In 2018, 70 percent of respondents in 2018 believe that violent extremism is a Kosovo national threat;

- Around half of the respondents agreed that radicalized individuals continue to spread violent extremism;

- 37 percent of respondents consider that Kosovo institutions are addressing the phenomena of violent extremism, while 30 percent of respondents believe that Kosovo institutions should be focused more on this issue;

- In the regional context, the majority of respondents from Gjilan and Ferizaj (40 percent) municipalities consider that Kosovo institutions are more responsible on preventing violent extremism;

- Respondents from Prishtina and Gjakova (30 percent) have low perceptions about the work of Kosovo institutions on fighting violent extremism;

- More than half of respondents would not accept RTFs in their community;

- Women consider returned male individuals as a higher threat compared to men respondents;

- Responders expressed positive attitudes towards women and minors who have returned from the conflict zones.

The key findings identified by this edition of KSB related to citizen's perception related to stakeholders were as following:

- The citizens trust in Civil Society Organizations and Religious institutions resulted in being higher compared to Government, Assembly, Courts, Prosecution and municipalities;

- Citizens have lower trust towards media, which has an important role to play in spreading counter-messages against violent extremism narratives;

- Majority of respondents use private televisions as the main source of information;

- Almost half of the respondents from North Mitrovica use online media platforms to be informed;

- Fifty-seven percent of Muslim practitioners have trust towards Islamic Community while 76 percent of catholic respondents shared trust toward Catholic Church in Kosovo.

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM 2018:
Perceptions on threats posed by ethnic, political and religiously motivated violent extremism

Over the past years VE has been seen as a considerable threat by Kosovo citizens. The results of 2017 shows that 74 percent of respondents considered this phenomenon as a threat. Nevertheless, this year the results show that the percentage of those who considered violent extremism as a threat have slightly dropped. Respectively only 70 percent of those asked considered it as a threat. Only 13 percent of respondents stated that violent extremism is not a threat for the country.

Here it must be pointed out however, that while Kosovo citizens do not undermine the potential threat that VE poses, other results show that they are also aware that this phenomenon is not the highest threat that Kosovo is facing. For instance, respondents mentioned threats such as unemployment, organized crime, political polarization, tensions between Kosovo and Serbia at a much higher frequency.[1] Nevertheless, this report focuses solely on the citizens perception towards violent extremism.

The findings of the KSB show that citizens have different views regarding the threat of violent extremism depending on the source which causes this threat, such as ethnically motivated, politically motivated and religiously motivated violence.

The results showed that 41 percent of respondents considered politically motivated violent extremism a threat, while 30 percent of respondents stated that national/ethnic motivated violent extremism is a threat towards national security, and around 23 percent of respondents stated religious-based violence as a national risk.

A risk 70%

12%
Somehow risk

13%
Not a risk

3%
No opinion

Figure 1 General Perceptions on Violent Extremism 2018

1   Marku, D (2018) "Kosovo Security Barometer 8th Edition" http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/barometri2018-eng2_477654.pdf

Ethnicaly motivated

A Threat

30%

Not a threat **20%**
Somehow **33%**
No opinion **4%**

Politically motivated

A Threat

40%

Not a threat **34%**
Somehow **30%**
No opinion **5%**

Religious motivated

A Threat

23%

Not a threat **46%**
Somehow **24%**
No opinion **5%**

Figure 2 Citizens' Perception on different forms of violent extremism such as: ethnic, political and religious based

This year's result is in line also with previous editions of KSB which continuously listed the religiously motivated violence as a lesser threat compared with other two forms of violent extremism.[2] Such perceptions are mainly based on the overall political developments which have characterized Kosovo over the past years, tense relations between position and oppositions in one hand and political disputes between Kosovo and Serbia on the other, including difficulties to establish institutional control in the K-Serb majority municipalities in the northern part of Kosovo.[3] Nevertheless, the result must not undermine the threat coming from violent extremism especially considering that recently there have already been reporting of the religiously motivated terrorist attempts but which have been successfully prevented by Kosovo Police .[4]

The perception towards the threat posed by ethnical, political and religious point of view have been analyzed also from regional, ethnic, gender perspectives. From regional

2   Kelmendi. V (2017) "Citizens Perceptions and Community Response on returned foreign fighters" http://www.qkss.org/ repository/docs/perceptimet-eng.-(1)_933130.pdf

3   Focus group with field researchers 2018 (Date: 09 November 2018)

4   Newspaper Zeri "Si po pergatitej sulmi terrorist vetvrases kunder ushtareve te Kfori-it ne Kosove", 09 June 2018 Access on: http://zeri.info/kronika/202299/si-po-pergatitej-sulmi-terrorist-vetevrases-kunder-ushtareve-te-kfor-it-ne-kosove/

point of view, respondents from Mitrovica (north) considered all these sources of extremism much more as a threat compare to those from other districts.

Ethnicaly Motivated	Religious Motivated	Politically Motivated
25% Prishtina	16% Prishtina	33% Prishtina
31% Mitrovica	25% Mitrovica	46% Mitrovica
30% Gjilan	29% Gjilan	47% Gjilan
23% Peja	19% Peja	41% Peja
59% Gjakova	36% Gjakova	63% Gjakova
26% Prizren	14% Prizren	38% Prizren
32% Ferizaj	25% Ferizaj	40% Ferizaj
79% North Mitrovica	65% North Mitrovica	65% North Mitrovica

**Figure 3 Citizens' Perception on different forms of violent extremism such as: ethnically, politically and religious motivated**

Gender based public perceptions on forms of violent extremism show that majority of women, or 42 percent of women respondents consider politically motivated violence as the main risk, compared to 41 percent of men respondents. Thirty-two percent of women respondents consider that ethnically motivated violence as risk in comparison with 28 percent of men respondents who held the same views. In general, men and women consider religious motivated violence as a lower risk.

Ethnicaly Motivated

32%   28%

Religious Motivated

23%   21%

Politically Motivated

42%   41%

No opinion

3%   5%

Figure 4 Gender perceptions on forms of violent extremism such as: ethnically, politically and religious motivated

From the ethnic perspective, the results once again showed that K-Serbs respondents were more predisposed to consider ethnically motivated violence as a risk compared to K-Albanians respondents, who consider politically motivated violence as a main risk of violent extremism. However, the margin of difference between K-Albanians and K-Serbs in this case are their perceptions towards religious motivated violence. For instance, 50 percent of K-Albanian respondents see religious motivated violence as a low risk, in comparison with 10 percent of K-Serbs respondents who view religious motivated violence as a low risk for the country.

K-Serbs
Ethnicaly motivated

Risk

63%

Somehow **30%**
Not a Risk **7%**
No opinion **0%**

K-Serbs
Politically motivated

Risk

56%

Somehow **32%**
Not a Risk **10%**
No opinion **1%**

K-Serbs
Religious motivated

Risk

56%

Somehow **25%**
Not a Risk **10%**
No opinion **8%**

K-Albanians
Ethnicaly motivated

Risk

27%

Somehow **30%**
Not a Risk **37%**
No opinion **4%**

K-Albanians
Politically motivated

Risk

20%

Somehow **25%**
Not a Risk **50%**
No opinion **4%**

K-Albanians
Religious motivated

Risk

40%

Somehow **35%**
Not a Risk **20%**
No opinion **4%**

Figure 5 Ethnic perceptions on risks posed by violent extremism such as: ethnically, politically and religiously motivated

1.1 Citizens Perception of Progress Made in Countering and Prevention of the Violent Extremism (C/PVE) in Kosovo

In Kosovo, the problem of violent extremism so far has been tackled mainly with the aim of preventing this phenomenon (PVE). Since the approval of the National CVE Strategy and Action plan, activities have mainly been focused on involvement of the community in raising awareness of violent extremism and developing creative platforms for youth in local level. However, in the past two years Kosovo Government has shifted their agenda from PVE to focusing mainly on returned combats and non-combats from Syria and Iraq. Related to the programs which are focused on rehabilitation of returned FTFs in 2018 the Government of Kosovo has created the division of re-integration of the returned foreign fighters and their family members. This program is set to be implemented with the support of ICITAP on behalf of the Ministry of Interior.[5] Division has started to implement some activities focused on returnees, as well as family members of foreign fighters.

However, in the question: "*If there are still individuals who are continuing to spread violent extremism in Kosovo*" citizens believe that there is evidence that radicalized individuals are still recruiting people from community to support their ideology. For example, 52 percent of respondents agreed that radicalized individuals are influencing others to support terrorist groups, while 20 percent of respondents consider that there are no attempts that radicalized individuals are continuing to spread violent extremism. Only, 21 percent of considered that radicalized individuals are continuing to spread violent extremism in their community to some extent.


Figure 6: Citizens perceptions: "If there are still individuals who are continuing to spread violent extremism in Kosovo"

The KBS 2018 survey has asked respondents also whether they agree that the situation today regarding violent extremism has changed and also whether the measures undertaken by Kosovo institutions have provided positive results. In the first case, 48 percent of respondents believe that the situation related to violent extremism remains the same to previous years, in comparison with 26 of respondents who disagree with this assessment. In the second case, 37 percent of respondents consider that Kosovo institutions are addressing the phenomena of violent extremism, while 30 percent of respondents disagree with this assessment.

5   Newspaper Telegrafi "MPB themelon njesi per deradikalizmin e personave qe jane ne lufterat e huaja" 2018, Access on: https://telegrafi.com/mpb-themelon-njesi-per-deradikalizimin-e-personave-qe-jane-ne-lufterat-e-huaja/

Kosovo institutions are fighting violent extremism

Agree

36%

Somehow **26%**
Disagree **29%**
No opinion **6%**

The situation remains the same nothing has changed

Agree

47%

Somehow **21%**
Disagree **27%**
No opinion **3%**

Figure 7 Citizen perceptions towards the situation on Violent Extremism in Kosovo 2018

The responses are also measured and divided based on a regional level In the graph below it can be seen that respondents from Gjilan and Ferizaj were more predisposed to agree that Kosovo institutions have been focusing on issues related with violent extremism, compared with other regions such Prishtina and Mitrovica where respondents consider that Kosovo Government has not worked much on fighting violent extremism.

Agree
31%
Prishtina

Somehow **27** %
Disagree **34** %
No opinion **6** %

Agree
30%
Gjakova

Somehow **33** %
Disagree **30** %
No opinion **6** %

Agree
37%
Mitrovica

Somehow **22** %
Disagree **33** %
No opinion **6** %

Agree
36%
Prizren

Somehow **27** %
Disagree **27** %
No opinion **8** %

Agree
47%
Gjilan

Somehow **25** %
Disagree **20** %
No opinion **7** %

Agree
40%
Ferizaj

Somehow **28** %
Disagree **26** %
No opinion **4** %

Agree
37%
Peja

Somehow **26** %
Disagree **30** %
No opinion **6** %

Agree
38%
North Mitrovica

Somehow **38** %
Disagree **20** %
No opinion **3** %

Figure 8 Regional Perceptions on Kosovo institutions in fighting Violent Extremism according to National Strategy for Preventing Violent Extremism in Kosovo

On the other hand, the majority of citizens from all the regions believe that the situation regarding the phenomena of violent extremism is the same and little to nothing has improved. Fifty-four percent of respondents from Peja, Mitrovica, Gjilan consider that situation with violent extremism is the same today and nothing has changed in comparison with respondents from Prizren, North Mitrovica, Prishtina and Gjakova who shared same views.


26% Somehow

31% Disagree

7% No opinion

Agree **34**%

Agree **39**%

27% Somehow

28% Disagree

5% No opinion

Figure 10 Gender Perceptions on Kosovo institutions in fighting Violent Extremism according to National Strategy for Preventing Violent Extremism in Kosovo

Agree
46%
Prishtina

Somehow **22** %
Disagree **27** %
No opinion **3** %

Agree
46%
Gjakova

Somehow **24** %
Disagree **22** %
No opinion **6** %

Agree
52%
Mitrovica

Somehow **14** %
Disagree **29** %
No opinion **3** %

Agree
40%
Prizren

Somehow **26** %
Disagree **30** %
No opinion **2** %

Agree
52%
Gjilan

Somehow **22** %
Disagree **24** %
No opinion **1** %

Agree
50%
Ferizaj

Somehow **19** %
Disagree **26** %
No opinion **4** %

Agree
54%
Peja

Somehow **17** %
Disagree **24** %
No opinion **4** %

Agree
44%
North Mitrovica

Somehow **31** %
Disagree **17** %
No opinion **7** %

Figure 9 Situation on violent extremism based on regions of Kosovo

HAVE THE COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS ON RETURNED FOREIGN FIGHTERS CHANGED?

This part of the report addresses these questions and perceptions of (i) *risks from returned former fighters (ii) community willingness to perceive returned male fighters and women and minors in their community*. The data are categorized on gender, zones and regions. The results show that there is a lack of readiness from Kosovo communities to accept returned former fighters and reintegrate them in local level. Statistically, only 65 percent of respondents stated that these individuals represent a risk for the national security, and only 16 percent added any risk posed by the returnees.


Rural   Urban

Risk 65%   **Risk 62%**

Not a risk **14%**   Not a risk **15%**
Less risk **11%**   Less risk **16%**
No opinion **9%**   No opinion **5%**

Figure 12 Citizens perception towards foreign fighters as a security risk divided rural/urban areas

Another interesting insight offered on risks posed by returned foreign fighters is the difference perceptions based on the gender. Majority or 68 percent of women respondents consider that returned former fighters pose a real threat for a national security in comparison to 60 percent of men respondents who share those assessments. Only 20 percent of men respondents stated that returned former fighters do not pose any risk for Kosovo while 12 percent of women respondents held the same views. Consequently, Kosovo institutions must include gender awareness on security issues and strengthening the role of women in formal and informal mechanisms to prevent violent extremism. This is obvious even in the National Strategy for Preventing violent extremism where women are only mentioned once, at the end of the Strategy.[6]

Risk 65%
15% Not a risk
13% Less risk
6% No opinion

Figure 11 Citizens perception towards foreign fighters as a security risk in 2018

6   Strategy on prevention of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism 2015-202 http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGY_parandalim_-_ENG.pdf

Figure 13 Gender Perceptions towards returned FTFs as a security risk

Data based on regions shows that most of the regions consider returned former fighters as main risk for national security. For example, 71 percent of respondents from North Mitrovica believe that these individuals pose a risk for the country, in comparison with respondents from Prizren, Peja and Gjakova which shared same assessments about the returned former fighters.


Figure 14 Citizen Perceptions divided by regions towards returned FTFs as a security risk

2.1 Community Response towards Returned Male Fighters who joined in Syria and Iraq Conflict

The latest report on "**Accounting for the difference: vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in Kosovo**" concluded that effective preventive programs must primary focus on local capacities and building partnerships for PVE and community resilience to violent extremism. In particular, the data presented on this report confirms that it is necessarily to identify the factors that make communities vulnerable or resilient on violent extremism.[7] For this purpose, it is very important to analyze perceptions of Kosovo citizens to understand if they would accept returned former fighters in their community. Such perceptions, help us to understand how institutions, civil society and donor community should be concentrated on local initiatives with communities.

The data collected shows that 53 percent of respondents would not accept returned former fighters in their community while 28 percent of respondents consider that they would accept these individuals under the condition that they are placed on law enforcement oversight. In the other hand, 12 percent of the respondents said that they do not have a problem at all with their presence in their communities According to respondents, male former fighters pose a higher risk since they have been directly on the battleground.


YES **12**%
NO **53**%
Yes, supervision by the state **28**%
No opinion **5**%

Figure 15 Community perceptions accepting FTFs on their neighborhood

KBS data also show that depending on their background communities in Kosovo are more or less hesitant to accept former foreign fighters in community. For this purpose, we analyzed this result also based on the rural urban and regional perspective. The data shows that rural respondents were more hesitant to accept FTFs compare to urban ones.


Rural

YES 9%

Urban

YES 13%

NO **58**%
Yes, supervision by the state **25**%
No opinion **6**%

NO **53**%
Yes, supervision by the state **29**%
No opinion **5**%

Figure 16 Citizens willingness to accept returned male fighters by zones (rural/urban)

7   Jakupi.R & Kraja.G "Accounting for the Difference: Vulnerability and Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kosovo", October 2018,http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/CTR_CaseStudy3_kosovo_ENG_574166.pdf

Most communities in Kosovo have expressed their opinions about male fighters, in most of the regions of Kosovo they stated that they would not accept them in their neighborhood.


Figure 17 Citizens willingness to accept returned male fighters by regions

Perceptions based on gender towards male fighters shows that 57 percent of women respondents would not accept former fighters in their community in comparison with 49 of men respondents who shared same assessment on returned FTFs.


Figure 18 Gender Perceptions to accept returned former fighters in their neighborhood

2.2 Community Response towards Returned Women and Minors who joined in Syria and Iraq Conflict

In addition to FTFs the respondents were asked also if they are willing to accept returned women and minors in their community. The following figure shows that in this case responders have shared more positive attitudes compare to FTF. According to respondents, women and minors have been mostly pushed and threatened by their husband or father to take the decision to join in the area of the conflict. Hence, 36 percent of respondents stated that they would accept returned women and minors in their community while another 28 percent stated that they would accept if they were to supervise by state institutions. Nevertheless, also in this case about 30 percent of respondents stated that they would not accept women and minors in their community, which is a considerably high percentage.

Figure 19 Community perceptions to accept Women and Minors in their neighborhood

YES **36**%
NO **30**%
Yes, supervision by the state **28**%
No opinion **4**%

However, it is very important to measure the perceptions of citizens in relation to the category of returned women and minors from the regional aspect because the community can play an extraordinarily positive role in their rehabilitation programs. Based on the perspectives of Kosovo municipalities, up to 40 percent of respondents stated that they would accept women and minors in their community, compared with 59 percent of respondents who stated that they would not accept male fighters in their community. For instance, Ferizaj (43 percent) and Gjakova (41 percent) were more accepting towards women and minors in comparison to male foreign fighters. According to respondents from Prizren municipality they would not accept male fighters in their community. In most of the regions there were positive perceptions to accept male fighters in their community under the supervision by the state authorities. For example, 30 percent of respondents from North Mitrovica would accept male fighters in their community under the supervision by the state.


YES **36**% Prishtina
NO **32** %
Yes, supervision by the state **27** %
No opinion **5** %

YES **41**% Gjakova
NO **16** %
Yes, supervision by the state **43** %
No opinion **0** %

YES **32**% Mitrovica
NO **36** %
Yes, supervision by the state **26** %
No opinion **5** %

YES **38**% Prizren
NO **32** %
Yes, supervision by the state **28** %
No opinion **1** %

YES **36**% Gjilan
NO **27** %
Yes, supervision by the state **28** %
No opinion **8** %

YES **43**% Ferizaj
NO **26** %
Yes, supervision by the state **27** %
No opinion **3** %

YES **39**% Peja
NO **27** %
Yes, supervision by the state **30** %
No opinion **4** %

YES **13**% North Mitrovica
NO **31** %
Yes, supervision by the state **38** %
No opinion **17** %

Figure 20 Regions perception to accept Women and Minors in their community

The data collected shows that one of the crucial challenges of the reintegration efforts of returned foreign fighters is to raise awareness about the importance and the responsibility of institutions and society to assist in the rehabilitation of the returnees. Statistics show that that most of the women and minors are still in the conflict areas or camps but they want to be back in Kosovo. Moreover, recent research suggests that women and minors play a significant role in carrying forward the ideology and legacy of IS even after the physical fall of so called 'Caliphate'.[8]


30% No
29% Yes, supervision by the state
5% No opinion

YES 34%

33% No
27% Yes, supervision by the state
6% No opinion

YES 33%

Figure 22 Gender Perceptions to accept returned women and minors in their community

Rural

YES 31%

Urban

YES 38%

NO **35%**
Yes, supervision by the state **27%**
No opinion **6%**

NO **28%**
Yes, supervision by the state **28%**
No opinion **4%**

**Figure 21 Citizens perceptions divided on rural/urban areas to accept returned women/minors in community**

8   Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. "From Daesh to 'Diaspora': Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State." International Centre for the Study and Radicalization (ICSR), Department of War Studies, King's College, p.3. 2018. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State.pdf

TRUST TOWARDS THE MAIN STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN PVE PROGRAMS

In this part of the report data on trust towards main stakeholders involved in PVE programs are presented: (*i*) *institutions at central and local level (ii) Civil Society Organizations and Religious Institutions (iii) Media*. Coordination of activities between responsible government institutions, religious communities, community in general, media as well as the cooperation with international partners will enable to address the identified problems related to the radicalization through preventive measures.[9] Therefore, there are specific measures such as capacity building programs, development of a strategic plan for communication, awareness raising community and the aim of increasing the cooperation between central institutions, and municipalities.[10] As specified on the general Edition of KSB 2018 the trust towards central and local governmental institutions as well as judiciary ones have been very low while the trust towards security institutions resulted being much higher. Nevertheless, another stakeholder which plays crucial role especially in the prevention of violent extremism and which have not been highlighted by this aforementioned report are civil society, religious and media organizations.

The result of this edition on KSB shows that the citizens trust towards these institution is higher compared to governmental and judicial institutions however, lower compared to the security ones. Respectively, this year 55 percent of respondents resulted trusting Religious institutions followed by 49 percent of respondents who trusted also CSO's. While with 29 percent, the respondents trust on media resulted significantly lower.


Figure 23 Citizen trust towards Civil Society, Media and Religious Institutions

Majority or up to 50 percent respondents from Mitrovica, Gjakova and Ferizaj have trust towards Civil Society Organizations in Kosovo while respondents from Prishtina and Gjilan who seems to have lower trust compared with these three municipalities. Media perceptions show that respondents from Mitrovica, GJilan and Prizren regions have more trust towards compared to other municipalities such Prishtina, Peja and Gjakova who shared lower trust.

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9   Strategy on prevention of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism 2015-202 http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGY_parandalim_-_ENG.pdf

10   Ibid.

Gjilan and Mitrovica regions respondent were the ones who seems to have more trust towards Religious Institutions compared with other districts. For example, only 34 percent of respondents from North Mitrovica have trust in their religious institutions.


Figure 24 Citizens trust towards Civil Society, Media and Religious Institutions divided by districts

Respondents belonging to Muslim and Catholic religions have more trust towards religious institutions compared with respondents belonging to Orthodox religion. Fifty-seven percent of Muslim practitioners have trust towards Islamic Community, while 76 percent of Catholic respondents shared same trust toward Catholic Church in Kosovo. Meantime, 43 percent of Orthodox practitioners have trust towards Orthodox Church.


Figure 25 Trust towards Religious institutions divided: Muslim practitioners, Catholic practitioners and Orthodox practitioners

To inform themselves on a daily basis, citizens of Kosovo use mainly *Public Television, private televisions, online media, newspapers or status of friends in social media*. The figure below shows that 44 percent of respondents are informed from private televisions of Kosovo, while 22 percent of citizens use public television as a source of information. Only 19 percent of respondents use social media platforms as a source of information.

RTK **22%**

Other/Private TVs **44%**

Newspapers **2%**

Radio **2%**

Online Media **19%**

I got informed from my friends in social media **6%**

No opinion **5%**

Figure 26 Which media citizens' use as the main source of information

Data divided by regions shows that most of respondents get informed from private televisions (KTV, Klan Kosova, 21 and others) while respondents from Ferizaj are informed more from Public Television of Kosovo (RTK). Majority of respondents from North Mitrovica are informed from online media platforms. Such data can serve us as guideline where institutions and donor community should be more focused on empowering media role on CVE, to use as a main tool for narratives of extremist groups in Western Balkan countries.

|	Prishtina	Mitrovica	Gjilani	Peja	Prizreni	Ferizaj	North Mitrovica
RTK	23%	22%	25%	20%	24%	45%	0%
Other TV	46%	47%	39%	41%	52%	27%	31%
Newspapers	1%	1%	3%	2%	0%	9%	6%
Radio	1%	3%	3%	2%	0%	0%	3%
Online media	20%	16%	21%	14%	13%	18%	48%
I got informed from my friends in social media	4%	6%	3%	10%	6%	0%	3%

Figure 27 Which media citizens' use as the main source of information divided by districts

METHODOLOGY
WHAT IS KOSOVO SECURITY BAROMETER?

The Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB) is a special program of the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) which was established in September 2012. Its primary focus is to measure public's trust toward security, justice and central institutions in Kosovo as well as to measures citizens' perception of the internal and external security threats posed to Kosovo. The KSB is the first and the largest undertaking of this kind designed, implemented, and communicated by a local think tank in Kosovo. The KSB's uniqueness in Kosovo is its political neutrality. As an independent think-tank, KCSS has no political constraints in communicating any of the findings and messages of the survey. The KSB is a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods that provides objective and credible results. Its data are collected through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected respondents conducted by KCSS field researchers throughout the entire Kosovo. The KSB questionnaire mostly consisted of closed-ended questions in the form of five point Likert Scale, followed by several open-ended questions that allow respondents to provide their thoughts without predefined options.